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INTRODUCTION
In November 1989, when I obtained my Bachelor’s Degree in law, the
world in general and my country, in particular, were undergoing unex-
pected changes. If the Cold War was coming to an end with the reunifica-
tion of Germany, in Brazil, we were witnessing the first general presiden-
tial elections after a period of forty years, under the auspices of a new,
democratic Constitution. Both situations would have been inconceivable in
the mind of even the most enlightened citizen, just five years earlier, when
I attended my first class at Law School, which consisted of an inaugural
lecture on the role of the State according to Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.
Twenty years later, even greater changes have taken place. Some NATO
and Iron Curtain countries are now joint members in a Union and the US
has its first Afro-American president, who has close ties to his Muslim ori-
gin. In Brazil, a man, who was considered a ‘dangerous’ proletarian candi-
date in 1989, has just ended his second presidential term in an ever weal-
thier country, approved by 80% of the nation’s population. So, what
happened?
I would say that the strong democratic winds that have been sweeping
the world since 1989 have ushered in an unprecedented situation, in which
electoral democracies now constitute the predominant form of government
in the world. They have also given birth to a steady increase in the
people’s participation in public affairs, either at the national or international
levels, through private bodies, the so-called non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs), the object of our study. As we will see, NGOs are new
forms of people’s participation in public affairs, based on the international
legal personality of individuals and the right of people to self-determina-
tion, which has expanded way beyond the de-colonization process of the
last century to encompass the right to democracy.
We are aware that the title of our essay – NGOs: Legitimate Subjects of
International Law – may be regarded by some scholars as rather open to
debate. After all, there is no conclusive definition of an NGO; legitimacy
can be appraised from several different perspectives; some authors suggest
that the subject/object dichotomy must be abandoned, and; finally, that in-
ternational law is not a legal system at all. However, needless to say, criti-
cism is not only necessary for the development of knowledge but also a
key element in scientific inquiries. In the field of Law, many theories or
theoretical approaches have been striving to explain international law and
almost all of them ‘seem to be better and more productive in criticizing
rival approaches than contributing to the explanation of the reality of inter-
national law’.1
But, after all, what is reality?
One could say that reality is a singular historical fact. Given that men
are not omnipresent, one may have the chance of observing it or not. Here,
however, the first problem arises: Does reality exist only when we see it?
We would be inclined to answer no, for if we thought so, no ‘explanation
of the reality of international law’ could be given, because a lot of ‘facts’
would not be taken into account in our answer (for example, a rebellion in
a distant land). Hence, it appears that answering that question necessarily
implies in performing the task taking into consideration what we have
observed. At this point, a second problem emerges: depending on our
standpoint, one sees different characteristics of a given fact, which is ex-
actly what happens when one observes, say, a man: from the front, one
sees his beard and does not know that he is hurt; from the back, other sees
some wounds but does not know that he is bearded. One person saw a
bearded man, the other saw a wounded one. So, one’s perception of the
facts is highly influenced by the place one occupies at the moment of
observation. But reality is not only affected by the ‘objective’ features of a
standpoint, but also by its ‘subjective’ features. For the authorities dealing
with the rebels, the bearded man was a criminal; for his followers, he was
the leader that they had been expecting. The observation of reality is also
affected by the ‘context’ (a people oppressed by a foreign ruler saw the
bearded man as a leader capable of freeing them) and the ‘values’: for the
authorities, he was an ordinary man; for his followers, he was the son of
God. If we had been living in that distant year, as a Roman consul, we
would have recorded an ordinary trial, as a disciple, we would have written
a gospel; however, none of us would have been able to foresee that the
teachings of that man would change the foundation of the legal system of
the world forever.
So, if we endeavor to conduct research on the role of NGOs in interna-
tional law aiming to contribute to the development of this field of legal
science, we must necessarily assume that our study and, consequently, our
findings, will be influenced by the facts that we have seen - from a given
‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ standpoint - in a given context, interpreted
according to our values. In our quest, we will be neither a consul nor a dis-
ciple; however, we will interpret the facts and the context with the eyes of
someone who values pluralistic democracy.
Legitimacy is the subjacent idea that has permeated our research. It is a
question that has been discussed intensively by scholars with several stand-
points and values, in different contexts. International law’s legitimacy, for
example, can be appraised from different standpoints: some scholars
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support that international law lacks legitimacy because one should see it
from the perspective of national law and national interests, while others,
diametrically opposed, support that legitimacy must be enhanced through
the reshaping of international structures to allow the exercise of parliamen-
tary and executive functions capable of coping with the global challenges.
In intermediate positions, supporting less polarized stances, a third school
advocates strengthening the presence of national parliamentarians in the in-
ternational sphere, currently concentrated in the hands of the Executive,
while a fourth supports qualified norm-making.2 NGOs’ legitimacy, in turn,
can be studied from a political science standpoint, appraising its representa-
tiveness of civil society vis-à-vis the State; adopting an international rela-
tions perspective, one can appraise its power as an actor of the interna-
tional sphere and; from a legal perspective, the one that we have chosen,
its accommodation in a rational-legal model that recognizes rights and
duties under international law. Finally, the legitimacy of individuals in in-
ternational law can be appraised based on the theories of creation of States
and the emergence of human rights, moreover after World War II and the
massacres perpetrated by totalitarian States against their own people.
One can acknowledge two senses for legitimacy: au sens large, c’est la
qualité de conformité au critère normatif qui fixe les paramètres de valori-
sation de l’object qu’il règle et par rapport auquel on prédit ou non la
legitimité; au sens strict, cést la qualité qui, attribuée à un ordre juridico-
politique suppose sa ‘reconnaisance’ comme domination, el la reconnais-
sance de sa capacité à dicter des ordres auxquels on doit obéir.’3
From a strictly legal perspective, the core idea of legitimacy has been
historically centered in the figure of the State and in justification of author-
ity, the capacity to establish binding rules that will be obeyed or make deci-
sions bind. A given authority may be deemed legitimated if it has been em-
powered according to the consent of those who will be bound by its acts;
its acts will be legitimated if taken according to determined fair procedures
and both will have legitimacy if the outcome is deemed acceptable by
those who will obey, compared to what they regard as right and just. It fol-
lows that ‘without the clarification of what is to be understood by the right-
ness and justice of law, legitimacy cannot be comprehended either’.4
The basis for the ex-ante analysis of legitimacy is the principle of con-
sent, the idea that more powerfully represents the source of value for indi-
viduals.5 In the contemporary world, for example, the principle of self-
determination has changed from its original pro-independence core into a
specific kind of dependence – the dependence of governments on the will
of the population,6 following that the consent of people has been raised to
a strengthened level in international law. The basis for the ex-vi procedural
analysis must necessarily appraise its conformity with fair procedure, fol-
lowing that the decision-making process indeed matters, and, finally, the
ex-post analysis will depend on whether the constituencies are capable of
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maintaining the authority accountable for its acts and decisions according
to previously known needs and aspirations, a task that necessarily implies
in transparency.
If the justification of the authority of intergovernmental organizations re-
quires such three-step analysis and one assume that the States’ representa-
tives before those bodies were not elected by their people, a situation also
observed in the international bureaucracy, the apparent obvious conclusion
is that intergovernmental organization lack legitimacy in regard to the ‘peo-
ples of the United Nations’. We have found, however, that pluralism is ad-
mitted by the UN Charter not only between States, but also beyond States,
because the Charter acknowledged that individuals could interact with the
United Nations not only through governmental organizations but also
through non-governmental organizations. Hence, the participation of indi-
viduals is critical to enhance the legitimacy of intergovernmental organiza-
tions, a network of bureaucratic bodies that has been growing incessantly
since 1945, which, according to D’Amato, ‘the more that international in-
stitutions prosper and grow, the closer we may be getting to a coalition of
those institutions that proclaims itself the government of the world [hence,
being necessary] to keep a vigilant eye upon the practice of “lawful” inter-
national institutions [because] if they turn out to stifle individual freedoms
and abolish human rights, there will be no counterforce to overturn the
government and reclaim those rights and freedoms’.7
NGOs, widespread democracy, and closely knit economic interdepen-
dency have been affecting the traditional concept of the sovereignty of
States, moreover the legitimacy of undemocratic ones, and, consequently,
international law. While NGOs’ power is not absolute, it has become sig-
nificant and is still growing8 and this fact definitively cannot go unnoticed.
However, such actors have never been legally defined nor has legal doc-
trine reached any conclusive concept regarding them. For that reason, we
have decided to begin our appraisal by showing the importance of these
entities in the contemporary world and, after addressing their main charac-
teristics, by proposing a comprehensive, though focused, definition, a task
carried out in the Preliminary Chapter.
NGOs, being a phenomenon of the 20th century, could not be considered
in the formulation of the traditional theories of international law that
regarded the States as the only legitimate channel of expression of the col-
lective will of people in the international realm. Nevertheless, States and
NGOs have several things in common. If they share similar ancient roots
deeply embedded in contractarianism, they also have the common goal of
ensuring the well-being of the people and, for that reason, they are con-
stantly bombarded with criticism regarding a lack of transparency as well
as questions as to their accountability. In order to determine the role of
NGOs in the international sphere, we began our quest analyzing, in
Chapter 1, the sources of legitimacy in international law, with a particular
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emphasis on Natural Law and the rights of individuals in their relations
with the sovereign States.
Some authors suggest that since 1945, the world has been living a neo-
Grotian era in so far as the principles of solidarity have been invigorated.9
Not coincidently, this is the same period in which we observed the appear-
ance of NGOs, which experienced a particularly explosive growth after the
adoption of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (1966)
and the end of the Cold War (1991), both pivotal moments for civil
society at large. A proper appraisal of the role of NGOs in the recent so-
called era of solidarity in international relations must necessarily pass
through the sources of international law and, for that purpose, the forth-
coming chapters dealt with NGOs under each of them, which, according to
authoritative legal doctrine, were listed in article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
In Chapter 2 we will observe that the expression ‘non-governmental
organizations’ was coined by the UN Charter, which, by establishing con-
sultative procedures with NGOs, assumed that the public sphere was larger
than the governmental one and that not only States had legitimacy to be
heard in matters affecting the needs and aspirations of citizens. This hard
law recognition of the importance of NGOs was followed by several simi-
lar provisions in the constitutive acts of intergovernmental organizations,
both at the universal or regional levels, UN programmes and funds, as well
as in other innumerous soft law instruments of interaction between govern-
mental bodies and NGOs. It is quite relevant to observe that the relation-
ship between traditional subjects of international law and NGOs has gone
beyond consultations to encompass close working relationships, especially
in the fields of human rights, humanitarian law and environmental protec-
tion. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), for example,
has rights under the Geneva Conventions and is widely recognized as pos-
sessing international legal personality, having even entered into a
Headquarter agreement with Switzerland, despite being an association with
no more than twenty-five members, all of whom are individuals. Another
organization, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
(IUCN), acts as substantive secretariat of a relevant environmental conven-
tion and has materially drafted some others. Of course, all this evidence
shows that NGOs are legitimate players in the international sphere.
In the following chapter, we will appraise the place of NGOs in judicial
and quasi-judicial bodies’ decisions. The capacity to bring claims before
international courts is traditionally recognized as one of the characteristics
of international legal personality. Our research has shown a peculiar and
non-uniform situation for NGOs that either fulfils or not the criteria. NGOs
do not have locus standi before the ICJ, even though they managed to con-
vince the UN General Assembly to request a historic advisory opinion on
the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which ended in an unexpected
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non liquet, subverting the so-called completeness of the sources of interna-
tional law enshrined in article 38 of the Court’s Statute. At the European
level, we will see that they cannot stand as parties before the Court of
Justice of the European Union to defend shared and common rights – inas-
much performing the expected role of NGOs – but only their own personal
rights. However, this awkward situation has not hindered, for instance, the
judicial suspension of the application of an EC Council regulation sup-
ported in a UN Security Council resolution, in a marked victory of peo-
ple’s fundamental rights over State’s covenants. From the Human Rights
perspective, NGOs can stand as victims in the European specialized court
but cannot represent a third party; in America, differently, they can repre-
sent a victim, but only at the Commission, having no access to the Court.
If the situation is non-uniform when NGOs act in their own cases, it is far
more complex when they try to act in third parties’ cases, presenting ami-
cus briefs, either in judicial or quasi-judicial bodies, a practice which is
widely accepted in some bodies and rejected in others, being either ac-
claimed or contested by parties to the cases concerned.
But, if treaties and judicial decisions provide material evidence that
allows for a greater understanding of the roles assigned to NGOs in inter-
national law, customary law has not provided such clarity. In our research,
we have not found any former systematic study of customary state practice
in regard to NGOs. For that reason, in Chapter 4, the appraisal of the fun-
damental elements (consuetudo and opinion juris vel necessitatis) required
to create an international customary law called for a comprehensive analy-
sis of the criteria adopted by the ICJ to recognize a state practice accepted
as law according to a reputed methodology, a task that we have endeavored
to accomplish with the help of Herman Meijers’ concept of ‘stages of
growth’. The outcome was capable of evidencing that NGOs have
achieved certain rights under international customary law, supported in
constant, extensive and virtually uniform settled practice accepted as law
by those parties whose interests are specially affected, without persistent
objection.
The study of NGOs under the general principles of law required a broad-
er approach, in which we addressed the germination of our legal thought
from the seeds of Natural Law, the juridical conscience of humankind
reflected in the principles common to the major contemporary legal sys-
tems that would further legitimize the existence of jus cogens. Given the
physical and language restrictions imposed on conducting a direct survey
in each of the systems, we decided, relying on article 9 of the Statute of
the ICJ, to start Chapter 5 appraising the jurisprudence of the Court that, as
a whole, represents the main forms of civilizations and of the principal le-
gal systems of the world. The study has shown that the Court has progres-
sively expanded the recognition of humanitarian principles and peoples’
rights under international law. In a second approach, we focused on general
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principles of law related to society at large that have flourished more re-
cently, such as those concerning environmental protection and civil and po-
litical participation, specifically the principle of self-determination, which
has particularly experienced a broadening that has gone far beyond the nar-
row limits of de-colonization to become a truly continuous process of parti-
cipation in public affairs that currently can be interpreted as the right to
democracy. Decision-making process, hence, indeed matters.
The appraisal of the legal status of NGOs in the teachings of the most
qualified publicists of the various nations presented an even greater diffi-
culty, for, as we have pointed out, NGOs are a recent phenomenon, there-
fore they did not receive the attention of founding fathers of international
legal theory nor even that of those who lived more recently, such as
Anzilotti, Brierly, Brownlie, De Visscher, Lauterpacht, Scelle and
Schwarzenberger, just to mention a few. Notwithstanding, given that our
study possessed a focus on the status of NGOs in international law, we
deemed it appropriate to concentrate in Chapter 6 on the analysis of the
concept of subject of law or international legal personality, putting particu-
lar emphasis on the situation of the individual, who often operates interna-
tionally through NGOs, which, hence, would have a legitimated derived,
functional and relative legal capacity stemming from the international legal
personality of the individual, similarly to the one observed in the inter-
governmental organizations in regard to their member-states. This chapter
ends with an evaluation of the role of the individual and non-state actors in
the work of organized law doctrine bodies, such as the International Law
Commission, the International Law Association and the Institut de Droit
International, the latter two, themselves, NGOs.
In Chapter 7, we resumed the ideas of the origins of the State, discussed
in the beginning of our study, to evaluate to what extent the social contract
metaphor is still valid in an era that has witnessed the debacle of strong
states and the creation of new ones out of the decolonization perspective
and from an overwhelmingly democratic context. Our study has shown that
the relationship between international legal personality of individuals and
the principle of self-determination, together with the right to participate in
public affairs, directly or not, ensured by treaty law, have provided people
with the necessary democratic entitlement to act in the international realm
through NGOs. However, if democracy provides the contractual arrange-
ment framework for the participation of people in public affairs through
periodic elections, it is currently not capable of ensuring the same partici-
pation in the operator of the social contract, the Weberian bureaucracy that
controls the State and the intergovernmental organizations and has replaced
parliament as the main norm-creator. For that reason, having in mind
Thomas Franck’s ideas on Democratic Governance, we proposed adding a
fourth building block to his model, through mechanisms of civil participa-
tion to hold bureaucracy accountable for its acts and decisions.
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Chapter 8 expands on the topic discussed in the previous chapter, shift-
ing the focus to the broad range of existing intergovernmental organiza-
tions (IGOs), which play a twofold role, both providing bureaucratic staff
to accomplish their goals as well as acting as a locus for dialogue between
the relevant actors in international law. Given that IGO officials are not
elected nor do IGOs possess a parliament-like body composed of people
elected by their own nations, they greatly lack democratic legitimacy, a
handicap that must be compensated for by higher levels of compliance to
objectives, transparency, ends-oriented accountability and democratic gov-
ernance with different forms of interaction with civil society. The similari-
ties between IGOs and NGOs (both instituted by agreements to pursue a
specific aim without territorial boundaries with the help of a skilled staff)
provide the needed conditions for adding the fourth building block to
Franck’s model, though be it at the international level.
In the Conclusion, we support that the Charter, aligned with the respect
of human rights of individuals and the right to self-determination of collec-
tivities of individuals (the nations) recognized that that right could be exer-
cised at the UN, but making concessions to rationality and effectiveness,
established that this would be done through a new kind of organization es-
tablished by the individuals, coining, for the first time in a legal document,
the expression ‘non-governmental organization’. When individuals were to
act in a broader collective perspective, i.e., as a nation, they would do so
through governmental organizations (the States); when they were to act in
another form, they would do so through non-governmental organizations.
Pluralism may also be acknowledged from a universal perspective: since
nations (and States) are deeply enrooted in their own cultural background,
therefore lacking (inter)nationality, the United Nations, having universal
aims, had to welcome a different perspective of interaction with individuals
from several countries, for which the international NGOs appeared to be a
reasonable and legitimate solution.
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PRELIMINARY CHAPTER
1 The increasing role of NGOs in the contemporary world
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the bipolar political struc-
ture shaped by the Cold War, the States’ concerns shifted from deterrence
to cooperation. This move is noticeable not only in the rise of collective
actions addressing a converging agenda, such as free trade and environ-
mental protection, but also at the UN, with the 1990s decade of multilateral
conferences and the unprecedented search for consensus at the General
Assembly.1
From a citizen’s perspective, the facility to move throughout the world
and the real time interactions with other people provided by technology,
together with the apparent reduction in the risk of another World War, have
reduced the appeal of nationalism, which has become old-fashioned, if
compared to other forms of group identification.2 Massive individual mi-
gration as well as the integration of the States in blocks has also contributed
to the decline of nationalism. If it is a truism that the traditional conception
of nation is slowly vanishing, it is also true that it is giving space to a dif-
ferent kind of relationship between individuals; another form of citizenship
shaped by shared issues of a global range, facilitated by the immediate con-
tact provided by small devices carried in our pockets: global agendas.
The globalization of economic activity, together with the transnational
information flow has led to the establishment of a so-called global civil
society, which has been defined as the ‘sphere of ideas, values, institutions,
organizations, networks, and individuals located between the family, the
State, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national socie-
ties, policies and economies.’3 One could say that this conception repro-
duces at the international level, the same model of social space observed
within the confines of States.
If there is a certain general agreement that the expression ‘global civil
society’ refers to a response to rising concerns about the need for a new so-
cial, economic, and political deal at the global level - a new governance
model – there is no further consensus as to how this response should be.4
In a certain way, the emergence of international intergovernmental organi-
zations (IGOs) has tried to respond to this challenge. But these institutions
and their founding members, the States, incurred in the same mistake
observed in national level, when they tried to monopolize the public
sphere.5 If social movements and similar organizations are recognized as
legitimate voices of plural civil society and relevant players in democratic
regimes at the national level, effectively helping to guide the country along
a new path, they can perform accordingly at the international level, where
transnational networks play an important role in transforming certain issues
in politics and, subsequently, in international law, through the adoption of
multilateral conventions on the subject.
We are not postulating that it is an easy task, nor are we assuming that
States have a true willingness to accept newcomers to their post-
Westphalian territory. But we do affirm that the ‘states-only’ club has
eroded, and that we cannot regard an international system effective if it has
divided the world as if into a puzzle, where each State is one piece and the
only thing that matters. Individuals must have their natural right to an
active voice in the decision-making process recognized in issues that go
far beyond the national (own) interests of their representatives, the States,
and that will shape global governance.
It is a truism that the international sphere is a fragmented and conten-
tious arena, where States and IGOs, albeit aiming to cooperate, struggle to
defend their own interests, often supported in claims of the needs of civil
society, which, in turn, is trying to emerge and to be legitimized by those
same institutions that purportedly represent it.6 During the 20th century, we
have witnessed the consolidation of a new form of expression of the voice
of civil society at large that wants to join the arena. These self-proclaimed
spokesmen or, sometimes, attorneys-at-law, have placed themselves to-
gether with traditional institutions that represent the interests of citizens,
such as the election of the heads of government and parliament in demo-
cratic regimes, and brought to light a new model in the organization of in-
dividuals bound together by common goals in public interest themes,
usually of a universal nature: They are the non-governmental organizations
(NGOs).
NGOs cannot be regarded as being equal to civil society,7 yet they are
relevant non-state actors in the contemporary world that have demonstrated
a great capacity in gathering collaborators8 and financial supporters, being
actively involved in the shaping of public policies, whether at a local,
national or international level, addressing a broad range of issues, some-
times as supporters but also - and more often - as critics.9 The examples
are outstanding: from the long-serving International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) to the young and provocative Greenpeace and Oxfam, they
are continuously extending their range of action. Currently, no longer oper-
ating solely towards famine and disaster relief, but also in social and eco-
nomic development, advocacy, agenda setting and monitoring international
agreements, NGOs perform a significant role in various sectors of interna-
tional relations and, most relevantly, they are key players whilst dealing
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with the international public opinion in matters such as human rights,
environment, peace and disarmament. They undoubtedly influence State
decisions. The importance of some of their contributions for the creation of
new international law has been compared with that of the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists in the sense of Art 38(1) (d) of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).10 NGO activities, in some cases,
have reached global proportions and extraordinary persuasive power and,
in some instances, even regulatory power.11
At the international level, we have witnessed an increasing participation
of NGOs in global issues which led, for example, to awarding five Nobel
Peace Prizes to such entities in the last 25 years, three of which just in the
last 15 years.12
The Union of International Associations (UIA) database informs that the
number of international NGOs (INGOs) has been growing steadily, rising
from 832 entities of all types in 1951, to 952 in 1978, 20,635 in 1985 and
51,509 in 2006.13 The same phenomenon can be observed in the United
Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) database of INGOs with
consultative status in the Council, where the number of accredited organi-
zations has risen from 40 in 1948 to 180 in 1968, 724 in 1992 and 3,536
in 2012.14 These figures represent only those organizations that have sub-
mitted their database to the UIA or applied for ECOSOC consultative
status and, hence, despite being the best sources available, surely do not
comprise all NGOs operating at an international level.
The role and presence of non-state actors in the UN system have also
risen considerably over the last thirty years, with a spectacular participation
in the cycle of major conferences. 2,400 NGOs participated in the UN
Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in
1992 (The Earth Summit), a number that reached 4,993 civil society repre-
sentatives accredited to the UN Conference on Climate Change, in Bali
(2007). It is estimated that 30,000 people participated in the NGOs forums
that occurred together with the Fourth World Conference on Women
(Beijing 1995)15 and that 35,000 attended the 2002 Johannesburg World
Summit on Sustainable Development side events, surpassing by far the dip-
lomatic corps at those events. The presence of NGOs is perceived not only
in the surroundings of the conference venues but also inside the meeting
rooms, seeing as they were responsible for presenting fifty-two statements
at the 1995 Beijing Conference,16 had a remarkable influence in the agenda
and the declaration of the 2002 Johannesburg Summit, and are often speak-
ing at the UN Human Rights Council, the General Assembly (UNGA) and
its committees and even at the Security Council (UNSC).
Their presence is relevant at the UN program level too, where they per-
form valuable work that the agencies are not able to undertake or, at least,
to undertake directly.17 One-third of the UNFPA and UNICEF funds are
disbursed through NGOs, which also amass 21% of UNHCR’s budget and
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are present in 72% of the projects financed by the World Bank.18
According to a 1988 UN Secretary General report, NGOs collectively con-
stitute the second largest source of development assistance in terms of net
transfer.19
At a first glance, the NGO phenomenon may appear to be a new trend
because, as we have seen, the number of NGOs has increased significantly
in recent years, outnumbering tenfold the number of intergovernmental
organizations, often having similar or identical goals.20 From one perspec-
tive, this is not true, seeing as nonprofit and charitable organizations have
existed and operated throughout the world since immemorial times, being
based upon religious beliefs, solidarity, mutuality or altruism. The first
known NGO-like international private organization was the Anti-Slavery
and Aborigines Protection Society, established in 1837 in England, whose
activity contributed positively to the enactment of the World Anti-Slavery
convention of 1840.21 Up until World War I, most of the organizations had
pursued idealistic or scientific purposes and while several of the organiza-
tions created in the 19th century are still alive today,22 the most famous one
is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a legal entity
created in 1863 as a Swiss association with no room for more than twenty-
five members, all Swiss citizens.23 Its tiny membership, however, does not
detract from its international importance, confirmed by its status in the
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949),24
its three Nobel Peace Prizes (1917, 1944 and 1963) and, quite relevantly, its
budget (provided mainly by governments), which totaled E 664.7 million
(CHF 1,049.2 million) in 2006 destined towards providing food to more
than 2.5 million people and emergency supplies to more than 4 million
people, among other activities.
The last three decades have shown an accelerated growth rate, whether
in scope or scale, to such an extent that some authors have affirmed that
we are in the midst of a ‘global association revolution’ that may perma-
nently alter the relationship between States and citizens, impacting far be-
yond the limits of the material services provided.25
Taking Amnesty International - another Nobel Peace Prize laureate - as
an example, we can see that its roots in civil society run deep, represented
by more than 2.2 million voluntary members and subscribers in more than
150 countries who donated E 46.2 million in 2009/2010 to support the
organization’s activities.26 A similar situation can be observed in another
global organization, Greenpeace International, which has approximately
2.9 million supporters around the world who donated E 196 million to the
organization in 2009.27
Both entities have more than 5 million supporters in local branches, most
of whom are volunteers and participants in the organization’s daily life, and
have obtained resources equivalent to their counterparts in the UN system
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(The OHCHR28 gathered voluntary contributions of USD 95.7 million in
2007 and UNEP29 obtained USD 89 million in 2008).
Unequivocally, another relevant aspect of the operation of NGOs in
recent years has been the outstanding volume of financial resources that
they have invested internationally in public interest efforts, several times
greater than the sums provided by governmental and intergovernmental
international aid. In the fiscal year 2009/2010, the American National Red
Cross had operational revenues of USD 3.60 billion and expenditures of
USD 3.37 billion with program services.30 In the same period, another US-
based humanitarian relief organization, Americares, obtained USD 801
million in support and revenues, which enabled an expenditure of USD
850 million that same year to assist people in need of relief in 97 coun-
tries.31 Sound financial standing is not only to be seen in humanitarian or-
ganizations, as can be observed in the Nature Conservancy 2010 annual re-
port, which shows USD 990 million in revenues, an expenditure of USD
719 million in programs and USD 4.9 billion in net assets’.32
2 The (lack of ) definition of NGOs in international
documents
Global activities, political influence at national, regional and international
levels, worldwide networks of supporters and financial soundness have
granted NGOs a striking presence in the contemporary world. But, what
are they?
The UN Charter was the first international instrument to adopt the ex-
pression “non-governmental organization”. Its article 71 prescribes that
‘The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements
for consultation with non-governmental organizations which are
concerned with matters within its competence. Such arrangements
may be made with international organizations and, where appropri-
ate, with national organizations after consultation with the Member
of the United Nations concerned’.
Before the creation of the UN, during the existence of the League of
Nations, legal reference was made solely to national Red Cross organiza-
tions and NGOs were referred to as “private institutions”, while many of the
entities gathered under the auspices of the UIA called themselves interna-
tional institutes, international unions or simply international organizations.33
According to Willetts, ‘the first draft of the UN Charter did not make
any mention of maintaining cooperation with private bodies. A variety of
groups, mainly but not solely from the USA, lobbied to rectify it at the
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San Francisco Conference, which established the UN in 1945.’34 The draft-
ing was, thus, the subject of considerable dispute.35
Despite being successful in achieving a certain level of participation in
the major association of nation-states, NGOs remained technically unde-
fined. Consultative status has provided NGOs with a recognized standing
and entitled them to certain limited rights and privileges within the UN
system. Nevertheless, this situation, from our point of view, has retarded
the evolution of their legal status, especially if we bear in mind that the
discussions about the crucial character of the definition of NGOs began
with the UN Charter and that the several attempts made throughout the
20th century to clarify their legal status have proven unsuccessful, as we
shall see hereinafter.
The lack of definition does not comprise only NGOs, these peaceful
non-state actors, but also extends to their disturbed counterparts, the terror-
ist groups, similarly composed of individuals aiming a ‘new’ world order.
Under the perspective of the latter, as Becker pointed out, if such non-state
(terrorist) actors can operate as subjects of international law in the interna-
tional plane, then they should be viewed as capable of operating together
with States36 with severe implications to the notion of State responsibility
and also in the conception of international legal personality.
NGOs share relevant common features that have justified positioning
them as an identifiable third “social sector” that merges the public purposes
of the State (the first sector) with the private identity of institutions of the
market (the second).37 Notwithstanding having such an ostensive presence
in life nowadays, NGOs do not have a commonly agreed upon definition,
whether among scholars or common citizens.38
The reasons for this lack of consensus are, from our point of view, the
non-existence of a precise definition in international conventions and the
different formal requirements, duties and benefits governing them in each
national legal system, which have led to different approaches and perspec-
tives in the international arena.
An aspect noticed is that NGOs have commonly been referred to as the
denial of the organizational models already in existence: they operate in
the public sphere, but are not government, and they are private entities but
do not aim profits. NGOs, also by their name, differ from the intergovern-
mental organizations created by the nation-states. These fundamental fea-
tures must be explored in more detail.
3. Conceptual framework of NGOs
3.1 Independence from States
Unequivocally, an NGO must be an organization independent from the di-
rect or indirect control of any government or intergovernmental body in
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order to ensure its private character. The four ECOSOC regulations on the
consultative status of INGOs (1946, 1950, 1968 and 1996) shed an evolu-
tionary light on the subject, attempting to reach an ideal concept which un-
fortunately remains unachieved.
The first initiative was the report of the Committee on Arrangements for
Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations adopted by ECOSOC
Res. 2/3 (21 June 1946).39 This report established the Council NGO
Committee, making it responsible for reviewing the applications for con-
sultative status submitted by NGOs, for making recommendations to the
ECOSOC, and for setting certain rules for the accreditation and consulta-
tive procedure.
The rules were revised by ECOSOC Res. 288 B (X) (27 February
1950), which considered that ‘any international organization which is not
established by inter-governmental agreement shall be considered as a non-
governmental organization.’40 The third regulation was brought to light by
ECOSOC Res. 1296 (XLIV) (23 May 1968).41 It kept the main concept of
private incorporation but, probably making concessions to the Cold War
realpolitik, accepted that those ‘organizations could accept members desig-
nated by governmental authorities, provided that such membership did not
interfere with the free expression of views of the organization.’42 We con-
sider this to have been a bad move, since history has shown it to be quite
difficult for civil society leaders and organizations to hold out against
strong government pressure. Most of all, such a concession brought a cer-
tain legitimacy to the creation of government-related non-governmental or-
ganizations (GRINGOS in UN parlance) which currently, together with the
business-oriented NGOs (the BINGOS) or religious organizations
(RINGOS), epitomizing an important and growing global trend that threa-
tens civil society’s representative system and warrants greater scrutiny.
The current regulation introduced by ECOSOC Res. 1996/31 (25 July
1996) refined the concept again, adding that no organization that has been
‘established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement’
should be considered an NGO, maintaining recognition to those organiza-
tions that accept members designated by governmental authorities pro-
vided, it must be stressed, that ‘such membership does not interfere with
the free expression of views of the organization’. The municipal law of
some countries has adopted equivalent criteria to grant public interest sta-
tus to NGOs.43
Private status and independence from governmental bodies have not
only been stressed in political expression but also from a financial perspec-
tive.44 The 1946 and 1950 regulations made no reference to the financial
support of the accredited INGOs, which first appeared in the 1968 regula-
tion, which has remained unaltered in its current rules. Res. 1996/31 pre-
scribes that ‘the basic resource of the organization shall be derived in the
main part from contributions of the national affiliates or other components
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or from individual members.’ However, assuming that some organizations
obtain funding from governmental and international agencies, the rule es-
tablishes (para. 13) that ‘any financial contribution or other support, direct
or indirect, from a Government to the organization shall be openly declared
to the ECOSOC Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations through
the Secretary-General and fully recorded in the financial and other records
of the organization and shall be devoted to purposes in accordance with
the aims of the United Nations.’
3.2 Legal personality
It is important to debate to what extent the concept set forth in article 71
of the UN Charter refers only to formal, legal entities incorporated under
the municipal law of any member-state or if it provides an opportunity for
NGOs to be created under international law.
As we may note, the aforementioned article 71 addresses arrangements
for consultation with non-governmental organizations which may be made
with international organizations and, where appropriate, with national or-
ganizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations
concerned.
The adoption of the term ‘organization’ instead of, for example, ‘move-
ment’, ‘civil society’ or ‘non-state actor’, in our point of view, undeniably
leads to the understanding that it makes reference to a legal entity formally
created.45 The legal incorporation can also be inferred throughout the sev-
eral subsequent regulations of the accreditation of consultative status when
references are made to the existence of established headquarters with an
executive officer, the representativeness of members, voting rights, a demo-
cratically adopted constitution, and the formation of joint committees
among national organizations.
Another key aspect to be regarded is the law regulating the incorporation
of the organization. If the UN Charter assumed that all non-governmental
organizations had to be incorporated according to the municipal law of any
member-state, then the international organizations mentioned in article 71
would not exist, hence making any differentiation between international
and national organizations in the article irrelevant. Furthermore, if the re-
ferred consultation with a UN member-state concerned the territorial range
of activities of the INGO, then, assuming that international organizations
must operate in several countries to be ‘international’, all arrangements for
consultation with INGOs should be previously submitted to any and all
member-states involved, which, in some issues such as global warming or
poverty relief, should lead to consultation with all member-states.
Therefore, despite being clear that INGOs have to be legal entities and
that they cannot be established by a governmental entity or intergovern-
mental agreement, it still remains possible for them, in the future, to be
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incorporated under the guidance of general rules set forth in an interna-
tional convention.46
To reinforce this perspective, we should point out that the Res. 1996/31
adopts the term ‘organization’ to make reference to non-governmental or-
ganizations at national, sub-regional, regional or international levels and
does not expressly require, for granting consultative status, that the con-
cerned entities be incorporated under the municipal law of any member-
state.47 However, in the absence of any consensus on the matter, presently
INGOs granted consultative status under the auspices of article 71 of the
UN Charter have been incorporated as legal private entities under the law
of the member-state where they are headquartered.
The first remarkable regulation of international organizations was a na-
tional law enacted in Belgium on 25 October 1919 that granted civil per-
sonality to international associations that pursued scientific ends without
profitable aims, provided that the entity was open to the participation of
Belgian and foreign citizens and had a governing body headquartered in
Belgium with at least one Belgian citizen. The law also authorized foreign-
based associations to operate in the country without the participation of
Belgian citizens in its management, provided it did not harm public order.
According to Normandin, the law did not produce the expected effect,
since just five institutions had applied for the legal recognition by 1926.48
However, it is worthy of note that the 9th article of the law, which took into
consideration the goal of international organizations obtaining a super-
national status, authorized the Belgian government to ‘negotiate with other
States the needed treaties to establish an international status for the interna-
tional associations with scientific ends based on the principles set forth in
the same law’.49
At the international level, the first convention clearly addressing the
issue that INGOs had to be incorporated under municipal laws is the
European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of
International Non-Governmental Organizations drawn up in Strasbourg in
1986 (Strasbourg Convention),50 which defined INGOs as ‘the associa-
tions, foundations and other private institutions that have been established
by an instrument governed by the internal law of a member-state of the
Council of Europe and that have their statutory office and their central
management and control in the territory of one member-state’.51
3.3 International scope
Another material aspect is the international representativeness of INGOs.
As we have seen in the 1919 Belgian Law formerly mentioned, the interna-
tional character would be ensured by a multi-national governing body and
membership and, most of all, by its range of activities. The Strasbourg
Convention, assuming that national organizations perform their activities
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only in one country, usually where they are headquartered, adopted a simi-
lar conception, conditioning the international character to the performance
of activities also in a foreign country and, therefore, required that the can-
didate INGOs ‘carry on their activities with effect in at least two States’.
This qualitative approach on representativeness has not been reproduced in
the UN model, which adopted a quantitative approach. The 1950
ECOSOC regulation, for example, conditioned the consultative accredita-
tion to the ‘recognized standing and representation of a substantial propor-
tion of the organized persons within the particular fields in which the orga-
nization operated and also to the existence of an international structure’.52
Going much further and virtually deeming the accreditation impossible
due to the burden set down by the demand for a required quantity for le-
gitimacy, the 1968 ECOSOC regulation considered eligible for receiving
consultative status only those organizations with ‘recognized international
standing, representing a substantial proportion, and expressing the views of
major sections, of the population or of the organized persons within the
particular fields of its competence, covering, where possible, a substantial
number of countries in different regions of the world’.53
Not surprisingly, this regulation did not prove satisfactory and, bearing
in mind an attempt to express the opinion of the major part of the world
population, the 1996 regulation maintained the required ‘recognized (but
no longer ‘international’) standing within the particular fields of its compe-
tence’ but introduced the concept that the organizations could be divided
up not only into national or international levels, but also into sub-regional
and regional levels, hence portraying the distinct influence of the existing
economic blocs and regional intergovernmental organizations established
during the previous decades.
Another apposite aspect is the participation ensured, to the extent possi-
ble, of NGOs from all regions, and particularly from developing countries,
based on the proclaimed goal to ‘achieve a just, balanced, effective and
genuine involvement of NGOs from all regions and areas of the world’,
also pursued by the encouraged participation of NGOs from developing
countries in international conferences and a greater involvement of organi-
zations from countries with economies in transition.54 An aim of establish-
ing a balance between the Northern and Southern hemispheres becomes
clear, especially upon examining the evidence that the major part of accre-
dited organizations is headquartered in Europe and the US.55
3.4 Public interest purposes
Another relevant aspect to be considered while trying to define an NGO is
the purpose of its activities, which, on one hand, must keep a clear conver-
gence with the goals, purposes and principles of the public administration
without, on the other hand, being – or seeking to be – part of the
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government apparatus. Thus, for example, concerns with human rights
must be general rather than restricted to a particular group, nationality or
country. This convergence is the main factor that has led to the shaping of
the expression ‘non-governmental’ since, from an ends perspective, such
organizations have the same focus as governments – the reason for the
similarity – but, from a means perspective, operate in a privately driven
manner – this being the reason for the discrepancy.
The Strasbourg Convention recognizes those NGOs with ‘an aim of in-
ternational utility’. Such vagueness makes important to recall the preamble
of the convention, where member-states recognized as worthy to the inter-
national community the work carried out by NGOs in the ‘scientific, cul-
tural, charitable, philanthropic, health and education fields’, since they
‘contribute to the achievement of the aims and principles of the UN
Charter and the Statute of the Council of Europe’.
Similar general criteria have been adopted by the UN Resolutions on the
ECOSOC accreditation that grants the consultative status to NGOs that
‘can demonstrate that their programme of work is of direct relevance to the
aims and purposes of the United Nations’. 56
Furthermore, the ECOSOC Res. 1996/31, if compared with the
Strasbourg Convention, proposed a formula of division of the NGOs into
groups, in order to provide proper balance to nonequivalent capabilities
and backgrounds, defining the following three categories with regards to
the ‘nature and scope of their activities and to the assistance they may be
expected to give to the ECOSOC or its subsidiary bodies in carrying out
the functions set out in Chapters IX and X of the Charter of the United
Nations’:
a. Organizations with general consultative status: ‘those whose primary
purpose is to promote the aims, objectives and purposes of the United
Nations and a furtherance of the understanding of its work, or that are
concerned with most of the activities of the ECOSOC and its subsidiary
bodies and can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Council that they
have substantive and sustained contributions to make to the achieve-
ment of the objectives of the United Nations concerned with matters
falling within the competence of the Council and its subsidiary bodies,
and are closely involved with the economic and social life of the peo-
ples of the areas they represent and whose membership, which should
be considerable, is broadly representative of major segments of society
in a large number of countries in different regions of the world’;
b. Organizations with special consultative status: ‘those that have a special
competence in, and are concerned specifically with, only a few of the
fields of activities covered by the ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies,
and that are known within the fields for which they have or seek con-
sultative status. If the concerned organization operates in the field of
human rights, it must pursue the goal of promotion and protection of
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human rights in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United
Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action’;
c. Organizations included in the roster: ‘those that do not have general or
special consultative status but the ECOSOC, or the Secretary General
of the United Nations in consultation with the council or its Committee
on non-Governmental Organizations, considers, can make occasional
and useful contributions to the work of the ECOSOC or its subsidiary
bodies or other United Nations bodies within their competence’.
These conceptual differences, while grading the consultative status, have
led to different rights for NGOs within the Council. Since those with gen-
eral consultative status have a substantive capability to contribute with the
UN and relevant support in the communities, both for close involvement in
local affairs and considerable membership, the ECOSOC Res. 1996/31
granted them some rights that are very similar to those ensured to the
member-states, excluding voting power and the right to participate in col-
lective bodies composed of representatives of member-states. Their rights
include (a) the proposition of placement of items of special interest in the
provisional agenda of the Council, commissions and subsidiary bodies; (b)
the designation of representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of
the Council, its commissions and its subsidiary bodies; (c) the presentation
of 2000-word written statements relevant to the work of the Council, its
commissions or other subsidiary organs, which shall be circulated by the
UN Secretary General to its members; and (d) the opportunity to make oral
statements to the Council, subject to approval.
Those with special consultative status were not granted the rights to pro-
pose items for the agenda or to make oral presentations to the Council,
being the submission of written statements reduced to 500 words if ad-
dressed to the Council or to 1500 words if aimed for consideration by its
commissions or other subsidiary organs. With more restrictive rights, the
organizations included in the roster are only allowed to send representa-
tives to meetings concerned with matters within their fields of competence
and may only make oral presentations or submit written statements, which
are not expected to exceed 500 words, if invited to do so by the Secretary
General.
Adopting another perspective, Daillier and Pellet have proposed a classi-
fication of NGOs based on their purposes, dividing them into seven cate-
gories: (a) humanitarian and religious; (b) political; (c) scientific; (d) so-
cial-economical; (e) sports; (f) environmentalists; and (g) documentary.57
This formula has also been adopted by Salomon in his comparative re-
search of civil society organizations in the world. 58
We believe that the nomination of specific areas of knowledge or activ-
ities is an inappropriate approach for the subject, seeing as public interest
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is a complex matter and it is common practice to identify NGOs operating
in two or more categories.59 Therefore, we support the UN and the
Council of Europe’s definitions that consider international NGOs as those
entities whose aims and purposes have international utility and are in con-
formity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
Furthermore, we must obviously consider excluded those entities consti-
tuted as political parties or that are related to political groups that seek di-
rect political power (since they are or aim to be part of the government
bodies), making it relevant to quote that para 57 (a) of the ECOSOC Res.
1996/31 determines the suspension or withdrawal of the consultative status
of any NGO that ‘either directly or through its affiliates or representatives
acting on its behalf, clearly abuses its status by engaging in a pattern of
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations, including unsubstantiated or politically motivated acts against
member-states incompatible with those purposes and principles.’
3.5 Nonprofit aims
Resuming the denial by NGOs of the organizational models already in ex-
istence, and taking in account the conditions set down by the Strasbourg
Convention and the ECOSOC Res. 1996/31, which address the funding of
concerned NGOs, it is important to point out that NGOs are institutions
that do not aim profits even when they have their income partially gener-
ated from commercial activities, notably consultancy contracts, courses or
sale of publications or data, which are not expressly or indirectly prohib-
ited in either of the aforementioned international norms.60
The ordinary idea of profit is reduced to a single positive arithmetic
result [10 (revenues) - 7 (expenditures) = 3 (the profit)]. However, this di-
mension is not enough to comprise other relevant aspects of the definition,
because profit is mainly a purpose, not just a result, and, as such, the prof-
itable aim of a given initiative is set at its start not at its end, when the fig-
ures are obtained. Even in the case that an entity should set its strategy to
make a surplus in a certain activity and it is very successful in accumulat-
ing an endowment or increasing its activities or facilities over the years, it
will remain a nonprofit institution if it is previously made known that the
result will not be distributed to managers, associates or other interested par-
ties but reinvested in its own purposes.61
This continuous reinvestment of the surplus is not a matter of board de-
cision, since sometimes businessmen decide to invest the companies’ prof-
its in their activities for a couple of years and the enterprises do not be-
come NGOs due to these decisions. The continuous investment is, in fact,
supported by a different legal concept: the property, or - more precisely put
- the lack of property. Companies always have owners, even if pulverized
on stock exchanges; NGOs do not. A group of people can create both a
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company and a nonprofit institution and they can also manage both, but
they will only be the owners of the former, not the latter.
This specific characteristic of NGOs approximates them to the State,
since the latter neither belongs to the statesmen or political party on duty
nor to the citizens, because its purpose is to serve the entire nation, present
and future. It also reinforces our point of view that it is not convenient to
define NGOs based on the cause they address, since nowadays any cause,
aim or issue can be the purpose of a private profit-oriented entity.62
Needless to say, criminal organizations cannot be considered NGOs since
they are profit-oriented and practice illegal activities, being either of these
circumstances enough to warrant the suspension or withdrawal of the con-
sultative status of any NGO under the ECOSOC Res. 1996/31.63
3.6 Voluntary and associative organization
Another germane concern while defining NGOs for the purpose of the
study of their international role is the voluntary and associative character
of those entities. This particular aspect, while presenting no discordance
with respect to their voluntary organization, i.e., not determined by law or
government orientation, presents a different situation when the needed ex-
istence of membership is addressed.
Recalling the conditions set down for granting consultative status to
NGOs under the auspices of the ECOSOC Res. 1996/31, we can identify
several references to an associative organization, as summarized below:
a. Para. 10 makes reference to a democratically adopted constitution;
b. Para. 11 determines that the organization shall have authority to speak
for its members;
c. Para. 12 states that the organization must have a representative structure
and possess appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its members,
who shall exercise effective control over its policies and actions
through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic
and transparent decision making processes;
d. Para. 13 establishes that the resources of the organization shall be de-
rived in the main part from contributions of the national affiliates or
other components or from individual members; and
e. Para. 22, while defining the conditions for granting the general consul-
tative status, makes reference to considerable membership of the
candidate.
At a first glance, these references clearly make foundations ineligible for
the international non-governmental organizations’ consultative status with
the ECOSOC, since this kind of legal entity does not have membership,
despite having all of the other characteristics (independence from govern-
ment, legal personality, international scope, public interest purposes,
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nonprofit aims and voluntary establishment). However, this ineligibility is
not the current situation, as we can observe that several foundations have
been granted general and special consultative status.
The member-states of the Council of Europe, in turn, expressly agreed
that foundations should be considered as international non-governmental
organizations under the auspices of the Strasbourg Convention.64
The UN system regulation for INGOs is coherent with the United
Nations design itself, which adopts an associative model, in which major
decisions are made in general assemblies, councils or committees of mem-
bers, disregarding, at least in the formal voting process, the relevance of
the financial stature of the member-states.
3.7 Peaceful Operations
Maintenance of peace is the main purpose of the UN and its structure has
been conceived to deal with threats to peace originated by acts of States.
Current times have shown that another kind of actor plays an important
role in destabilizing peace in the world, the so-called terrorist groups, an-
other form of non-state actor originated in civil society. Of course, the
strengthening of the relationship between the UN and civil society organi-
zations does not comprise terrorist groups that, based on their methods,
could never be considered a kind of NGO - albeit their independence from
States, international scope of activities, nonprofit aims and voluntary asso-
ciative character - because they adopt violence, mainly against civil targets,
as a means to achieve their goals. Thus, peaceful operations have become
a relevant characteristic to distinguish NGOs from terrorist groups.
4 Conclusion: A NGO concept
In this Preliminary Chapter, we have addressed some aspects and facts that
can contribute towards clearly establishing the definition of an international
non-governmental organization since, as formerly stated in this present
work, none of the treaties or conventions currently in force has been able
to do so.
A 1994 Secretary General report of a task force established to undertake
a general review of arrangements for consultations with NGOs, although
having in mind that there is no universally accepted definition, tried to de-
fine that ‘an NGO is a non-profit entity whose members are citizens or as-
sociations of citizens of one or more countries and whose activities are de-
termined by the collective will of its members in response to the needs of
the members or of one countries and whose activities are determined by
the collective will of its members in response to the needs of the members
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or of one or more communities with which the NGO cooperates’.65 This,
however, is an incomplete definition, for a terrorist group fits it.
A document was produced in 2002 by the OECD Financial Action Task
Force on Money Laundering, which analyzes international best practices in
combating the abuse of non-profit organizations, in which the task force
realized that non-governmental organizations can take on a variety of
forms, depending on the jurisdiction and legal system, having recognized
within the definition entities incorporated as associations, foundations,
committees, community service organizations, corporations of public inter-
est, limited companies and public benevolent institutions.66 Bearing in
mind a risk-based approach to the problem of abuse of NGOs, the organ
decided to adopt a functional rather than legalistic definition of NGOs,
considering them the ‘non-profit organizations that engage in raising or
disbursing funds for charitable, religious, cultural, educational, social or
fraternal purposes, or for the carrying out of other types of good works’.
This is a better definition, which excludes terrorist groups, but that does
not suffice to define an INGO, because it does not address independence
from State, voluntary incorporation and international scope.
This functional approach has also been adopted by the US Department
of State, which released in 2006 ten Guiding Principles on Non-govern-
mental Organizations regarding the treatment to be dispensed by govern-
ments to NGOs.67 Instead of defining an NGO based on its own character-
istics, the document decided to use the term as an ‘umbrella name’ for sev-
eral legal forms of incorporation of legal entities, comprising ‘independent
public policy advocacy organizations, non-profit organizations that defend
human rights and promote democracy, humanitarian organizations, private
foundations and funds, charitable trusts, societies, associations and non-
profit corporations, except political parties’. That’s an even better concept,
but that doesn’t fit our needs because it does not highlight the international
scope of activities and the voluntary incorporation.
The discrepancies among scholars on the characteristics of NGOs - these
well-known but still undefined contemporary actors – are, on average, less
glaring because most of them based their definition on a mix of the factors
addressed in this chapter instead of their legal form.
However, the absence of a widely accepted definition represents an ef-
fective harm to the participation of civil society organizations in the UN
bodies or events since there is material disagreement between UN member-
states on whether participatory rights should be understood, especially
among those with less democratic tradition that are often the subjects of
criticism from the same NGOs that are applying for participation, a situa-
tion perceived in the ECOSOC practice in granting consultative status.68
Therefore, the challenge is to find a definition that comprises the com-
monly agreed upon characteristics of non-governmental organizations in a
way that ensures their proper participation in the international arena, while
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avoiding their masquerade use for business or government-oriented prac-
tices or, much worse, criminal initiatives.
Under this perspective, we could define that international non-govern-
mental organizations are those non-profit legal entities, voluntarily estab-
lished by citizens or associations of citizens with residence in at least five
countries, that are independent from government and political groups that
seek political power, whose transnational aims and peaceful operations
have international utility and are in conformity with the spirit, purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
We have left, deliberately, one aspect aside: legitimacy.
Who is to say that NGOs have legitimacy to interact in the international
realm?
This is a task that we will endeavor to answer throughout the essay.
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CHAPTER 1
Legitimacy, Foundations and
Sources in International Law
1.1 Overview
This essay addresses the participation and role of people in international
law, through the non-governmental organizations, those private born, public
oriented bodies that we have endeavored to define in the previous chapter.
NGOs regard themselves as legitimate voices of the people in the interna-
tional arena. A noticeable trend in State behavior, which will be observed
throughout this essay, granting NGOs greater participation in international
fora and organizations, provides apparent evidence of the recognition of
that legitimacy.
The forthcoming chapters will appraise the NGOs under each of the
sources of international law to verify to what extent they support our claim
that international NGOs are legitimate expressions of the natural right of
individuals to participate in the public affairs conducted in the international
realm, which, due to this circumstance, cannot be regarded as a State-only
sphere.
NGOs are recognized as legal entities under the major legal systems of
the world and are notably present in the conduct of public affairs in demo-
cratic countries. Their recognition under international law is not as clear.
Of course, one can argue that, when observed through the prism of national
legal systems, even international law is not that clear. But, if we endeavor
to regard international law as a separate legal system aimed at preserving
peace,1 then we will be able to observe that it is composed of mandatory
and permissive rules and principles that regulate international rights and
duties of States, organizations and individuals, built on fundaments and
sources above and beyond any specific national legal system.2
International law, in contrast to municipal law, is not restricted to a cer-
tain national territory. It is composed of rules that, at one end, regulate
enterprises located in small portions of land in border countries, e.g. the
Asuncion Treaty adopted by Brazil and Paraguay to regulate the Itaipu
Hydroelectric Dam,3 and also, at the other end, by rules that regulate situa-
tions outside of our planet Earth, such as the Outer Space Treaty.4 The ex-
istence of rules at the international level does also not imply in the
identification of any State structure similar to those observed in national le-
gal models, usually regarded as fundamental features for the legitimacy of
any such rules. After all, there is no legislative body to pass ‘ordinary in-
ternational laws’ systematically arranged, and international law has neither
established an executive branch for governing nor a judiciary body with
comprehensive power for solving conflicts and enforcing obedience to
those rules.
This apparently chaotic or under-developed picture of international law
hasn’t hindered its emergence as a legal discipline, especially since the
nineteenth century, when Europe engaged in its ‘civilizing mission’ of the
world and needed a rational-legal support for its efforts.5 It also fostered
the birth of hundreds of intergovernmental organizations with an extensive
public bureaucracy for operating and serving shared interests of each and
all constituencies, a structure that would certainly have pleased Hegel and
Weber.6
The absence of legislative, executive and judiciary bodies; rules issued
by different sources, with a different scope, nature and territorial applica-
tion; institutions that are objects and also subjects of law; actors that are
not subjects; all of these discrepancies but still a system. This is interna-
tional law and, in this chapter, we will explore to what extent it is capable
of dealing with the legitimacy of its own rules, actors and subjects.
1.2 Legitimacy: a permanent quest
In an effort to conceptualize legitimacy, Thomas Franck defined it as ‘a
property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull to-
ward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed
believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in ac-
cordance with generally accepted principles of right process’.7 In the same
tone, Boyle and Chinkin, concisely defined it as being the ‘normative be-
lief that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed’.8
Historically, the core idea of legitimacy has been centered on the figure
of the State, and in the recognition, by the governed, of its authority, ex-
pressed by its capacity to enact and enforce binding rules. Individuals, as
Kelsen9 wrote, ‘are not actually subordinated to the individual from
whom the norm emanates, but to the order that delegates the authority to
this man; not to the lawmaker; but to the law; to the law on account of
which the lawmaker is a lawmaker; to the constitution which has granted
him competence to issue laws’. The legitimacy of the acts of State has
been a preeminent issue at national level, and a central problem of mod-
ern political and social philosophy, addressed distinctly by two main tra-
ditions: the Continental-European Enlightenment and the Anglo-American
Liberalism.
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The Continental Enlightenment philosophy is embodied in the concept
of Rechtstaat, a State administered by a rational bureaucracy that has no
other political objective but to implement the laws enacted by the represen-
tatives of the people, aimed at the promotion of social and economic pro-
gress. While expressing the prevalence of the sovereignty of the people
over that of the State, the Enlightenment philosophy circumscribed the
legitimacy of the acts of State to the boundaries established by democrati-
cally enacted written laws, in an attempt to eliminate, or minimize, the risk
of the State’s abuse of power.
Taking a different angle, Anglo-American Liberalism, advocated the pri-
macy of the fundamental rights of the people over governmental authority,
in an attempt to define a legal system in which any act of government,
even if supported by laws enacted by the parliament, would be deemed
illegitimate if it should threaten the life, liberty or private property of the
individuals. The power was in the hands of the individuals. It was quintes-
sentially represented by the Declaration of Independence of the United
States, which prescribes in its famous preamble that ‘governments are insti-
tuted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned’, a marked contractarianism.10
Consequently, while the Enlightenment philosophers sought to establish
popular sovereignty over state sovereignty through a civilizing effort to im-
plement a sustainable democracy, American Liberalism sought to establish
the concept of rule of law over governmental authority to guarantee funda-
mental individual rights and freedoms. In America, the Hegelian mighty
State has been reduced to government.
Yet, as argued by Heiskanen, ‘while Enlightenment is more concerned
with social progress and the welfare of the people than with the property
rights of individuals, and while Liberalism is more interested in the happi-
ness and prosperity of its citizens than in the promotion of a welfare state,
the fact remains that both operate within the same conceptual framework –
the relationship between the state/government and civil society (people/
citizens)’.11
If the State is the ‘who’ and the law is the ‘what’, legitimacy certainly
addresses the ‘why’. Franck endeavored to answer the question affirming
that it was the ‘belief’ of the addressees that the rule or institution was op-
erating according to generally accepted principles of right process. If indi-
viduals, the ultimate addressees of any law, have to believe that the law-
making process and/or the exercise of authority are legitimate, then, a
‘how’ question, related to the process, necessarily arises.
At a national level, the relationship between the state/government and ci-
vil society (people/citizens) is nowadays supported in the internationally
recognized principle of self-determination of the peoples, by which citizens
have a legitimate ‘originary’ power to create a State, to reorganize it, or
even to extinguish it.12 It is also supported by the rise of human rights and
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the consolidation of liberal democracy as the generally pursued form of
government. These pillars form the foundations of a re-emerging under-
standing that the contractarian metaphor is still valid, a theme that we will
address more extensively in Chapter 7.
However, if individuals have broad power to define the States in which
they live, these same States resist in giving them more room to participate
in the shaping of the legal order under which the States they have defined
operate, despite increasing evidence toward enhanced participation.13
Apparently, the circumscription of the debate regarding legitimacy to na-
tional boundaries hindered academic research in the subject and its expan-
sion in the international realm. Franck pointed out that international law
was a ‘no go’ area for philosophers of law.14 Charlesworth and Coicaud
noted that ‘questions of international legitimacy have received secondary
attention’ over time.15 Similarly, Clark argued that ‘in the discussions of
international relations, the idea of legitimacy has not always proved a pop-
ular term of reference, and has more often been self-consciously
eschewed’.16
Several reasons may be raised for such a lack of interest on behalf of
scholars in addressing the question of legitimacy in international law.
Perhaps one of the most straightforward reasons was raised by Brunée and
Toope: ‘in popular parlance, the world is a jungle, and the law of the jun-
gle is simple: the strongest win’.17 The ‘legitimacy’ of any rule, act or
claim, hence, would be supported by the strength of the ruler, actor or clai-
mant, as evidenced, for example, in the civilizing mission18 of the
European countries while partitioning Africa amongst themselves in the
Berlin Conference of 1885, or in the heavy penalties imposed to Germany
by the Versailles Treaty of 1919.
Such a claim is clearly influenced by the realist school of international
relations theory, which, in brief, supports that State conduct is determined
by its relative power and interests, and that international law is the expres-
sion of reciprocal deeds built upon those interests and relative power. It
has also found an echo in the understanding of some legal scholars, such
as De Visscher, who argued that some States have heavier footprints than
others while shaping international custom,19 and, more recently, Rosalyn
Higgins, who wrote that reciprocity is a ‘central element’ for the basis of
obligation.20 It was also evidenced in the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in
1999 and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, both conducted by heavy
foot printer States without previous UN Security Council authorization.
If, arguably, the legitimacy of law at the international level depends on
the ‘adhesion’ of the States, whether by consent or consensus, at the na-
tional level the core idea of legitimacy has been historically centered on
the figure of the State and on the justification of its capacity to establish
rules that ought to be obeyed by the people it governs. Several features
must be present to make an authority and its acts and rules legitimate.
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These features gravitate around the understanding of what is right and just.
It is also construed based on the idea of legality which, in either the
Enlightenment’s Rechtstaat or the Liberalism’s primacy of fundamental
rights, aims at constraining abuse of authority.
A given authority may be deemed legitimated if it has been previously
empowered according to the consent of those who will be bound by its
acts; its acts will be legitimated if taken according to determined fair pre-
established rules of procedure, and both will have legitimacy if the out-
come is deemed acceptable by those who will obey, compared to what they
regard as right and just.
Fuller, for example, sustained that respect for law (‘fidelity’) relies on a
perception of legitimacy arisen out of the fulfillment of eight internal cri-
teria of legality (the ‘internal morality of law’), which, according to his
own words, is a ‘procedural version of natural law’.21 Such criteria are:
legal norms must be general, prohibiting, requiring or permitting certain
conduct; they must also be promulgated, and therefore accessible to the
public; they should not be retroactive, but prospective; they must be clear;
they should avoid contradictions, not requiring or permitting or prohibiting
at the same time; law must be realistic and not demand the impossible; its
requirements of citizens must be relatively constant; and there should be
congruence between the norms and the action of officials operating under
the law.
According to Brunée and Toope, Fuller’s eighth criterion is a fundamen-
tal element for understanding the failures in international law, for it ex-
presses that the enforceability of law does not rely on the power of sanc-
tion, but on congruence between the law and State behavior.22 When, for
instance, the US rejects the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
and its military disregards international law in its war on terror, being
upheld by its federal courts,23 or NATO intervenes in Kosovo without UN
Security Council Authorization, it is a ‘signal that international law is be-
coming even less relevant than it has been to the solution of major interna-
tional problems’24 and the entire legitimacy of the international system of
rules of war is put at risk by heavy foot printer States.
If such congruence may harm the system, it can also strengthen it. With
respect to NGOs, there has been increasing awareness of their importance
toward enhancing the legitimacy of international law-making in general,
and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) authority, in particular. This
awareness is embodied in several hard law provisions granting NGOs the
right to take part in debates within the UN System and in several soft law
arrangements for joint work, congruently confirmed by State and IGO be-
havior in conferences, programmes and activities in several fields, to an ex-
tent that, as we will see in Chapter 4, was capable of creating Customary
International Law.
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Brunée and Toope, relying on the theories that Fuller had conceived for
the domestic level, have construed their own theory for international law,
which they called interactional theory of law. According to these authors,
when shared understandings and rules met the criteria of legality, the actors
will be able to pursue their purposes and organize their interactions through
law, generating ‘fidelity’ to the legal system. For them, the increasing parti-
cipation of actors other than States – including NGOs - in the international
realm is ‘indicative of the potential for major shifts in the breadth of inter-
national legal interaction’, indeed requiring it, because of the need for reci-
procity in the construction of the law, a task that ‘demands an extension of
society at the international level beyond the sphere of states’. Furthermore,
they argue that ‘influential norms will not emerge in the absence of pro-
cesses that allow for the active participation of relevant social actors’; only
when law is produced through an interactional framework with broad parti-
cipation can it be said that the law is legitimate, and limited participation
in norm building results in a legitimacy deficit, because ‘citizens in domes-
tic systems, and states and other actors at the international level are not
consumers (of law): they are active agents in the continuing enterprise of
law-making, through the elaboration of custom, treaty and soft law’.25
Their answer to the ‘how’ question possesses a strong argument, indeed
a very strong one. It is unequivocal that broader participation intuitively
enhances the legitimacy of international law-making yet other authors did
not go that far.
Thomas Franck, acknowledging that international law lacks the coercive
power observed in national legal systems, posed a stellar question: Why do
powerful nations obey powerless rules? According to him, they behave so
‘because they perceive the rule and its institutional penumbra to have a
high degree of legitimacy.’26 And, considering that there are thousands of
rules, we can intuitively assume that some have higher (or lower) degrees
of legitimacy than others. Why should a purported rule have more ‘compli-
ance pull’ than others? According to Franck, it depends on four factors: de-
terminacy, symbolic validation, coherence and adherence. Only when all
features are present in a rule or rule process will it exert a strong pull on
states to comply.27
At first sight, determinacy can be taken as synonymous of clarity, or the
capacity of a rule to pass a clear and transparent message to its addressees.
But determinacy is not just a matter of textual clarity or transparency, be-
cause it encompasses the whole range of plausible meanings of the rule.
Let’s take, for example, the ‘nongovernmental organizations’ which were
granted consultative status with the ECOSOC by the UN Charter: one can
say that the text makes reference to an organization that is not part of a
government – this is the clarity dimension. However, several types of orga-
nizations fall within such a scope, whether they are profit-oriented or not.
Considering that it was a newly coined expression, the UN Charter
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provision introduced an element of uncertainty, an issue that we have dealt
with in the preliminary chapter. Fortunately, ‘a rule with low textual deter-
minacy may overcome that deficit if it is open to a process of clarification
by an authority recognized as legitimate by those to whom the rule is ad-
dressed’.28 The ECOSOC endeavored to carry out such a task when it
worked to remedy such a deficit through the regulations on the consultative
status of international NGOs (1946, 1950, 1968 and 1996), which were
openly discussed (although not voted upon) with NGOs.
If determinacy is the linguistic element of legitimacy, symbolic valida-
tionprovides its cultural and anthropological dimension. According to
Franck, it can be observed in the several specialized agencies of the UN
that, while ensuring equality of participation, provide a symbol of the equal-
ity of States in international law, counterbalancing the empirical evidence of
inequality of power.29 Similarly, it is arguable that when the UN Charter
provided that the peoples of the world could interact with the UN through
governmental organizations – the States – but also through nongovernmen-
tal organizations, it symbolically recognized their right to self-determination
and, also, their democratic entitlement to act in the international realm.
Coherence is also essential to legitimacy. Franck asserted that ‘the legiti-
macy of a rule is determined in part by the degree to which that rule is
practiced coherently; conversely, the degree to which a rule is applied
coherently in practice will depend in part on the degree to which it is per-
ceived as legitimate for those applying it’.30 As we will observe in Chapter
4, there is a consistent practice of major worldwide multilateral interna-
tional organizations regarding the participation of NGOs in their decision-
making proceedings, supported either by treaty or customary provisions, as
well as an established state practice to allow their participation in major
conferences. These practices are not only consistent – repeated through
time; they are also coherent with the democratic (equality of states, one
vote each) principle and with the right of self-determination enshrined in
the UN Charter.
Lastly, let us examine adherence. It is meant as ‘the vertical nexus be-
tween a primary rule of obligation and an hierarchy of secondary rules
identifying the sources of rules and establishing normative standards that
define how rules are to be made, interpreted, and applied.’31 But, what
makes a treaty (the primary rule) binding if apparently there is no second-
ary rule in international law capable of exerting a pull toward its
compliance?
For the positivists, such as John Austin (1790-1859), no such pull ex-
isted because all laws were enacted by a sovereign person or a sovereign
body of persons to members of a given independent political society
wherein that person or body was sovereign.32 Thus, from his perspective,
the will of the sovereign was the will of the State, and international law
could not be properly regarded as ‘law”, inasmuch as there was no
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sovereign at the international level. By the same token, George Jellinek
(1851 – 1911) postulated that States were moral persons whose wills were
subject to no external limitation but that could be reversibly self-limited to
achieve certain needs.33 Such theories lack coherence: if States have the
free will to engage, then they could not remain bound if they withdrew
their consent, as observed, for instance, in the jus cogens provision in arti-
cle 43 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties34, because, in that
circumstance, their will would be submitted to an ‘independent will’ above
their own; contradicting the original free will. Furthermore, actual interna-
tional practice has continuously shown, for instance, that new States are
bound by international customs, even if they did not participate in their de-
finition or do not like them. The pull, therefore, exists.
States are bound because they are members of a community that be-
lieves so. Franck noted that ‘the belief of states, governments, judges, and
the public that such a rule hierarchy exists, and their tendency to act on
that belief, is a sufficient, if contingent, proof of the thing believed’, being
‘the will of the sovereign states subordinated to obligations that derive
from their status as members of a community’.35
The theory championed by Franck prescribes that the legitimacy of a
rule depends on its capacity to exert compliance pull upon the States. But,
as we have seen, such a capacity does not rely solely on the ‘independent
will’ of the States, but rather on their membership to the community of na-
tions, following that a primary rule (a treaty or custom) must be validated
by adherence to a secondary rule (about rule-making) and to an ultimate
rule of recognition of the binding character of the treaty/custom to achieve
its pursued legitimacy.
In another work on Democratic Governance, Franck added a new indica-
tor, pedigree, referring to the depth of the rule’s roots in a historical pro-
cess.36 According to him, self-determination provided the pedigree of a de-
mocratic entitlement comprehending three different generations or ‘build-
ing blocks’: self-determination as the first; freedom of expression as the
second; and finally, the right to free and open elections as the third. But it
appears to be unquestionable in current days that the right to participate,
directly or not, in public affairs ensured by the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR),37 has gone beyond the participation in
free elections.
A fourth building block, enhancing the participation of individuals in
public affairs, must be added to effectively and properly answer the ‘how’
question embedded in Franck’s definition of legitimacy. Throughout this
essay, we will share Brunée and Toope’s convictions that a broader partici-
pation of relevant actors in norm-building in international law is a funda-
mental feature for its legitimacy. We will endeavor to demonstrate that
NGOs are actors capable of enhancing the process of international law-
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making and the authority of intergovernmental organizations, contributing
to the reduction of their perceived legitimacy deficit.
In order to understand why individuals have the right to act in the inter-
national realm, and what the material sources of the legal legitimacy of the
subjects of international law are, in the forthcoming sections of this chapter
we will briefly appraise the foundations of international law and its
sources, understanding by sources of international law the methods of
creating international law.
1.3 Foundations: a brief appraisal on its historic development
Legal doctrine register the flourishing of international law in the treaties
that ended the Thirty Years’ War, signed in Münster and Osnabruck in
1648 – called the Peace of Westphalia – and consecrated the rule cujus re-
gio, ejus religio (literally, ‘in his region, his religion’) previously agreed
upon by the Religious Peace of Augsburg (1555), giving birth to the con-
cept of a modern nation-state based on a Western (European) notion of so-
vereignty. We know that this notion is not crystal-clear, but, borrowing the
words of Kelsen, ‘whatever may be understood by this word of many
meanings, and however much the definitions of this concept may differ
from one another, most of them agree on one point: the thing characterized
as “sovereign”, whether it be an order, a community, an organ, or a power,
must be regarded as the highest, above which there can be no higher,
authority limiting the function of the sovereign entity, binding the
sovereign’.38
The first systematic study on sovereignty was written in 1576 by Jean
Bodin (1530 – 1596) and defined the State as ‘un government juste de plu-
sieur Familles et des choses qui leur étoient communes sus le puvoir abso-
lut’.39 His approach was highly influenced by the political facts he ob-
served in the 16th century, particularly in France, a unified kingdom which
had nonetheless been deeply weakened by religious distensions and eight
civil wars.40 He understood that the remedy for such a situation was the
concentration of power in the hands of the sovereign and, to support his
idea, conceived his brainchild of associating the family to the State, and
the father to the sovereign. Since the father was ultimately responsible for
maintaining the order in his home – a territory – and for guaranteeing the
well-being and happiness of his family members – the people of the nation
– he was entitled to superior power (summa potestas) to rule his home –
the sovereignty. This superior power consisted in his being granted permis-
sion to lay down the rules but did not imply that the sovereign was bound
by them.41 According to Bodin, the sovereign was only bound by the
Laws of God and Nature (Reason), the laws common to all nations, and
the customary fundamental laws of the kingdom. His approach, supported
LEGITIMACY, FOUNDATIONS AND SOURCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55
in the sacrosanct institution of the family in a Catholic nation, tired of con-
flicts, produced an outstanding impact on France and contributed to the
birth of the absolutist monarchy with the House of Bourbon, established at
the accession of Henry IV to the Throne of France, in 1590.
Although an apparent creation of the Modern Era, international law has
deeper roots, laid down in far ancient grounds. Law was paramount among
the cultural achievements of ancient Rome and the rules of Roman Law,
together with their references to the conception of Natural Law, were com-
piled by order of the Byzantine emperor Justinian I to form the Corpus
Juris Civilis (527 – 565). This magnificent work was written in Latin and
certainly reached the fragments of the former Western Roman Empire,
where it was considered the Holy Roman Empire’s secular law, neverthe-
less being abandoned during the Dark Ages. Notwithstanding, it definitely
influenced Canon Law.42 Feudalism, despite being regarded as the antith-
esis of the centralized State ruled by a secular power, contributed to the
further development of the conception of sovereignty through the creation
of the suzerain–vassal linkage, which established a territorial connection of
ruling power and loyalty, the embryo of the later idea of nationality.43
Mostly, it also kept alive the notion of a unique human genre, submitted to
one superior law that no one could revoke: the Natural Law, that would
flourish after the Middle Ages.
The greatest theologian to address the idea of Natural Law was St.
Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274), in his great unfinished work Summa
Theologica (1265 – 1274), considered the epitome of the perennial juris-
prudence of the Natural Law.44 According to him, in the scholastic tradi-
tion, all laws come from the Divine Reason that rules the universe, and
‘the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation in
the eternal law’.45 Once the Natural Law is codified, it becomes human
law (positive law). However, human laws can be unreasonable or unjust if
they are contrary to the Natural Law. In these circumstances, they ‘are no
longer a law but a perversion of law’46 and, thus, ‘should not be obeyed’.47
Most relevantly, he supported the concept that a lawful authority could be
legitimately removed if he behaved or acted contrary to the Natural Law.48
The Natural Law and human (positive) laws are, thus, complementary
elements, where the Natural Law, constituting the base of the juridical con-
science of humankind, supports positive law, providing its binding charac-
ter, and positive law, in turn, gives a more ordinate form to the principles
of Natural Law.49
St. Thomas Aquinas’ work is regarded as the definitive Catholic doctrine
and has remained authoritative within the orbit of Catholic thought, while
also notably influencing non-Catholic authors.50 Furthermore, his Summa
Theologica influenced the work of another Dominican priest, who is re-
garded as one of the founders of modern international law: Francisco de
Vitoria.
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Francisco de Vitoria (1480 – 1546) left no published work, but his lec-
tures were compiled by his alumni and published after his death under dis-
tinctive titles, collectively known as Relectiones. In De Potestate Civili
(1528) he argued that people had the immanent power to rule themselves,
arisen out of Natural Law and God. Per contra, since it would not be natu-
rally possible to exercise such power individually, it was placed in the
hands of the sovereign, who could make laws, but only in the benefit of
the Republic (‘Si la ley no es util a la republica ya no es ley’). It is worthy
to quote also that, according to Vitoria, the sovereign was bound by the
laws that he issued (‘las leyes dadas a la república obligan a todos. Luego,
aunque estén dadas por el rey, obligan al mismo rey’).51
We can attribute to Vitoria a vision far ahead of his times, not only be-
cause, as we have seen, he supported the idea that the King was bound by
the Law (an idea that would later be rejected by Bodin) but also because in
another compiled lecture, De Indis et De Jure Belli (1532), he affirmed that
the ‘(Holy Roman) Emperor was not the lord of the whole world’ neither
was the Pope ‘the civil or temporal lord of the whole world, in the proper
sense of civil lordship and power’52 and that the native people of the
Americas had princes with legal positions similar to those of Christian
princes and were ‘not to be warred into subjection or despoiled of their
property if they had given to the Spaniards unhindered freedom to preach
the gospel, and this whether they accepted the faith or not’.53 Christendom
was no longer the whole world, which was composed of sovereign nations
with different faiths and political arrangements, living together in a socie-
tas naturalis, a political community (‘totus orbis, qui aliquo modo est una
republica’) with duties of solidarity and the power to establish fair laws for
the common good (jus gentium) that not only had the strength of an agree-
ment but the strength of Law.54 We cannot assume, however, that Vitoria
was a liberal thinker in contemporary terms since he lived in the 15th cen-
tury and advocated ecclesiastical and papal authority. Additionally, one can
observe in his writings that he considered resistance to missionaries a cause
for just war and supported the replacement of the pagan princes by
Catholic rulers, which did not properly indicate rigorous equality of
Christian and pagan princes and much less equality of States.
Notwithstanding, his ideas were ahead of their time and he could be re-
garded as a forefather of the concept of self-determination of the peoples,
which, as we will study in chapter 5 of this essay, gave birth to the right of
the individuals to participate in world governance, as observed, e.g., in the
Aarhus Convention.55 The ideas of Francisco de Vitoria and the scholastics
had a great influence on the work of another founding father of interna-
tional law and student of the University of Leiden: Hugo Grotius (1583 –
1645).
Grotius’ first relevant work is Mare Liberum (1609), in which he argued
that the sea was international territory and that all nations had the right to
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use it for trade and navigation. This work is a part of his first known legal
assignment, a treatise defending the seizure of a Portuguese ship in the
Strait of Singapore by a flotilla of the Dutch East India Company (VOC)
in 1601, when the Netherlands were at war with Spain and Portugal, then
being under Spanish ruling.56 One can identify its roots in the ideas of
Francisco de Vitoria, since Grotius asserted that the Portuguese could claim
no right of possession to the East Indies because those lands had already
been inhabited by the natives before the arrival of its first ships and that
the Pope could not transfer its dominium because he was not the civil or
temporal lord of the whole world. Therefore, again recalling the ideas of
Vitoria, the Dutch had the right to travel to those lands and carry on trade
with its inhabitants.
In our point of view, a remarkable contribution made by Grotius to the
21st century is the idea that people have rights over common things, whose
use is subject to two natural laws: ‘that all surely might use common things
without the damage of all and, for the rest, every man contented with his
portion shall abstain from another’s’.57 One could see here the remote off-
spring of the contemporary idea of sustainable development.
Also noteworthy is a passage of his Defense of Chapter V of Mare
Liberum, where he made a distinction between things that can become pri-
vate and things that remain in common, quoting an affirmation made by
Cicero that nothing was private by nature to conclude that ‘it is evident
that community is prior to property’ and that necessity authorized to ‘make
common again things formerly owned’.58 Grotius resumed this idea in his
most important work, De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), where he asserted in
Book II, Chapter 2, § 6 that:
‘Let us now see whether men may not have a right to enjoy in com-
mon those things that are already become the properties of other
persons; which question will at first seem strange, since the estab-
lishment of property seems to have extinguished all the right that ar-
ose from the state of community. But it is not so; for we are to con-
sider the intention of those who first introduced the property of
goods. There is all the reason in the world to suppose that they de-
signated to deviate as little as possible from the rules of natural
equity; and so it is with this restriction, that the right of proprietors
have been established; for if even written laws ought to be thus ex-
plained, as far as possible; much more ought we to put that favor-
able construction on things introduced by a custom not written, and
whose extent therefore is not determined by the signification of
terms.
From whence it follows, first, that in a case of absolute necessity,
that ancient right of using things, as if they remained common, must
revive, and be in full force: for in all laws of human institutions and
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consequently, in that of property too, such cases seem to be
excepted.59
It is important to notice that Grotius didn’t mean that the ‘privileges of ne-
cessity’ could be invoked freely, since he conditioned them to the previous
adoption of any and all other means to avoid the necessity; to the non-exis-
tence of equal necessity by the owners, a situation in which they would
have an advantage, and finally, to the obligation to restitute it.60 We have
addressed this aspect of his work with the purpose of raising another im-
portant contribution made by Grotius to the development of international
law, i.e., the idea that humankind had a ‘right’ over some ‘things’ that
could not be appropriated by someone in clear disadvantage to the rest of
the society based on human laws that were, thus, enacted against the law
of the nature. In the 17th century, Grotius regarded the high seas. In the
21st century, could one regard the right to development?
In De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625), Grotius, within the tradition of Natural
Law, sustained that ‘amongst Things peculiar to Man is his Desire of
Society, that is, a certain Inclination to live with those of his own kind, not
in any Manner whatever, but peaceably, and in a Community regulated ac-
cording to the best of his Understanding’.61
Therefore, Grotius, following Aristotle, supports the notion that men
have an innate inclination to live in society in a peaceful manner according
to certain rules regarding what is right and due, which have arisen from of
the rational nature of man. He, thus, removes natural law from theology by
his famous statement that law of nature would be valid even if ‘which can-
not be admitted without utmost wickedness, that there is no God and that
human affairs do not concern to Him’.62 This sociable instinct, which dif-
fers from the one observed in animals because it is based on Reason, is the
‘Fountain of Right’.63 Human nature, thus, is the mother of Natural Law,
and positive law arises from the latter, aiming at living peaceably in a so-
ciety. Grotius was neither a pure naturalist nor a pure positivist, rather, he
proposed a ‘workable synthesis of Natural Law and State practice’.64 As
Nussbaum notes, ‘Grotius’ Natural Law may be called the rule of reason-
ableness with little left for a truly divine law’.65
De Jure Belli ac Pacis is a treatise about private rights, and wars to de-
fend violated rights with the aim of reaching peace.66 It has unequivocally
contributed to the definition of the fundaments of international law. From
Grotius’ perspective, one can understand peace as the absence of war or
peace as the respect for rights. That is the idea that arises from the afore-
mentioned work. Peace is the main purpose of the United Nations, and, as
we have seen at the beginning of this chapter, it is at the core of the under-
standing of international law as a legal body aimed at preserving peace,
composed of mandatory and permissive rules and principles that regulate
international rights and duties of States, organizations and individuals.
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However, peace is far more than the absence of war. If we take, for ex-
ample, the Nobel Peace Prize, it is awarded ‘to the person who shall have
done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the aboli-
tion or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of
peace congresses’.67 The list of laureates includes several individuals and
even organizations that were not properly or directly involved in situations
of wars or armed conflicts, which, at least from the Norwegian Nobel
Committee’s perspective, leads to a more comprehensive understanding of
Peace.68 Based on the more recent laureates, it also embraces environmen-
tal protection (2007), advancing economic and social opportunities for the
poor (2006), sustainable development and democracy (2005) and human
rights, including the struggle for the rights of women and children (2004,
2010 and 2011).
Peace, then, can be regarded as respect for immanent human rights.
Resuming Grotius and bearing in mind the struggle for peace in the 21st
century, we cannot neglect that he considers the violation of what belonged
to everyone by right a justified cause for war.69 In his epoch, he could only
regard the sea, the air and the banks of sand as things common to human-
kind.70 Today, one can see other things, such as human rights, ‘the rights
that everyone is said to have by virtue of his or her very humanity’.71
Health, for example, is regarded by the World Health Organization as ‘one
of the fundamental rights of every human being’ which is ‘fundamental to
the attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon the fullest co-
operation of individuals and States.’72
Grotius also supported that men have a right to use those things which
are another’s property, if thereby there arises no detriment to the proprietor.
To justify his argument, he exemplified the right to drink water from a riv-
er that was within someone else’s property or a free passage through third
parties’ land.73 This idea is particularly of interest in the contemporary
world if we have in mind, for example, the demands of breach of patents
in cases of endemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS.74 Of course, one could
not say that Grotius was exposing his particular concerns about basic hu-
man rights, since he personally supported a Jus rectorium where, in socie-
ties, some individuals were unequal, as that of masters and servants.75 But
the centrality that ‘Common Rights’ has in his work can’t go unnoticed.
And that is, in our opinion, his main contribution to our study of interna-
tional law and to the justification that individuals can indeed interfere in
the international realm to pursue a broad conception of peace.
His conception may be currently observed, for example, in article 31 of
the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), which addresses the issue of use of protected rights without
authorization from the holder.76 This provision is considered the legitimate
legal permission to the compulsory licensing in situations of ‘national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
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non-commercial use’. It has been invoked several times, mostly concerning
patent-protected medicine for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, aiming to ex-
pand public access to essential drugs at an affordable cost.77 This interpre-
tation of the TRIPS has raised several concerns as to whether article 31
could be regarded as a supportive element for pro-public-health initiatives,
which, as is to be expected, was challenged by developed countries and
the pharmaceutical industry.78 However, it was confirmed by the 2001
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which ac-
knowledged the importance of public health and the rights of WTO mem-
ber- states, under emergency conditions, to adopt all the necessary flexibil-
ities of TRIPS in order to protect public health.79
The compulsory licensing does not represent damage to the economic
rights of the patent holder, considering royalties will be paid (TRIPS, arti-
cle 31 ‘h’). It represents, however, the supremacy of the interests of the
Society over exclusive economic rights, reaffirming the Grotian conception
of international relations, although he ‘does not explicitly distinguish a ca-
tegory of human rights from those of States or citizens or princes’.80 We
shall resume the analysis of Grotius’ contribution to the 21st century debate
about the limits of international law in the Conclusion, since, now, we
think it is appropriate to address one of his contemporaries that also influ-
enced international law: Pufendorf.
Samuel von Pufendorf (1632 - 1694) is considered the founder of the
naturalist school of jurisprudence, which strived to identify international
law completely through the law of nature, abandoning the idea of the joint
existence of a positive law agreed upon by Nations, supported by
Grotius.81 In his work De officio hominis et civis ("On the Duties of Men
and Citizens") of 1673, Pufendorf broke with the ancient tradition of legiti-
macy of the States, arguing that men established the States not because
they needed satisfaction of their primary needs, which ‘could have been
abundantly satisfied through the first communities’.82 Rather, men accepted
a certain loss of natural liberty and subjection to an authority with rights of
life and death to ‘fortify themselves against the evils which threaten man
from man’.83 In an individualistic, voluntarist and rationalist perception, he
saw the State as a humane construction aimed to protect one man from an-
other, in spite of peaceful living in the state of nature.84 Fear, for instance,
was the amalgamating factor of citizens into the State, a moral person
‘whose will, intertwined and united by virtue of the compacts of the many,
is regarded as the will of all’85 individuals that gathered into a joint agree-
ment to form it.86 According to Stephen Hall:
‘The ‘natural’ element in the Enlightenment’s conception of the nat-
ural law was not a moral, ethical and rational standard as it is in the
natural law itself. Rather, it was an essentially empirical or
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descriptive standard resting upon the state of nature in which people
had supposedly existed before entering into their social contract.’87
The influence Hobbes had on Pufendorf is remarkable. Although Thomas
Hobbes (1588 – 1679) was not concerned with war between nations such
as were Grotius and Pufendorf, all of them worried about peace. In his
Leviathan (1651), Hobbes, adopting a purely interest-based perspective,
postulated that men were by nature equal in abilities and entitled to every-
thing in the world. That circumstance inevitably led to conflict among men
based on competition, diffidence and glory. Since men could not live se-
curely in this state of permanent war of everyone against all, they all lived
in continuous fear and danger of violent death, in a solitary, poor, nasty
and brutish short life.88 According to Hobbes, this situation was against
the fundamental law of nature, i.e, ‘to seek Peace, and follow it by all
means we can, to defend ourselves’; in order to obtain peace, men – the
Authors - should ‘lay down the right to all things and be contented with so
much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against him-
self’, doing it by a Contract where such rights were delegated to another
person – The Actor.89 This person was the sovereign that, therefore, had
no divine right, inasmuch as his power had been received through a cove-
nant made by all individuals that, as we’ve seen, lived in nature in equal
conditions. Democracy, hence, is at the genesis (and only at the genesis) of
the theory of Social Contract proposed by Hobbes, where the State has no
mission other than that of preserving peace, requiring indivisible power to
achieve this objective on behalf of its constituencies, who, we reinforce,
have delegated their power to regulate their lives to the sovereign.
For Hobbes, men are no longer the ‘political animal’ conceived by
Aristotle.90 They do not have a natural inclination to live in society for the
common good; rather, they ‘agree’ to do so for mutual advantage in a so-
cial contract metaphor. However, if Hobbes supported that such arrange-
ment was done because individuals were rational and individualistic and
were moved by fear, hence purely interest-based, the later Enlightenment
authors, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, supported that the it was done on the
assumption of existing prior moral and natural rights. This latter approach
has been resumed in the 20th century by John Rawls, whose ideas we will
discuss on chapter 7.
Once a covenant is made, it must be performed. This principle (pacta
sunt servanda) constitutes, for Hobbes, the Fountain of Justice, seeing as
before the Social Contract, no right had been delegated and every man had
the right to everything; consequently, no action could be called unjust nor
could anyone be called owner of something. Injustice, for him, is nothing
other than ‘the not Performance of Covenant’ and propriety only begins to
exist after the creation of a coercive power, strong enough to make men re-
spect their covenants.91
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Man’s sociable instinct is no longer the fountain of ‘Right’, as Grotius
had determined; the Social Contract is the fountain of ‘Justice’; Society is
no longer the result of an innate sociability pointed out by the jusnatural-
ists; instead, it is created by contract, moved by fear; Propriety, a bourgeois
core value, is no longer intrinsically guaranteed, since it depends on the
will of an omnipotent sovereign, whose power does not arise out of patriar-
chy, theocracy, divine right or strength, but rather from a covenant, a con-
catenated consent of all men.
The Hobbesian treatise of power and the theory of Social Contract can
be clearly perceived in Pufendorf’s conception that positive law could not
exist in international relations, because agreements entered into by sover-
eigns were based on their will and, therefore, could not be regarded as true
positive law, which relied on the existence of a sovereign power ruling
other subjects. Hence, if there were only natural law and positive law, in-
ternational law would be nothing but the ‘natural law of the States’.92
Also influenced by Hobbes was Spinoza (1632 – 1677), whose ideas,
strongly reinforcing individual liberty and freedom of expression, intro-
duced a ‘distinctively urban, egalitarian and commercial type of republi-
canism’ that considered the democratic form as ‘always the most natural,
freest and best kind of state’.93
Spinoza considered that the power of nature was the very power of God,
who had supreme power to do all things. However, he said, ‘since the uni-
versal power of the whole of nature is nothing but the power of all indivi-
dual things together, it flows that each individual thing has the sovereign
right to do everything that it can do’ or, to put it more straightforwardly,
‘the right, and the order of nature, under which all human beings are born
and for the most part live, prohibits nothing but what no one desires or no
one can do’.94 This entitlement to do everything in the world could be
pursued according to the laws of appetite, as any intemperate person might
do, or according to the laws of reason, as the wise men should do.
Accordingly, to ensure that men ‘would collectively have the right to all
things that each individual had from nature’, they would have to rely in the
power and will of all of them together, instead of in the force and appetite
of each individual. Thus, argued Spinoza, men ‘had to make a firm deci-
sion, and reach agreement, to decide everything by the sole dictate of rea-
son’, curbing their appetites if their desires suggested things that could hurt
someone else and refraining from doing ‘anything to anyone they did not
want done to themselves’. To achieve this and preserve the contract in its
entirety with complete fidelity, he continued, men had to surrender all the
power they possessed to the society, in order to make society, alone, the
supreme power, with supreme natural right over all things, that had to be
obeyed by everyone, either willingly or through fear of punishment. The
right of such society, Spinoza called democracy, defining it as ‘a united
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gathering of people which collectively has the sovereign right to do all that
it has the power to do’.95
Curiously, Spinoza hasn’t shared his thoughts about how this democracy
should be exercised, vaguely arguing that, when constituting a state, it was
indispensable that ‘the entire power of decision-making should be lodged
in all the people, or else in some, or else just in one’. Also curious and
rather conflicting with his advocacy of democracy, are his claims that peo-
ple had to defend the government with all their strength, being also obliged
to carry out absolutely all the commands of the sovereign power, ‘however
absurd they might be’, although attenuating his assertion by claiming that
sovereigns, wishing to protect their position and retain power, had to direct
all things by the dictate of reason, working for the common good and for
the security of the whole people of the state, therefore being unlikely that
they would issue absurd commands.96
Despite this, it is a fact that Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise
(1670) was a sound effort to strengthen individual freedoms of expression
and thought and to weaken the power of the Pope and the importance of
theology in the Netherlands after the end of the Thirty Year’s War. By ar-
guing that ‘a state can never succeed very far in attempting to force people to
speak as the sovereign power commands’ and that the ‘ultimate purpose of
the state is to free everyone from fear so that they may live in security so far
as possible’ he reached the remarkable conclusions, back in the 17th century,
that the ‘true purpose of the state is in fact freedom’ and that ‘trying to con-
trol everything by law will encourage vices rather than correcting them’.97
It was Hegel,98 at the beginning of the 19th century, who proposed a dif-
ferent perspective, in which the State was no longer a collection of indivi-
duals who gathered to form an abstract entity with anthropocentric origin;
rather the State was an anthropomorphic organism with a mind of its own,
fruit of the participation of every human mind. For him, individuals had to
sacrifice their lives for the State, and could possess objectivity only as a
member of the State, who was sovereign and could resort to war against
other State if the co-existence was deemed unsatisfactory. His doctrine, fol-
lowed by the positivists, supported that the State possessed unlimited rights
over the individuals. The emergence of the positivist doctrine in interna-
tional law is regarded as a reaction against the naturalist school of jurispru-
dence and also as a fruit of the termination of the Napoleonic wars, which
gave birth to a homogeneous, interstate, nationalist and Eurocentric society,
affected by the shift of many countries from absolutism to parliamentary
governments, which would experiment an exceptional evolution in science
and technology, making rational thinking prevail.99 The prominence of po-
sitivist theories in international law relied on the notion that ‘laws were ba-
sically commands issuing from a sovereign person or body’ and that ‘any
question of ethics and morality was irrelevant to discussion of the validity
of man-made laws’.100
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This conception of international law as a co-existence voluntary system
based on contractual arrangements made by fully sovereign States that
were, hence, self-limited only according to their interests, allowed the
strengthening of nationalism and absolutist theories and remained the ma-
jor understanding until the end of World War I when, taking into account
the two previous Peace Conferences held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907
and the creation of the League of Nations after the end of the hostilities, it
gave place to a new perception of international law as a normative system
aiming at cooperation among the States to achieve pax perpetua.101
The League was conceived to pursue cooperation among States to reach
peace, in an epoch in which international society had far fewer States and
was far more homogeneous than today. In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles
was signed by a handful of States, mostly European. In 1920, the list of
signatories to the Covenant of the League of Nations comprised only 30
States.102 In 1945, the creation of the United Nations was approved by
only 51 States. Today, the UN has 193 member-states, most of them lo-
cated in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The heterogeneity of the interna-
tional society in the 21st century is a fact that will lead to a different, less
‘western-like’, approach to international relations, which is admitted even
by the United States.103
Judt postulates that World War I and World War II together could be re-
garded as a thirty-year war, since the causes of the first conflict remained
at the beginning of the second.104 Most important, however, is the fact that
the second conflict had a tremendous impact on the civil population, contri-
buting to a death toll of 19 million people, more than half the total 37 mil-
lion casualties in the period 1939-1945, in Europe alone. This tremendous
massacre due to massive bombing and ethnical cleansing, together with the
appearance of mass destruction weapons, challenged the classical rules of
war and raised several humanitarian issues. Not without reason, the UN
was conceived to pursue World Peace, laid down by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; the rights that, once achieved, would lead to
obtaining peace, since no war would be deemed necessary.
On the European concert, Judt asserts that the pacific and cooperative
Europe that is observed today, wasn’t born from the optimistic, ambitious
and progressist project conceived by the idealists that defend the European
Union and the euro; on the contrary, Europe was the insecure child born
from anxiety, and this situation was experienced on both sides of the conti-
nent.105 Nonetheless, the aggregation of long-standing rivaling European
nations around a common and cooperative project that struggles to reduce
the differences within the bloc and works to ensure to all citizens access to
similar living standards, together with the participation of individuals in
some relevant decision-making, looks, despite the tremendous difficulties
experienced, like an interesting paradigm for a heterogeneous world.
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Although the bipolar political world ended with the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989 and the subsequent dismantling of the Soviet Union in 1990,
currently the heterogeneity relies not only on the countries’ cultural back-
ground, but also on their social and economical ones. It would be hard to
affirm that the 193 UN member-states share the same interests. But coop-
eration is still pursued, because humankind’s needs disregards boundaries.
From an economic perspective, the sovereignty of the majority of these
States is a myth, since they all compete for investments from transnational
corporations or international financial aid and, once economical sover-
eignty becomes weak, political sovereignty goes the same way. The impact
of the 2008 financial crisis in Iceland, Latvia and Ukraine is a remarkable
example.
Therefore, a cooperative approach in international law, centered on the
respect for universal human rights (particularly through the reduction of
wealth inequality) and the protection of the common good (such as the en-
vironment) is a contemporary goal, which is witnessing the renaissance of
the social contract theories and the recurrent invocation of Natural Law,
due to the economic problems left unsolved by international positive (writ-
ten or customary) law.
As we’ll explore in more detail in this essay, it is necessary to defini-
tively abandon the positivist idea that individuals, and as a consequence,
NGOs, are just objects of international law, not only due to the increasing
number of rules concerning international protection of human rights and
access to international tribunals, whether at a global or regional level, but,
mostly, because the human being has always been the ultimate concern of
international law, which, as we have seen, has been constructed upon the
ancient, deep and solid roots of Natural Law.106
In Chapter 8, we will see that the States gave birth to international orga-
nizations, entities that despite being created (thus, being objects), became
subjects of international law, even without having their own nation and ter-
ritory to rule, both classical – and essential - attributes for the recognition
of a State. Recalling the Contractarians and adopting the Hobbesian termi-
nology, the States, as Authors, by covenant created Actors to represent
them and gave to these Actors the authority to act on their behalf. Could
individuals, as Authors, in another form of democracy or expression of
Natural Law, create NGOs as Actors that, thus, have authority to represent
their constituencies in the international realm? Could these Actors have re-
cognized their legitimacy to participate in the defense and regulation of the
common wealth that, in ultimate analysis, does not belong to the States,
but to human beings? We believe that, yes, they can. That is what we will
explore in the conclusion of our essay. But firstly, it seems appropriate to
appraise in what extent individuals and NGOs can be regarded as subjects
of international law according to its formal sources.
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1.4 Sources: article 38 of the statute of the ICJ
In 1920, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was estab-
lished under the auspices of the League of Nations. Article 38 of its
Statute, materially reproduced in the statutes of the future International
Court of Justice (ICJ), provided that while appreciating the cases brought
to its ruling, it would apply treaties, international customs and the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations, together with judicial de-
cisions and the teachings of the most qualified publicists of the various na-
tions as subsidiary means for the determination of the rule of law.
Despite aiming to guide the works of the mentioned tribunals – and,
thus, having a functional purpose - article 38 has always been regarded as
a typology of formal sources of international law.107 The origin of the theo-
ry of formal sources of international law is attributed to positivism, which
separated Law (formal source) from its ethical or moral background (mate-
rial source), and, thus, isolated law from politics, enabling its systematic
analysis of the juridical phenomena.108
Article 38 was not the first attempt to establish the formal sources of in-
ternational law. The Hague Convention of 1907 included a section (XII)
aimed at the creation of an International Prize Court, the only section that
did not enter into force. In its article 7, it established that:
‘If a question of law to be decided is covered by a treaty in force
between the belligerent captor and a Power which is itself or whose
subject or citizen is a party to the proceedings, the Court is gov-
erned by the provisions in the said treaty. In the absence of such
provisions, the Court shall apply the rules of international law. If no
generally recognized rule exists, the Court shall give judgment in
accordance with the general principles of justice and equity.’109
As one can observe, it tried to establish a hierarchy in the formal sources,
commencing with written consented rules, followed by non-written con-
sented rules and closing with the general principles of law and equity,
where the tribunal could only apply the posterior source in the case of ab-
sence of the anterior one. Thirteen years later, when the statute of the
Permanent Court of International Justice was established, this hierarchy was
no longer mentioned. This circumstance caused some controversy regarding
the legal doctrine.
Some scholars supported that the tribunal should follow the order pre-
scribed in article 38, because it represented a modulation of the consent of
the States.110 Other authors supported that this hierarchy did not exist and
the tribunal was free to use the sources to the best of its understanding,
although, in practice, priority would be given to the treaties since they
represented a formal consent on a certain object, and, in sequence, the
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custom, because the existence of these rules created no need to appeal to
the general principles of law.111 Another group, relying on the analysis of
the jurisprudence of the tribunal,112 argued that all sources could be used
together without preclusion in the case of application of one of them, and
that treaties could not be regarded as the most important source, due to the
jus cogens established in article 43 of the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties113 that prescribed that the invalidity, termination or denuncia-
tion of a treaty, should not in any way impair the duty of any State to ful-
fill any obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject
under international law independently of the treaty.114
Another aspect that deserves attention is the fact that the text of article
38 cannot be regarded as the ultimate definition of the formal sources of
international law, because it was conceived almost a century ago, when the
international society had far fewer States, was more homogeneous and
could not imagine the existence of intergovernmental organizations regulat-
ing virtually all aspects of life. Some authors have pointed out that it disre-
garded the existence of other formal sources of international law, such as
the unilateral declarations of the States and the resolutions of intergovern-
mental organizations.115 There are elements of truth in these remarks, as
we will study in Chapter 4.
Notwithstanding any criticism on the comprehensiveness of article 38,
we have decided to adopt it as guidance for the appraisal of the situation
of NGOs in international law in the forthcoming chapters, with only one
discreet difference: we have decided to re-ordinate them, starting our ap-
praisal with treaties and judicial decisions, due to their greater empirical
support, following with custom, general principles of law and international
legal doctrine, which we regarded as more analytical.
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CHAPTER 2
NGOs in International Treaties and
other Documents
Despite playing an important role in international relations, several relevant
international documents are not treaties, and, thus, are not covered by the
Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties nor are widely considered
sources of law in the sense of article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ. Such
documents are often referred to as soft law because they are not subject to
the fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda that regulates interna-
tional treaty law and, therefore, they do not impose international legal obli-
gations – compensations and reprisals - to the signatories, especially if the
parties expressly excluded their registration in accordance with article 102
of the UN Charter.1
Some reasons have been invoked to justify this apparently incoherent
practice of engaging diplomats in extensive negotiations to reach non-bind-
ing agreements, but we would like to stress a few of those mentioned by
Hillgenberg that, for the sake of our study, are closely related to the actual
situation of NGOs in international law. These reasons are:
– A general need for mutual confidence-building;
– The need to stimulate development still in progress;
– The creation of a preliminary, flexible regime, possibly providing for
its development in stages; and
– The possibility of agreements being made with parties which do not
have the power to conclude treaties under international law.
The first reason is a marked aspect of the relationship between States and
NGOs, particularly in democracies, where governments have maintained a
long-standing cooperation with NGOs at a national level, comprising,
together with the joint execution of programs, the service of several former
NGO board members or executives as government officials and the cus-
tomary participation of NGO representatives in official delegations to UN
Conferences and even to the General Assembly.2 This close relationship,
however, is often turbulent, because both sides of the relationship invoke
the legitimate representation of the same constituencies – the civil society
– but with different plans, approaches or objectives regarding the same is-
sue. Therefore, confidence building is continuously at stake at the national
level, where the existence of a government, on one side, and multiple un-
coordinated NGOs, on the other, can be observed, a situation which poses
severe difficulties for reaching a successful outcome. This situation is far
more complex at the international level, because INGOs often invoke the
representation of ‘global civil society’ and, hence, one can notice multiple
players on both sides of the negotiation table, coordinating their efforts in
a matrical scheme, sometimes leading certain kinds of coalitions of States
and NGOs to oppose the proposals of other States, such as in the debate re-
garding global warming.
While the interaction of NGOs with States is experiencing steady
growth, it is also true that they are even more active in other spheres.
Currently, we can observe that the relationship between NGOs and
Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) has been improving continuously,
with NGOs providing reliable information, technical expertise and logistic
support to implement the goals of IGOs and evaluate the actual perfor-
mance of States in several fields, particularly human rights and the protec-
tion of the environment.3 We could assume that this willingness to coop-
erate is based on the converging characteristics of both types of entities
that differentiate them from the States: They are newcomers to the interna-
tional arena, without specific territories to rule or a defined nation to repre-
sent, and they are also ‘issue focused’ entities created by agreements of
some constituencies to achieve specific goals. These similar characteristics
make it easier for IGOs and NGOs to work together. The innumerable con-
tractual arrangements concluded to regulate international cooperation in all
fields of their activities, according to a UN agency report, have made UN-
NGO relations evolve into a ‘symbiotic relationship’.4
The second reason for implementing non-binding agreements is fre-
quently the case of ‘a text which has been laid down at a conference as a
non-treaty-binding standard (that) gradually becomes, as awareness grows,
a binding and possibly a “hard” obligation’.5 An outstanding example is
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), which acquired the
force of customary international law and gave birth to a set of legally bind-
ing international instruments, still in evolution.6
The creation of a preliminary, flexible regime to enable its further devel-
opment in stages deserves more attention. As we shall see in this chapter,
diverse treaties, starting with the UN Charter itself, ensure NGOs a consul-
tative status. Other documents go further, granting them the capacity of ob-
servers at meetings of the UN General Assembly, a treatment equivalent to
the one assured to the Holy See, the Sovereign Military Order of Malta
and Palestine. NGOs have already been admitted as members in interna-
tional organizations, together with States and IGOs.7 Evidence shows that
an evolutionary customary practice is in course and a lengthy but rising de-
bate ensues as to whether NGOs can be parties in treaties and whether they
can bear responsibility under international law. This situation is not exactly
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new, since similar debates occurred half a century ago, a few years after
the creation of the UN, which ended with the understanding that IGOs
were subjects of international law, together with States, although they had
no nation to represent nor a territory to rule – or, to the contrary – they re-
presented all nations and operated in all territories.8
The fourth and last reason – the possibility of making agreements with
parties that cannot conclude treaties – is customary practice for a State,
often engaged in written agreements with non-state actors, such as compa-
nies, some of which are even economically stronger than the State itself.
The situation has been appreciated in the Texaco (TOPCO) v. Libyan Arab
Republic case where the arbitrators ruled that such agreements could not
be regarded as treaties because only sovereign States could conclude trea-
ties.9 In another judgment, the Gabdcíkovo-Nagymaros case, in 1997, the
ICJ considered a wider view of the relations between the parties, instead of
a mechanical application of the rules of treaty breach, showing ‘that inter-
national law can endow obligations with greater or lesser possibilities for
enforcement’.10 Thus, a ‘self-contained regime’ could be created by a spe-
cific set of rules that does not violate jus cogens in which ‘the parties ex-
clude the application of rules that follow from pacta sunt servanda but not,
for instance, from inadimplenti non est adimplendum’,11 making it possible
to envisage this kind of ‘self-contained regime’ in agreements drawn up in
the usual treaty language and concluded between States and non-state
actors, such as INGOs, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, even open to ac-
cession by other States or INGOs, whose occasional disputes could be sub-
mitted to settlement procedures, with recourse to the principle of good
faith.
The emergence of soft law and the steady growth of multilateral negotia-
tions under the auspices of the UN and other major intergovernmental
organizations are being regarded as favorable elements for the enhance-
ment of the participation of NGOs in the international sphere.12 This parti-
cipation is also perceived through some soft law instruments of persuasion
of States, such as the Human Rights Council (The Human Rights
Commission up to 2006), whose reports may constrain States before the
public opinion.13 Hillgenberg emphasized that non-treaty agreements can-
not directly produce customary international law, but can contribute to its
creation as an emerging opinio juris if taken as ‘subsequent practice’ for
the sake of Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, while interpreting a treaty.14
In the fields of human rights and environmental protection there is a ten-
dency for soft law provisions to develop into hard law rules. It can be ob-
served, for instance, by Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,
reaffirmed as Principle 2 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, further enshrined in
a binding agreement, as article 3 of the Biological Diversity Convention,15
which ended up considered by the International Court of Justice as part of
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the ‘corpus of the international law relating to the environment’.16 This
idea demonstrates its relevancy if we analyze the evolution of the treatment
of INGOs in international documents within the institutional framework of
the UN and other international organizations, as we will see hereinafter.
2.1 The UN System
Some authors affirm that the UN Charter was not conceived as one of
many multilateral treaties that operates within international law, but as the
constitution of the international community, therefore occupying the high-
est level in the hierarchy of norms, providing the framework within which
international law would operate.17 Accordingly, they argue that its princi-
ples cannot be modified, restricted or revoked by further customary law or
treaties. Considering the development of humanitarian law and environ-
mental law since 1945, it is beyond any doubt that contemporary society is
challenging the UN to become more ‘responsive to the demands and needs
of peoples rather than exclusively those of States’.18 After all, the opening
phrase of the Preamble to the UN Charter begins with the expression ‘We,
the peoples of the United Nations’. Hence, increasing people’s participation
in the UN system is necessary to enhance the practice of the principles en-
shrined in the Charter, such as self-determination and respect for human
rights, and also to reduce the democratic deficit of the organization.
In general terms, the UN Charter allows for a formal channel of partici-
pation of NGOs at the UN: the application for consultative status with the
ECOSOC (art 71).19 Based on this (‘international constitutional’) right of
participation, the subsequent practice of UN subsidiary organs and agen-
cies demonstrates that INGOs can be invited to participate in the sessions
of work of the General Assembly in the capacity of Observer or ask for ac-
creditation for special UN Conferences, both without voting rights. They
can also associate themselves with the UN Department of Public
Information (DPI) or establish working relations with other UN special
bodies. As we will see, the bureaucratic structure of the UN provides var-
ious channels of communication and interaction with NGOs, despite some
overlapping of scope.
The so-called ‘focal point’ for NGOs seeking consultative status with
the ECOSOC is the UN Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs NGO
Branch (DESA NGO Branch) in New York, which acts as the substantive
secretariat of the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs. The DESA NGO Branch
is responsible for screening applications, processing reports, facilitating
consultative arrangements between the ECOSOC and qualified NGOs and
also providing advice and assistance to secretariats of other UN-sponsored
events in all aspects related to NGO participation or contributions.
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Once the consultative status is obtained, the NGO is referred to another
‘focal point’ within the UN system, represented by the NGO Liaison
Office in Geneva, which liaises NGOs holding consultative status with the
ECOSOC, facilitating their participation in UN activities. The office also
assists Permanent Missions based in Geneva in all aspects related to the re-
lationship between the UN and the NGOs.
A third structure offered by the UN to support the mentioned relation-
ship is the NGO Section of the UN Dept. of Public Information (DPI NGO
Section), which acts as the liaison between the UN and NGOs and civil so-
ciety organizations, whether with consultative status or not, in order to de-
velop and promote effective information programs for NGOs to dissemi-
nate information about issues on the UN’s agenda and its work. We will
address the association with the DPI in more detail below.
Finally, a fourth formal channel is represented by the UN Non-
Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS), which occupies a self-called ‘un-
ique place and role in the interface between the UN system and NGOs’20
due to its mission to ‘promote dynamic partnerships between the UN and
NGOs by providing information advice, expertise and support services to
strengthen dialogue and win public support for economical and social
development’.21
The UN system also interacts with NGOs through three other ‘private’
collective structures, which are: (i) the UN NGO Informal Regional
Networks (UN-NGO-IRENE), created in response to the UN Secretary
General’s Report of 1999 to the General Assembly,22 which underlined the
need to establish regional networks of NGOs to promote partnerships,
share information and contribute to the work of the ECOSOC; (ii) The
International Association of Economic and Social Councils and Similar
Institutions (AICESIS), composed of consultative assemblies fostered by
public authorities to promote dialogue with civil society in key social and
economic issues, which has been granted a permanent observer status at
the ECOSOC by Council decision 2001/318; and (iii) The Conference of
NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the UN (CONGO), a network of
national, regional and international NGOs possessing consultative status
with the UN that aims to assist its members to facilitate and enhance their
participation in UN decision-making, strengthening their voices and pro-
moting a consensus-building approach among the associated members,
which is particularly relevant considering the more than 3,000 organiza-
tions with consultative status.
The existence of these seven structures to support the interaction of
NGOs and the UN, together with several other NGO liaison offices in the
various UN funds, agencies and programmes, undoubtedly demonstrates
that NGOs are non-state actors with legitimacy to express the views of
their constituencies, yet the bureaucratic division of access between diverse
structures shows that these opinions may be heard but not necessarily
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always taken into account in a UN structure where States call to them-
selves the sole representativeness of the nations of the world in the interna-
tional arena. Notwithstanding, it is a fact that the UN system is paying
more attention to NGOs even at its main structure, the General Assembly.
2.1.1 General Assembly
NGOs were particularly active during the first years of the UN. The first
reference of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) document to NGOs is Res.
4(I) of 14 February 1946, which recommended that the ECOSOC adopt
suitable arrangements to put into practice the consultative status set forth
in article 71 of the UN Charter, acceding to the request of the World
Federation of Trade Unions, the American Federation of Labor and the
International Cooperative Alliance, all very active during the San
Francisco Conference. This recommendation led to a report from the com-
mittee on arrangements for consultation with NGOs, setting the principles
to be applied for such consultation, adopted on 21 June 1946, which finally
granted consultative status to the mentioned entities.23 Since Res. 2/3 only
allowed the considered NGOs to submit written statements and sit as ob-
servers at all public meetings of the ECOSOC (para 2), the NGOs put
more pressure on the UNGA and achieved a further step in participation,
when the UNGA approved Res. 49(I) of 15 December 1946, recommend-
ing the ECOSOC to give the World Federation of Trade Unions the right
to submit questions to the ECOSOC for insertion in the provisional agen-
da, in accordance to procedures then applicable to specialized agencies.
This right was further expanded to all NGOs with general consultative
status.
Once consultative status with the UN had become effective, some
NGOs deemed it necessary to establish a closer relationship with the States
themselves while maintaining a certain level of immunity in their opera-
tions. Acceding to the request of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, the
UNGA passed Res. 55(I) of 19 November 1946, encouraging the member-
states to cooperate with recognized national Red Cross and Red Crescent
societies, recalling that ‘at all times’ the independent voluntary nature of
those entities should be respected in ‘all circumstances’, in order to allow
them to carry out their humanitarian task according to the principles of the
Geneva and The Hague Conventions.
However, NGOs pursued more extensive rights. During its 2nd Session,
in 1947, the UNGA invited the Secretary General to prepare, in consulta-
tion with the ECOSOC, draft rules for the calling of international confer-
ences.24 It gave NGOs with consultative status a remarkable opportunity to
improve their participation in the UN system. The draft rules were pre-
sented at the UNGA’s 4th session in 1949 and proposed that NGOs with
consultative status would have the same rights and privileges ensured to
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them at the ECOSOC, while participating at conferences called according
to those rules.25 This extension of rights was fiercely challenged at the
General Assembly, where some member-states supported that the draft
rules could lead to a misinterpretation of their legal status, which, based on
article 71, should not be taken as the same ensured to States.26 The pro-
posed draft rules were never actually adopted, though the participation of
NGOs with consultative status in international conferences is currently
regulated by ECOSOC Res. 1996/31 (25 July 1996).
In a new tour de force, NGOs got the General Assembly to approve the
first structured model of collective consultation with NGOs, when it
adopted Res. 479(V) of 12 December 1950, setting down the rules for the
calling of non-governmental conferences by the ECOSOC on any matters
of its competence, allowing the participation of NGOs with consultative
status but also national NGOs without it, provided that the invitation of the
latter should be preceded by a consultation of the member-state concerned.
Another expressive movement of NGOs can be observed at the UNGA’s
6th Session, in 1951, where, after obtaining a preliminary achievement on
the ECOSOC, the NGOs succeeded in getting a UNGA authorization for
the Secretary General to make, upon request of the ECOSOC, the due ar-
rangements to enable NGO representatives to attend public meetings of the
General Assembly whenever economic and social matters within the
Council and the concerned organization’s competence were discussed.27
Since the sessions were public and the custom allowed the presence of ob-
servers without invitation, at first sight, this did not seem to represent any
advancement. However, the main purpose behind the NGOs’ convincing
the member-states to pass this resolution was that of extending the applica-
tion of the UN Headquarters Agreement to NGO representatives, since the
US government had been interfering in their participation in the works of
the ECOSOC by not admitting representatives of certain Eastern European
NGOs into the country, which represented an arbitrary McCarthyist inter-
ference in an intergovernmental organization.28
Improvement in the working relationship with the UN was also an NGO
goal. The first references of UN-NGOs cooperation are observed in UNGA
Res. 280(III) of 13 May 1949, which invited the ECOSOC to consider,
after consultation with NGOs concerned, the possibility of drafting a gener-
al report on the world’s social and cultural situation, in UNGA Res. 833
(IX) of 4 December 1954, which invited NGOs to stimulate public interest
in the draft covenant on human rights and in UNGA Res. 926(X) of 14
December 1955, which called NGOs to supplement the UN advisory ser-
vices to member-states in the field of human rights with similar programs
designed for further research and studies, exchange of information and as-
sistance. The partnership of NGOs with the UN has shown signs of contin-
uous improvement since these first years and is mentioned in dozens of
other UNGA resolutions.29
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The very first years of the UN were extremely fruitful for NGOs,
marked by significant achievements in their lobbying activities, setting a
pattern of participation that could lead to further rights under international
law if the pace of achievements had remained the same. However, this
proved not to be the case, seeing as NGOs made few strides in their rights
during the following decades, certainly due to the tense relationship be-
tween NGOs - seeking more power - and States, providing resistance to
them.
The next remarkable improvement in the status of INGOs at the General
Assembly was provided by UNGA Res. 45/6 of 16 October 1990, which
invited the International Committee of the Red Cross to participate in the
sessions of the General Assembly in the capacity of Observer, a status
further extended to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies in 199430 and to the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) in 1999.31 It is relevant to quote that the
Sovereign Military Order of Malta achieved similar status in 199432 and
Palestine in 1998.33 Since then, an evolutionary practice has allowed a
certain degree of informal participation of NGOs at the General Assembly,
mainly in subsidiary bodies (such as the 4th Committee) but also addres-
sing its plenary meetings during special sessions.34
Although there is no doubt that the UN has neither received a mandate
from the member-states to engage them in treaties nor constitutes a super-
State,35 it is unquestionable that the General Assembly represents a quali-
fied forum for the development of the understanding of international law.
Given that it works to obtain consensus on its resolutions,36 it may contri-
bute to the formation of customary international law,37 a theme that will be
explored in the Chapter 4.
2.1.2 ECOSOC Consultative Status
In the Preliminary Chapter, we analyzed the evolution of the rules concern-
ing the application of INGOs for the consultative status with the ECOSOC
and the difficulties encountered in clearly defining the kind of organizations
that were meant by article 71 of the UN Charter. Evidence shows that the
UN adopts different criteria for recognizing an INGO, since accreditation to
a UN conference does not require the previous granting of consultative sta-
tus with the ECOSOC,38 nor does the association with the DPI provide a
‘fast track’ for the consultative status or ensure the establishment of work-
ing relationships with other UN bodies. All these channels of participation
are in fact independent from each other and, albeit having some similarities,
cannot be regarded as having a single criterion. This situation reinforces the
need for a substantive definition of an INGO and a coordinated set of rules
regulating their participation within the UN system, moreover if we take
into consideration some practices upheld by the ECOSOC.
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The ECOSOC is composed of 54 States elected for three-year terms by
the General Assembly. According to article 62 of the UN Charter, the
ECOSOC may make or initiate studies and reports with respect to interna-
tional economic, social, cultural, educational, health, and related matters
and may make recommendations with respect to any such matters, and also
for the purpose of promoting the observance of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, to the General Assembly and to the specialized agencies
concerned. Since the INGOs holding consultative status with the Council
can attend its meetings and address its members orally or in writing, it is
important, especially for those countries with a past record of violation of
human rights, to control who is admitted and remains on the ECOSOC.
Taking a look at the 2009 composition of the Council,39 it is certainly sur-
prising to realize that the UN body in charge of promoting respect for hu-
man rights was composed – together with longstanding democracies – of
several countries under dictatorship or in civil war and, most astonishingly,
that it had, as a member of the Council and at the Chair of the Committee
on NGOs, a country (Sudan) governed by the only head of State ever to
have received an ICJ warrant of arrest for crimes against humanity and war
crimes, while in office. How is this possible? For several reasons, the first
being the division of seats among the continents in order to ensure equita-
ble geographical representation, and the consequent regional agreement to
nominate the candidates to the General Assembly, but, most of all, because
it is important to be at the ‘door’ to control the entrance and permanence
of ‘troublemakers’ on the ‘party’s’ premises.40
Consultative status is granted by the ECOSOC upon recommendation of
the ECOSOC Committee on NGOs, which is comprised of nineteen mem-
ber-states: five from Africa; four from Asia; two from Eastern Europe; four
from Latin America and the Caribbean; and four from Western Europe and
other regions. The Committee on NGOs is the ‘only intergovernmental
body mandated to monitor the evolving relationship between those organi-
zations and the UN’.41
At the 2009 Regular Session, held from 19 to 28 January and on 2
February 2009, the Committee on NGOs had before it one hundred and
fifty-seven applications for consultative status, including applications de-
ferred from its past sessions. Of those applications, the Committee recom-
mended sixty-seven for consultative status, did not recommend one, de-
ferred eighty-six for further consideration, took note that two applications
had been withdrawn, and closed without prejudice consideration of four
applications. The Committee also had before it four requests for reclassifi-
cation of consultative status, and recommended all of them. In addition, it
had before it ninety-five quadrennial reports, of which it took note of
ninety-four and deferred one. The Committee heard fourteen representa-
tives of NGOs.42
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An analysis of the outcome of the 2009 Committee on NGOs’ regular
session reveals some similarities with the 2000 regular session addressed
by Aston in his article.43 In the 2009 session, a lengthy debate was raised
by the Egyptian representative as to whether it was possible or not to ap-
preciate the application of national organizations whose host State had not
offered its opinion on the candidate, as set forth in ECOSOC Res. 1996/
31.44 The claim was supported by States with low democratic records
(such as Cuba, China, India and Pakistan) but was challenged by open lib-
eral democracies (the US, the UK, Switzerland, Chile, and Mexico), which
stated that the resolution had been in force for more than ten years and that
the question had never arisen in the past. Evaluating the session from an
outsider’s point of view and having at hand only the detailed press releases
made public by the Committee, reporting a never-ending request for addi-
tional information from the NGOs that led to a continuously deferred pro-
cedure, it seems evident that the ‘gatekeepers’ were controlling access to
the ‘party’ in a strategy to reduce (or, better put, avoid) criticism to their
own governmental practices, especially if we notice that ECOSOC Res.
1996/31 allows the possibility of the non-existence of such a view from
the host country (‘The views expressed by the member-state, if any…) and
that the considered NGOs were active in sensitive human rights issues.45
Furthermore, if the new interpretation were to become effective, then, any
country could impose an insurmountable obstacle for the accession of
NGOs to consultative status just by its silence. This issue remains open to
debate. It is also crystal clear that the procedure of the member-states at
the Committee shows a relevant concern about the works of any NGO that
might impact their domestic policies and practices, hence demonstrating
the increasing importance of NGOs in the international arena and espe-
cially their role in forming public opinion on the concerned issues in an
era of ‘audience democracy’ and media sympathy for NGOs.46
The proceedings of the Committee on NGOs provide evidence that, re-
calling Aston’s words, the UN is a ‘politically divided house’ in which the
current mechanisms of NGO participation at the UN reveal certain weak-
nesses and a variety of discrepant views, when considering whether and to
what extent the current participatory rights of NGOs in the UN decision-
making process should be kept or expanded.47 In a certain way, the
Committee debate can be regarded as a reproduction, on a smaller scale, of
the current debate at the UN General Assembly and conferences on the
role of NGOs. While there appears to be a consensus that the UN should
remain, in principle, an inter-state body and that NGOs can make important
contributions towards the pursuit of UN goals,48 it remains unclear what
kind of arrangements should be made to efficiently run joint efforts or,
what proves to be more complicated, to make collective decisions, with
thousands of NGOs proud of their independence located all over the globe
and without permanent missions in New York or Geneva. Nevertheless, we
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strongly disagree with the argument presented by the Conference of NGOs
with Consultative Relationship with the UN (CONGO) that the expanded
granting of consultative status might backfire, since it would make substan-
tive collaboration between NGOs and the UN less feasible,49 because, in
essence, it relies on the same argument presented by States to deny increas-
ing participation of NGOs in the decision-making process: the existence of
several other representatives of the civil society. Furthermore, if the ‘peo-
ple’ in the ‘ark’ assume that no one else can be admitted, then the question
as to whether they are the ‘chosen people’ necessarily arises, providing
more arguments for the NGO’s detractors, usually from countries with a
lesser tradition for recognizing civil society and human rights, as formerly
mentioned in the discussion of the 2009 Committee’s regular session.
What surely represents backfiring is closing the gates, not keeping them
open. Of course, there is need and room for improvement in the relation-
ship, as we will propose in the conclusion of this study, but, for the sake
of our analysis, we must address beforehand the other channels of interac-
tion of NGOs with the UN system established by international documents
other than the UN Charter.
2.1.3 Secretariat DPI Association
In 1947, the Secretariat Department of Public Information (DPI) was estab-
lished with the purpose of providing information about the work and aims
of the UN to the civil society. Since its enactment, close contacts have
been maintained with NGOs, culminating in an official relationship in
1968.50 Currently, the DPI/NGO Section acts as a liaison between the UN
and the NGOs that can become associates to the DPI. In 2009, there were
1664 NGOs with strong information programmes associated with the DPI,
668 of which were also associated with ECOSOC.51
This association differs substantially from the consultative status with
the ECOSOC that is focused on providing information to the UN and of-
fering subsidies to the decision-making process, including influencing the
agenda. Rather, it establishes a working relationship between the UN and
the NGOs that have the duty to effectively disseminate information about
the UN principles, issues on its agenda and its activities to the general pub-
lic. If the NGOs’ evaluation reports do not provide satisfactory evidence
about its collaboration with the UN system, the NGO in concern can be
disassociated.52
Observing the themes of the last fifteen years’ Annual DPI/NGO
Conferences, one can notice a useful dialogue about relevant world issues
such as globalization challenges, post-conflict rebuilding, security, the
Millennium Development Goals, human rights and climate change, which
are certainly at stake at the UN and in the international community.
Regarding this last theme, the 2007 conference, for the first time in sixty
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years of regular meetings, produced a Conference Declaration committing
the 500 participating NGOs to reach a concerted set of proposals compris-
ing both individual and collective action plans to combat issues of climate
change. The NGOs also reiterated their pledge to be active partners of the
UN, States and civil society to act on the matter.
Although association with the DPI does not induce a further change in
the legal status of NGOs in international law, since the DPI regards them
as private ‘service provider’ institutions, the fact of maintaining a continu-
ous dialogue through working partnerships, weekly briefings, communica-
tion workshops, orientation programs and the mentioned annual DPI/NGO
conferences, is extremely positive for fostering an increased awareness of
civil society issues and, more importantly, for the establishment of a differ-
ent UN channel of concerted interaction that does not pass through the
States’ permanent missions, enhancing mutual confidence building be-
tween the UN and NGOs.
2.1.4 Security Council
Under the UN Charter, the functions and powers of the Security Council
(UNSC) include, among others, the maintenance of international peace and
security and the investigation of any dispute or situations which might lead
to international friction, recommending methods of adjusting such disputes
or the terms of the settlement. The Council is authorized to make binding
decisions, particularly under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Based on its
state-only composition and its sensitive role, there is no room for formal
interaction with NGOs in the decision-making process, moreover if we
bear in mind the individual veto power assured to its five permanent mem-
bers. This does not mean, however, that the UNSC does not interact with
NGOs in some circumstances, notably when humanitarian issues are at
stake, through a protocol trick, the so-called Arria Formula.53 To exemplify
such interaction, we can quote UNSC Resolution 666 (1990), which ac-
knowledged a privileged role to the ICRC in executing humanitarian mea-
sures in Iraq during the first Gulf War, and UNSC Resolution 771 (1992),
which, in dealing with the Bosnia and Herzegovina war, demanded – im-
posing a binding obligation – that the conflicting parties grant unimpeded
and continued access of relevant international humanitarian organizations
and, in particular, the ICRC, to camps, prisons and detention centers within
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, also calling upon those organiza-
tions to provide the Council with any substantive information in their pos-
session relating to the violations of humanitarian law or grave breaches of
the Geneva Conventions.
Though the Council has little contact with NGOs, it does not mean that
it has little concern about non-state actors in the international arena. Since
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the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, another kind of civil so-
ciety group has drawn the attention of its members: terrorist organizations.
It is out of the scope of this study to address at length the situation of
such non-state actors in international law, but it is a fact that they are sub-
verting some important legal categories of a system conceived to govern
the relations between sovereign States which, thus, cannot deal with such
actors simply because they fall outside of the model.54 The attacks surely
highlighted the limitations of the Westphalian state-centric system.55
As Cassese remarks, the UN Charter ensures to all nations the right of
self-defense if attacked by another State, provided that such reaction is a
timely response to repel the attack, targeting the attacking State with pro-
portional force and with respect to humanitarian law.56 Obviously, the 9/11
events didn’t fit this model, because the US was not under attack by a
State. How could it respond to the attacks?
When the UNSC passed Resolution 1368 (12 September 2001), smoke
was still in the air in New York and its members had no legal option but to
define the attacks as ‘a threat to peace’ and to call all States to work to-
gether to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors, stres-
sing that those who harbored them would be held accountable. Of course,
the terrorists had to have a base in some State. Could this State become ac-
countable for acts of individuals or groups of individuals that lived in its
territory? If the answer is affirmative, that is a remarkable shift (perhaps ir-
reconcilable with the UN Charter rules on self-defense) in the customary
law on state responsibility that supported that a State had to be considered
responsible for the conduct of a person or group of persons only if the per-
son or group of persons was in fact acting on the ‘instructions’ of, or under
the ‘direction’ or ‘control’ of, that state in carrying out the conduct.57
However, realpolitik58 has shown that, yes, States could be held accoun-
table for acts of non-states actors.59 On 7 October 2001, the US-led coali-
tion launched air strikes against Taliban targets in Afghanistan (an act of
self-defense? reprisal?) based on the claim that the Afghan government al-
lowed the Al’Qaeda to establish training camps in the country, which en-
titled the US government to pre-emptive use of force against its potential
enemies, a decision that would later give birth to the so-called Bush doc-
trine.60 Once the use of military force was a reality, without previous
Council authorization, and the Taliban had been removed from power in
Afghanistan, the UNSC authorized the deployment of an international se-
curity force to the country to assist the new government in the maintenance
of security in the region of Kabul.61
The future development of the UNSC’s understanding on the legal status
of terrorist non-state actors, their responsibilities to the international com-
munity and their relationship with any lodging or financing State, will cer-
tainly influence the understanding of the legal status of NGOs inasmuch as
one could regard both non-state actors as the opposite sides of the same
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coin, minted by the inadequate response of international law to contempor-
ary challenges.62
2.1.5 Specialized Agencies
a. General overview
The ECOSOC’s consultative status model has been adopted by all the
funds, programmes and specialized agencies of the UN system as guidance
for their dialogue with NGOs. Some of them had the procedure established
in their constitutive acts, as is the case of FAO, ICAO, IMO, ITU,
UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, WIPO and WMO. Other bodies had it estab-
lished by decision of their governing structures, such as the IFAD, UNDP,
UNIFEM, UNODC, UPU, WFP and World Bank. Finally, some other sub-
sidiary organs go further, establishing NGO bodies that meet regularly,
such as the UN Populations Fund (UNFPA) NGO Advisory Committee,
composed of twenty-five to thirty representatives of NGOs, and the ‘WFP-
NGO Consultation’, an annual policy dialogue, jointly managed and orga-
nized.63 Given the similarities, we will appraise in this chapter just some
of them, that we have regarded as interesting paradigms for study.
b. ILO
The International Labor Organization (ILO) is the only UN ‘family mem-
ber’ that has adopted a tripartite scheme of governance, integrating sectors
of civil society representing workers and employers into its structure to-
gether with governments. Employers’ and workers’ national representative
organizations are not members of the ILO, whose membership is open only
to States, but they can participate in the decision-making because the con-
stitution of this international organization imposed to the member-states
the obligation to select their delegates to the governing bodies with the par-
ticipation of national civil society organizations. Adopting this model, the
ILO Constitution by-passed the debate regarding the international legal
personality of civil society organizations, nonetheless ensuring the right of
participation of those entities.64
According to the ILO Constitution,65 employers’ and workers’ delegates
are chosen by member-states in agreement with the industrial organizations
which are the most representative of employers and work people in their
respective countries and join the government representatives of all mem-
ber-states at the organization’ supreme organ, the International Labor
Conference. Every three years, the individual employers’ and workers’ de-
legates of all member-states organize themselves into electoral colleges to
elect their representatives to the ILO Governing Body, also a tripartite
body, where its members enjoy equal status, including voting rights, what-
ever the segment they represent.
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In addition to this unique integration of governments and non-state
actors in the high level decision-making process of an intergovernmental
organization, the Constitution of the ILO also established another channel
of dialogue with organizations of employers, workers, agriculturists and
cooperatives, provided by the consultative status with recognized interna-
tional NGOs with convergent purposes that can be granted at either general
or regional levels, depending on the territorial scope of the activities of the
NGO concerned (article 12(3)). The dialogue with civil society is not re-
stricted to the employer/worker binomial as the ILO set down, back in
1956, a special list of INGOs that share the same principles and objectives
as the ILO Constitution and the Declaration of Philadelphia,66 which cur-
rently comprises more than one hundred and fifty NGOs focused on hu-
man rights, poverty relief, social security, etc. In a further movement in the
dialogue with civil society, the ILO also invites qualified NGOs to attend,
in the condition of observers, some of its meetings, those for which they
have demonstrated particular interest.
The exceptional participation of civil society in the decision-making pro-
cess of an intergovernmental organization in charge of such an important
matter as employment, demonstrates that there is plenty of room for the
structured enlargement of non-state actors’ participation in IGOs and, in
particular, in the UN system. This affirmation is even stronger if we recall
that the ILO was established almost a century ago, together with the
League of Nations, at a time when public concerns about global govern-
ance and democracy, just to mention two contemporary issues, seemed far
less relevant.
We understand that the ILO model has been extremely facilitated by the
preexistence of matching structured representative bodies of either employ-
ers or workers in most of the countries, which generally adopt a pyramidal
shape with local, regional and national layers of representativeness. Surely,
several other contemporary issues do not have similar structures to support
them. Nevertheless, some ‘classic’ issues, such as Health and Education,
have worldwide structures and could definitely adopt an ILO-like govern-
ance. Probably, workers and employers were granted a golden opportunity
to take part in the organization due to the remarkable prominence of the la-
bor union movement at the beginning of the 20th century. We believe that
some other windows of opportunity are open now.
c. UNESCO
The Constitution of 1945 of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO)67 laid down the initial provisions for the
interaction between the organization and NGOs, establishing two channels
of participation: consultative status (Art XI(4)) and the possibility of sum-
moning international non-governmental conferences on education, the
sciences and humanities or the dissemination of knowledge (art IV(3)).
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Those initial provisions were first detailed in the General Conference in
1960, later replaced in 1995, and amended in 2001. The current Directives
authorize UNESCO to establish ‘operational relations’ with NGOs at inter-
national, regional, sub-regional, national, local and grass-roots levels
before establishing ‘official relations’. The former relationship comprises
those dynamic partnerships in the implementation of UNESCO programs
at all the mentioned levels, and the latter, the sustained cooperation with
UNESCO in its fields of competence, being granted to INGOs with recog-
nized international structure and membership, either consultative or associ-
ate, depending on their role and structure.68
Once the official relation has been established, INGOs can be invited to
send observers to sessions of the General Conference and its commissions,
where they may make statements to the audience, with the consent of the
presiding officer, or submit written statements to the Director-General for
further communication to the Executive Board or to the General
Conference.69
Compared with the ILO and the ECOSOC, the participation of NGOs in
policy decision-making at UNESCO is far less relevant, even if one con-
siders that their partnerships have been conceived to be of an essentially
intellectual nature, promoting the exchange of ideas, technical cooperation
and advising.
d. WHO
The World Health Organization (WHO) upholds the purpose, among other
issues, of acting as the directing and coordinating authority on international
health issues. To support this function, its Constitution stipulates that the
organization may ‘on matters within its competence make suitable arrange-
ments for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental interna-
tional organizations and, with the consent of the Government concerned,
with national organizations, governmental or non-governmental’.70
According to the ‘Principles Governing Relations with Nongovernmental
Organizations’, the WHO should act in conformity to any relevant resolu-
tions of the UNGA and the ECOSCOC and its relationship with NGOs is
an process evolving in separate stages which does not comprise different
categories, as do the relationships maintained by the ECOSOC, the ILO or
UNESCO, rather just one – known as official relations – being all other
contacts, including working relations, considered of an informal character.
The evolutionary approach demands a previous working relationship be-
tween the parties, supported by letters exchanged agreeing on the basis for
the collaboration, the outcome of which will be further jointly assessed.71
NGOs in official relations have the right to participate in WHO meetings
or in those of the committees and conferences convened under its auspices
with the possibility of speaking before those bodies, but without voting
rights. They can request access to non-confidential documentation and can
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also submit written statements to the Director General, who has the author-
ity to define their circulation as well as access to the data requested.
The tighter restrictions in participation, if compared to the ILO and the
ECOSOC, haven’t prevented NGOs from reaching a striking achievement
of convincing the 54th World Health Assembly in 1993, and later, the 1994
UN General Assembly, to ask the ICJ for an urgent advisory opinion, for-
mulating the following question: ‘Is the threat of or use of nuclear weapons
in any circumstance permitted under international law?’ More noticeable,
however, was the outcome: Albeit the apparent impossibility of getting an
affirmative answer and the completeness – an a priori assumption of every
legal system – of international law ensured by article 38 of the ICJ
Statutes, the Court pronounced a non liquet, i.e., decided that it ‘cannot
conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
be lawful or unlawful’.72
Although probably not the expected result, beyond any doubt NGOs de-
finitively influenced the agenda and the decision-making process of both
the WHO and the UNGA and, what’s more, gave birth to a fierce debate
by the ICJ and, afterwards, among scholars, as to the limits and openness
of international law, an issue that we will further appraise in the next
chapter.
e. World Bank
There is no provision for any kind of formal relationship between NGOs
and the World Bank in its formation acts, but in 1982 an NGO-WB
Committee was formed to provide a forum for formal discussion among
senior bank managers and twenty-six international NGO leaders on new
policies, programs, studies or the design of specific projects, aiming to
improve development effectiveness and sustainability and hold govern-
ments and policymakers publicly accountable.73 Additionally, the bank has
established one hundred and twenty Civil Society Focal Points, experi-
enced social scientists and communication officers working in over eighty
country offices that act as liaison officers with civil society.
The interaction with NGOs is also supported by the World Bank
Inspection Panel, established in 1993, a body that accepts complaints from
any affected parties regarding the bank’s projects and any failure of the
bank to follow its own rules. It is the sole check on the bank’s activities
and the implementation of its supported projects.74 We shall return to the
Inspection Panels and their role as tools for an enhanced accountability on
Chapter 8.
f. Other specialized agencies
Among other UN specialized agencies that have formal consultative rela-
tionships with NGOs established in their Constitutions, we mention the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO),75 the International Monetary
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Fund (IMF),76 the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),77 the
International Maritime Organization (IMO),78 the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO),79 the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO),80 the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)81
and the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).82
2.2 The OECD
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
has maintained a continuous dialogue with civil society organizations, in-
cluding NGOs, businesses and trade unions since its inception in 1961.
The relationship does not rely on treaty obligations, but rather relies on a
1962 OECD Council decision, still in force, that set down two consultative
bodies, the Business and Industry Advisory Committee and the Trade
Union Advisory Committee. Those formal bodies have annual meetings
with the OECD Council and pre-ministerial consultations, together with in-
formal contacts, consultations, seminars and workshops throughout the
year, and participation in several OECD activities through the Labor/
Management Programme.83
OECD’s goal of introducing high standards of governance in public in-
stitutions, through increased citizen awareness and understanding of public
policies, legitimizes information sharing, consultation and active engage-
ment of citizens in policy-making as guiding approaches, although such
partnership is still rare in the member-states.84
Active engagement of civil society is pursued in areas such as trade and
the environment, where the OECD Trade Committee holds regular consul-
tation with civil society organizations, and also on global and corporate
governance, fighting corruption and environmental policy, development co-
operation, biotechnology, food and agriculture, information and communi-
cations technologies, territorial development and nuclear energy, where
consultation has been established on a variable basis, either in formal or in-
formal meetings.85 Worthy to quote, too, is the initiative of the OECD
Forum, an international public conference that offers civil society organiza-
tions the opportunity to discuss key global issues with government minis-
ters and leaders of international organizations, together with the possibility
of contributing to the OECD annual ministerial summit.
But OECD contact with civil society has not always been smooth going.
One impact derived from the 9/11 attacks was that certain malfeasance
practices came to light, in which charitable fundraising and institutions had
been used as coverage for financing of terrorism, which included shelter to
terrorists, logistical support and illicit arms. Those circumstances led the
OECD Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF-GAFI)
to study and propose international best practices to combat the abuse of
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non-profit organizations, focusing on their financial transparency, program-
matic verification, administration, oversight bodies and sanctions.86
As aforementioned, while discussing the interaction of NGOs with the
UNSC, either NGOs or terrorist groups have roots in civil society and,
also, in their supporters’ dissatisfaction with the world’s current state of af-
fairs and/or government strategies to deal with them. Therefore, it is impor-
tant to implement a set of rules and procedures capable of enhancing civil
participation in global policy decision-making processes in order to address
the manifold issues at stake and counterbalance the appealing ‘The end jus-
tifies the means!’ call of certain groups before the deafness of States’
representatives.
2.3 The Council of Europe
The ideas and ideals enshrined in the UN Charter have roots in European
thought, as well as the conception of the welfare state, which offers a high
standard of State’s respect toward its citizens. Therefore, it is not without
reason that the relationship of the European institutions with NGOs had its
onset more than a half century ago, in 1951, when the Council of Europe
(CoE) authorized the Committee of Ministers to make suitable arrange-
ments for consultation with INGOs with activities and purposes within the
competence of the Council.87
Similar to the situation observed on the ECOSOC, there have been con-
tinuous improvements in the rules on consultative status, with new rules
being enacted in 1976 and 1993, when consultative status was extended to
national NGOs. The current rules were adopted in 2003 and have incorpo-
rated a sensitive advance in the relationship because they have ‘underlined
the participatory character’ of the interaction of NGOs with the CoE.88
In practical terms, the Council has remained a state-only organization
and the NGOs’ participation can neither be regarded as membership to the
Council nor represent the acquisition of voting rights in any of its bodies.
Notwithstanding it, the new regime provided an ‘upgrade’ to NGOs, that,
then, leave the status of consultants, who answer whatever and whenever
they are asked, to become true participants in the debates, with more op-
portunities to share their point of view, submitting memoranda without size
limitations and providing expertise advice on a more regular basis,
although not voting in the decision-making process.89 The enhanced status
was welcomed in a CoE Parliamentary Assembly that supported ‘the prin-
ciple of changing the consultative status to a participatory one’ and mani-
fested its intention ‘to consider in the future the possibility of creating a
specific status based upon appropriate criteria for the NGOs with the
Parliamentary Assembly in order to enhance direct contact and co-opera-
tion with them’.90
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To obtain participatory status, the candidate NGO must submit an appli-
cation to the CoE Secretary General, according to the aforementioned Res.
2003(8). Once the documentary conditions have been met, the Secretary
General submits the list of candidates to the Liaison Committee, a demo-
cratically elected body representing all NGOs with participatory status
within the Council, for any remarks, which must be given within two
months. Once the period has expired, the Secretary General submits the list
to the Committee of Ministers, Parliamentary Assembly and the Congress
of Local and Regional Authorities, whose members can raise objections to
any candidate within a three-month period. If the period should expire
without any remarks being made, the Secretary General concludes the pro-
cedure by appointing the NGO to the list of those entities with participa-
tory status. In a manner different from that of the ECOSOC, where the
member-states must actively vote to approve granting the status, at the
CoE their silence is enough to approve the candidacy.
Together with the new rules concerning participatory status, a new reso-
lution has been adopted that addresses the status of partnership between
the CoE and NGOs, providing directives about modalities of co-operation
(program implementation, public awareness-raising events, expert advice)
and procedures for partnership agreements.91 To foster participation of in-
dividuals through civil society organizations in CoE activities, the
‘Conference of INGOs in the Council of Europe’ has been established,
which is a network of NGOs with participatory status, that, similarly to
the CONGO in the UN system, aims to concatenate efforts of their mem-
bers to make them more effective in the CoE and enhance their political
role. Member NGOs are organized in committees aligned to the structure
of CoE bodies, with the clear intention of bolstering their influence in CoE
steering committees and groups of experts.92
The relationship of the CoE with NGOs has gone beyond simply regu-
lating their consultative (participatory) status or even working relations in
international documents other than treaties, since, back in 1986, the mem-
ber-states adopted the Strasbourg Convention, recognizing NGOs as those
associations, foundations or other non-profit making private institutions
with aims of international utility, carrying on their activities with effect in
at least two States with statutory offices and central management.
Despite silencing in recognizing the international legal personality of
NGOs, a necessary outcome of the rights ensured to them in other interna-
tional instruments, the Strasbourg Convention is a relevant ‘entrance door’
of NGOs in international law, not only because it demonstrates that they
are subjects that deserves regulation in multi-lateral treaties, but, most im-
portantly, that their condition can undergo further improvement, especially
if we take into account the cited Opinion 246 of the CoE Parliamentary
Assembly, which, while addressing the low adhesion of member-states to
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the Convention, assumed the possibility of adapting it through an amend-
ing protocol (para 4 (iii)).
2.4 The European Union
In 1991, the European Commission proposed a draft regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the statute for a European
Association (EA), the first governmental attempt to regulate a super-
national legal personality for NGOS.93 The project proposed an extensive
regulation for the EA that had to be established by a grouping of natural
and/or legal persons to pursue non-profit aims in accordance to the objec-
tives of the European Community (EC), and public interest. The draft en-
sured its legal personality in its registration of the member-state in which it
established its registered office and also full legal capacity. The super-
nationality was guaranteed not only by the operation in all of the European
Community but also by the existence of founding members from at least
two different member-states and the possibility of transfer of the registered
office to any other member-state without resulting in the winding up of the
EA or in the creation of a new legal person. Unfortunately, the proposal
was withdrawn by the Commission on 17 March 2006. 94
Currently, the European Union (EU), together with the institutions (gov-
erning bodies), has two advisory bodies, the Economic and Social
Committee (ESC),95 composed of representatives of various categories of
economic and social activity, in particular, representatives of producers,
farmers, carriers, workers, dealers, craftsmen, professional occupations and
representatives of the general public, and the Committee of the Regions
(CoR), consisting of representatives of regional and local bodies. The CoR
represents an interaction channel with regional and local authorities and
the ESC, with civil society. Both bodies have a defined, although not
equal, number of seats available to member-states. According to the treaty,
the ESC must be consulted by the Council or by the Commission wherever
the treaty so provides and in all cases in which these institutions consider
it appropriate. The ESC may take the initiative of issuing an opinion in
cases in which it considers such action appropriate. Despite the advisory
status, it can be noticed that the structure of the EU contemplates a regular
body for interaction between civil society organizations capable of balan-
cing the social and economic forces within the States and between the
States.
Governance is also a relevant focus at the European level, and the parti-
cipation of civil society is deemed necessary, especially if we bear in mind
the content of the Commission’s White Paper on European Governance,
laid down on the principles of participation, openness, accountability, ef-
fectiveness and coherence.96 Further to the 2001 Commission discussion
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paper on partnership with NGOs,97 and Declaration 17 of the Final Act of
the Treaty on European Union98 on the right of access to information, the
Council and Commission adopted a joint code of conduct ensuring that the
public will have the widest possible access to documents held by both
bodies.99 We shall resume this issue in Chapter 8.
2.5 The OAS, MERCOSUR and NAFTA
2.5.1 The Organization of American States
The Organization of American States (OAS) Charter recognized the impor-
tance of ‘the contribution of organizations such as labor unions, coopera-
tives, and cultural, professional, business, neighborhood, and community
associations to the life of the society and to the development process’ (Art
45 (g)) and assigned to the Permanent Council the possibility of entering
into special agreements or arrangements between the Organization ‘and
other American agencies of recognized international standing’ (art 91 (d))
which, as OAS practice has shown, comprises NGOs either at the national
or international level.100 The first General Assembly regulation of such
partnership was established in 1971.101 On several occasions, the member-
states emphasized the importance of NGOs in fostering democracy.102
In 1997, a comprehensive study on the legal status of NGOs in the OAS
was released by the Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs,103 which
supported the establishment, within the Permanent Council, of the
Committee on Civil Society Participation in the OAS in 1998, followed by
the adoption of Guidelines for participation of NGOs in OAS activities.104
According to these Guidelines, NGOs ‘may attend the activities of the
OAS, make presentations, provide information, and, at the request of the
organs, agencies, and entities of the OAS, provide expert advice. They
may also participate in operational activities relating to the design, finan-
cing, and execution of cooperation programs, in accordance with applic-
able regulations and specific agreements negotiated for this purpose’ (art 3
(a)). The participation includes the right to apply for participation in OAS
Conferences (art 12) and, after registration with the OAS, the right to at-
tend, as observers, public meetings of the Permanent Council, Inter-
American Council for Integral Development and subsidiary bodies, being
allowed to present written documents not exceeding 2000 words (art 13).
Despite the open access to the Organization, the participation of NGOs
does not imply in recognizing to them any negotiating functions neither
membership to the OAS, functions exclusively preserved to the States (art
4 (d)).
In order to improve and increase participation of NGOs in the organiza-
tion’s activities, the OAS Summits of Americas Department has prepared
and released a manual covering the role, principles and means of that
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participation, a practical and comprehensive tool that is still not available
within the UN system.105
2.5.2 The MERCOSUR
The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) was established by the
Treaty of Asuncion in 26 March 1991 with the purpose of economically in-
tegrating the countries of the South America southern cone, Argentina,
Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay, in a customs union. On December 1994,
the Protocol of Ouro Preto established the institutional structure of
MERCOSUR, providing its international legal personality and creating the
Social Economic Consultative Forum. The Forum is composed of an equal
number of representatives (nine) from each member-state, which ordinarily
meet twice a year with the purpose of integrating the social and economic
sectors, represented by civil society organizations of several scopes, such
as NGOs, Academia, workers’ and business’ associations, and scientific
societies. The Forum does not have decision-making powers, but can make
recommendations or submit draft new rules or policies to the MERCOSUR
governing bodies.106
The huge discrepancies in economic strength, territory and population of
the member-states pose a severe difficulty in the integration, a fact that can
be observed by the tiny achievements reached in economic integration
since its establishment. Despite this situation, it is noticeable that the struc-
ture of this intergovernmental organization contemplates a regular body for
interaction between civil society organizations capable of balancing the so-
cial and economic forces within the States and between the States.
2.5.3 The NAFTA
The North-American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) aims to integrate
economically the US, Canada and Mexico into a free commercial zone
that, in addition to the main treaty, is regulated by several other ‘side
agreements’, including the North-American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC).107 This is the first world experience in integrating
commercial and environmental issues in a commercial agreement, due to
the intense pressure of NGOs and civil society, including through congress-
men during the negotiation process.
One relevant aspect of the NAAEC is the obligation imposed to the
Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), steward of the imple-
mentation of the NAAEC with a quasi-judicial role, of considering written
submissions from any non-governmental organization or person asserting
that a Party to the treaty is failing to effectively enforce its environmental
law. The CEC also supports arbitral panel processes involving disputes be-
tween the state-parties on certain trade-related issues associated with failure
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to comply with environmental law enforcement. The CEC consists of a
Council of Ministers, comprised of Environmental Ministers from each of
the state-parties, a Secretariat headed by an Executive Director and a Joint
Public Advisory Committee, comprised of fifteen citizens, five from each
country, representing a broad range of interests.
If the submission satisfies the legal criteria, a response will be requested
from the party named in the submission. In light of that response, the CEC
Secretariat will prepare a factual record on the matter, objectively outlining
the history of the issue, the obligations of the party under the law in ques-
tion, the actions of the party in fulfilling those obligations, and the facts
relevant to the assertions made in the submission of a failure to enforce en-
vironmental law effectively. Once completed, the CEC Council of
Ministers may, by a two-thirds vote, make the final factual record publicly
available. Publicity on the failure to enforce environmental law produces
considerable political impact and may lead to legal obligations at the na-
tional level, if brought to the local courts.108
2.6 The African Union
The African Union (AU) Constitutive Act109 adopted the participation of
African peoples in the activities of the Union as one of its founding princi-
ples (art 4 (d)) and created the Economic, Social and Cultural Council
(ECOSOCC), an advisory organ composed of different social and profes-
sional groups of the member-states of the Union (art 22). This structure
gives a distinctive character to the ECOSOCC, if compared to the UN
ECOSOC, because it allows African civil society to play an active role in
charting the future of Africa. Again, as observed in the EU and
MERCOSUR, a regional international convention created a specific body
within an intergovernmental organization to interact with civil society.
The Statutes of the ECOSOCC, approved in the 2004 General
Assembly, establish that the Council has the purpose of strengthening part-
nerships between governments and all segments of civil society, promoting
the participation of civil society in the implementation of programs and po-
licies of the Union together with strengthening the institutional, human and
operational capacities of the African civil society. The Council is composed
of one hundred and fifty civil society organizations, such as NGOs, profes-
sional associations and social groups, either at a national, regional or conti-
nental level, and, quite interestingly, of African Diaspora, provided that
those organizations are managed by at least fifty per cent of Africans, a
marked position against any threat of neo-colonialism by Western
NGOs.110
It is also interesting to note that the ECOSOCC’s agenda has been di-
vided into themes to be addressed by one of its subsidiary bodies, the
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Sectoral Cluster Communities, instituted to formulate opinions and provide
inputs on the policies and rams of the AU in the following fields: Peace
and Security, Political Affairs, Infrastructure and Energy, Social Affairs
and Health, Human Resources, Science and Technology, Trade and
Industry, Rural Economy and Agriculture and Economic Affairs.
2.7 Human Rights Treaties
One could deem human rights as one ‘entrance door’ of individuals and
civil society organizations into the realm of international law. Since the
Battle of Solferino, in 1859, the improvement in the conditions of the hu-
man being in all kinds of struggles between States has been continuously
feeding the enhancement of what is now called humanitarian international
law.
The first known NGOs, established in the 19th century, worked to ensure
the now non-derogable human right of freedom from slavery (the Anti-
Slavery Society) and the right to life (The ICRC). Currently, human rights
are protected by either international or regional conventions, being en-
shrined in the UN Charter and in the constitutions of most States.
The ICRC, a Swiss association, gained relevant status in the Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1949) and its ad-
ditional Protocols (1977), which determined that the conflicting parties
should accept the services of a humanitarian organization, such as the
ICRC, to assume the humanitarian functions to be performed during the
conflict. Its access to prisoner camps, as we observed above while addres-
sing the role of NGOs before the UNSC, is often confirmed by Council
resolutions.
Relevant to the purpose of our analysis is the ‘executive’ humanitarian
function embedded in the mandate granted to the ICRC by the Geneva
Convention and Protocols, because it granted an NGO certain international
rights that could be opposed to any recalcitrant State, which, as mentioned,
includes the right to enter the territory of a sovereign State. This is a un-
ique feature in international law, since none of the classical subjects of in-
ternational law – i.e., the States and intergovernmental organizations –
have the right to do so.111 Again, as pointed out while addressing the ILO
Constitution, civil society organizations can achieve certain rights in an in-
ternational treaty even not being one of its signatories.
Since World War II, when civil losses surpassed for the first time mili-
tary casualties, armed conflicts have been imposing severe death tolls on
civil society. Likewise, NGOs (and their personnel) that are active in the
field of human rights have been suffering the same threats as those posed
to the people they aim to protect. This conflictuous situation reached such
an unacceptable level that the World Conference on Human Rights, held in
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Vienna in 1993, introduced a paragraph in its final declaration to affirm
that NGOs and their members genuinely involved in the field of human
rights should enjoy the rights and freedoms recognized in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the protection of national law.112
Excluding the specific situation of the ICRC, none of the more relevant
human rights treaties explicitly makes reference to NGOs. Some authors
support that NGOs should be considered included in the expression ‘other
competent bodies’ of article 45 (b) of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child,113 since NGOs customarily provide technical advice or assistance,
but this remains a question open to debate.114
At the operational level, NGOs are extremely active within the Human
Rights agencies because those bodies operate under enormous restraints of
time and resources, with an expressive backlog of reports due to the rising
number of State ratifications. NGOs have been a reliable source of infor-
mation, suggestions and support for the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (UNHCHR) since the creation of the post in 1993.115 They provide
relevant support to the monitoring of human rights due to their capillarity
and grass-root activities, which enable them to contribute, mostly by rais-
ing questions on targeted or omitted issues, to better access to a country’s
reports.116
Another relevant feature of the role of NGOs in human rights treaties is
their locus standi, i.e., their right to petitioning. The American Convention
on Human Rights117 establishes (art 44) that any NGO legally recognized
in one or more member-states of the OAS may lodge petitions with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights containing denunciations or
complaints of violation of the Convention by a State party. Direct access to
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is not allowed. A similar right
is ensured by the European Convention on Human Rights118 (art 25),
which establishes that individual applications may be submitted by indivi-
duals or NGOs claiming to be victims of a violation. At the African level,
the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights119 authorizes the
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights to consider communi-
cations received by parties other than the member-states concerning viola-
tions or threats on the protected rights (art 55-56), and the African Charter
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child120 authorizes the Committee of
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child to consider communication,
from any person, group or nongovernmental organization recognized by
the Organization of African Unity, by a member-state, or the United
Nations relating to any matter covered by the Charter (art 44). We shall ad-
dress the situation of NGOs before judicial or quasi-judicial bodies at
greater depth in the next chapter.
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2.8 Environmental Treaties
A second - and more active - entrance door of NGOs to international law
is, definitively, environmental law. The oldest environmental treaty with a
worthy reference to NGOs is the Ramsar Convention.121 In order to review
and promote the implementation of the convention, it established a
Conference of the contracting parties whose representatives should include
persons who are experts on wetlands or waterfowl by reason of knowledge
and experience gained in scientific, administrative or other appropriate
capacities (Art 7 (1)). Since that expertise is quite rare in diplomatic corps,
the convention demanded the participation of people customarily found in
civil society organizations, such as the Academia or NGOs.
However, the participation of civil society has gone much further ahead
than the condition of simply having individuals among the State represen-
tatives, because the Convention has nominated an NGO, the International
Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN), to act as
the substantive Secretariat of the Convention, performing ‘the continuing
bureau duties under the Convention until such time another organization or
government is appointed by a majority of two-thirds of all contracting par-
ties’, a replacement that has not yet occurred. The activities to be per-
formed by the IUCN include: (i) to assist in the convening and organizing
of Conferences; (ii) to maintain the List of Wetlands of International
Importance and to be informed by any of the contracting parties of any ad-
ditions, extensions, deletions or restrictions concerning wetlands included
in the List; (iii) to be informed by any contracting party of any changes in
the ecological character of wetlands included in the List; (iv) to forward
notification of any alterations to the List, or changes in character of wet-
lands included therein, to all contracting parties and to arrange for these
matters to be discussed at the next Conference; (v) to make known to the
contracting party concerned, the recommendations of the Conferences with
respect to such alterations to the List or to changes in the character of wet-
lands included therein.122 The Ramsar Secretariat has also signed several
Memoranda of Understanding and Cooperation with NGOs, including five
international organization partners and ten other NGOs.123
The substantial activities of the IUCN in the protection of the wetlands
differ from those performed by the ICRC with regards to the protection of
human rights. Nevertheless, despite this material and procedural discre-
pancy, these activities maintain a common situation within international
law, since both have received a mandate from the States to act on their be-
half in the fulfillment of an agreed convention.
The IUCN is also an active member of the Intergovernmental
Committee for the Protection of the Cultural and Natural Heritage of
Outstanding Universal Value (the World Heritage Committee) established
within the UNESCO by the Convention concerning the Protection of the
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World Cultural and Natural Heritage where, together with a representative
of the International Center for the Study of the Preservation and
Restoration of Cultural Property (Rome Center), a representative of the
International Council of Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and other NGO
representatives, invited at the request of States parties, it participates in the
meetings in an advisory capacity (art 8 (3)).124
Another important environmental convention supporting the legitimacy
of NGOs in the international real is the CITES,125 drafted as a result of a
resolution adopted in 1963 at a meeting of members of the IUCN. The
convention ensures that any international NGO technically qualified in pro-
tection, conservation, or management of wild fauna and flora which has in-
formed the Secretariat of its desire to be represented at meetings of the
conference, shall be admitted as observer, without voting rights, unless at
least one-third of the parties object (art 11 (7)). This provision represents a
substantive step forward in terms of civil society participation, because,
differently from the UN conferences, in which the participation depends on
the acceptance of the Secretariat, at CITES Conferences the participation is
guaranteed, unless a qualified group of member-states reject it. The partici-
patory right is also extended to national NGOs, provided that their partici-
pation is approved by the State where they are located (art. 17 (2)).
A fourth international environmental structure with relevant participation
of NGOs is the Global Environment Facility (GEF), a global partnership
among one hundred and seventy-eight countries, international institutions,
NGOs, and the private sector established to address global environmental
issues while supporting national sustainable development initiatives. The
GEF started as a World Bank program in 1991 but due to the outcome of
the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, it became an independent organization in
1994,126 designated to be the financial mechanism for the UN Convention
on Biological Diversity (CBD), the UN Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCC), the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants (POPs) and the United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification (UNCCD). It also provides funding to projects in partner-
ship with the Montreal Protocol of the Vienna Convention on Ozone Layer
Depleting Substances.127 The GEF is open to participation of any State
member of the UN or its specialized agencies and is structured into a
General Assembly, a Council and a Secretariat. Participation with the right
to vote at the General Assembly is given only to State representatives.
Partnerships with NGOs are not created at the Assembly or Council levels,
being focused on the Secretariat and the Implementing Agencies, either for
consultation or assisting in the design, execution, and monitoring of pro-
jects. The GEF maintains regular structured consultations with NGOs
through the ‘GEF-NGO Network’.
The Earth Summit approved Agenda 21, introducing a global partner-
ship for sustainable development. According to this extensive document,
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partnerships with civil society, through its major groups, are recognized,
valued and pursued. According to its paragraph 27.1, ‘NGOs play a vital
role in the shaping and implementation of participatory democracy’ and
‘should be recognized as partners in the implementation of Agenda 21’.128
Given these few examples, it becomes evident that the development of
international environmental law does not conform to the classic doctrinal
division of States/subjects – Non-state/objects not only because it allows
for the participation of individuals and civil society organizations, some
with executive roles such as the IUCN in the Ramsar convention, but
mostly because ‘international law imposes direct environmental responsi-
bilities on individuals and companies through the polluter pays principle,
transboundary civil liability for environmental damage and extra-territorial
criminal jurisdiction over certain environmental offences’.129
What becomes clear after quoting these few agreements, among the doz-
ens of environmental treaties, either at the international or regional levels,
legitimizing the role of civil society, is that environmental law is not sim-
ply a system of rules and obligations, but rather a complex decision-mak-
ing process in the realm of goals, values, methods and priorities that oper-
ate both at the municipal and international levels, through the notions of
‘common concern’ (Agenda 21), ‘property of humankind’ and ‘sustainable
development’, which cannot be legitimate if relying only on the hands of
States. It demands the participation of other actors, including individuals,
through procedures of transparency and public participation, such as those
prescribed in the Aarhus Convention and the NAAEC.
Challenging this understanding, some authors argue that these so-called
‘environmental human rights’ suffer from cultural relativism and lack the
universal value normally thought to be inherent to human rights and may
prove potentially meaningless and ineffective - such as the right to devel-
opment - and undermine the very notion of human rights.130 Others sup-
port that international conventions that define the civil responsibility of in-
dividuals and companies for damages caused to the international environ-
ment actually have defined internationally a legal regimen to be applicable
within the countries concerned. Thus, they have not created an interna-
tional responsibility to individuals and companies, but rather created a uni-
form municipal responsibility to those internal subjects.131
With all due respect to the quality of the arguments, we understand that
people’s rights to the environment are not only ‘material rights’ but mostly
‘procedural rights’ (Aarhus, NAAEC, etc), because international treaties
have legitimized their access to environmental justice and their participation
in environmental decision-making. These rights require and benefit from
notions of civil participation in public affairs already reflected in existing
civil and political rights (1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, arts 19, 25) and environmental documents (1992 Rio Declaration,
principle 10), which achieved an universal character by their adoption in
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several other treaties and international documents such as the World
Charter for Nature,132 the 1985 Vienna Convention,133 the 1987 Montreal
Protocol,134 the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change,135 the
1991 UN/ECE Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment,136
the 1991 UN/ECE Helsinki Convention on the Transboundary Effect of
Industrial Accidents,137 the 1992 Biological Diversity Convention,138 and
the 2003 CoE Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting
from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, 139 just to quote a few.
Regarding the second argument, that environmental law defines inter-
nationally a uniform municipal law for individual responsibility, we under-
stand that, even considering that it may be true in certain aspects of envir-
onmental protection, it is not general at all, because the purpose of the
international environmental law is protecting the human being in general,
focusing on the effects of human behavior that transcends the States
boundaries. The fact that a given individual will be prosecuted or penalized
under a certain municipal regimen does not imply that the challenged con-
duct is irrelevant for other individuals living in other States. This interna-
tional impact evidences that environmental law is not just a coordinated set
of municipal legal standards, rather a truly international concern that
require international regulation.
As concluding remarks to this chapter, we can summarize that the prac-
tice of States in international treaties and other documents concerning the
role and status of NGOs is not uniform, albeit recognizing their importance
in one way or another. Additionally, one can observe that the more recent
the document, the greater the participation of civil society, evidence that
undoubtedly attests a evolutionary relevance in the international arena.
Recalling protests against the WTO Conference in Seattle, in 1999,
Charles-Albert Morand wrote that
‘por reprendre la distinction de Montesquieu, elles (les ONG) n’on
pas directement la faculté de statuer, mas parfois la faculté
d’empêcher. (…) Pour le juriste positiviste, cela ne représente rien,
puisque formellement les Etats ne perdent pas leur monopole dans
la formation du droit international. Mais sociologiquement et politi-
quement cela représent l’irruption de la societé civile dans la vie in-
ternationale. (...) Par leur action, les ONG peuvent infléchir l’appli-
cation et l’interpretation des normes internationales, dans la mesure
où elles dépendent du contexte, de l’opinion publique
internationale.’140
As we will observe in the forthcoming chapters, NGOs are promoting
changes in international custom and definitively affecting the decisions of
judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.
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CHAPTER 3
NGOs in Judicial and
quasi-judicial bodies’ decisions
In 1946, the UN Charter established consultative status with NGOs, assum-
ing, for the first time in an international treaty, that the public sphere was
larger than the governmental one and that other kinds of organizations had
legitimacy to be heard on matters affecting the needs and aspirations of ci-
tizens. This treaty provision, in conferring upon NGOs consultative rights,
implicitly recognized that other actors should be recognized, as subjects of
law, in the then exclusively inter-state Westphalian system.
A few years later, in 1949, the ICJ issued its memorable advisory opi-
nion on the Reparation for injuries case, holding in an obiter dictum that
‘the subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in
their nature or in the extent of their rights and their nature depends upon
the needs of the community’.1 This opinion was rendered in response to a
UN consultation as to whether the organization held the legal capacity to
bring an international claim against a State if the government of that State
caused injuries to the organization’s activities or personnel. By releasing
this opinion, the ICJ understood that if the organization possessed rights
and obligations conferred by a multilateral treaty, it had, at the same time,
a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate on
the international plane, making it clear that the international sphere was no
longer a ‘state-only club’ and that entities other than States could be sub-
jects of law. In just three years, a major treaty and an international court
decision delivered a deadly blow to the States’ exclusive international legal
personality supported by the positivist doctrine that had engulfed interna-
tional law since the 19th century, blazing a secure path for the evolution of
an international legal theory capable of recognizing that individuals and
private organizations with public aims possessed international legal person-
ality, a status more coherent with the needs of a global civil society.
It is beyond any doubt that the decisions of judicial and quasi-judicial
international bodies affect the lives of real people, not only those legal-po-
litical structures named ‘States’.2 It is also beyond any doubt that interna-
tional affairs have become far more complex than they used to be in the
past, when the state-centric model was conceived, and that several new
rights and public concerns have been recognized as relevant by a
contemporary society with an unprecedented capacity of mobility and com-
munication, the impacts of which extend way beyond the boundaries of the
territorial divisions of the world. In national legal systems, the emergence
of collective rights, i.e., those belonging to a large group of identifiable in-
dividuals, led to the introduction of new forms of defense of such rights
before the Courts, with unions and associations playing a relevant role. A
couple of decades later, when the common and shared rights, i.e., those
owned by the society at large, became recognized by national legal sys-
tems, new advocates, the NGOs, took the bench to defend these newly ac-
knowledged rights against the acts or omissions of individuals, companies
and even the State. While this evolution may be clearly observable in the
national sphere, it is not so in the international realm, where the States
have tried to maintain their position as the sole players, anchored in the
classic positivist subject/object dichotomy, by which they consider that
they fall into the first category, while everything else falls into the second.
It is desirable that judicial proceedings be conducted in order to deliver
in due time appropriate protection to any threatened or jeopardized right,
hence making it necessary to establish a legal proceeding that balances the
collection of evidence and arguments with the defense of the accused,
within the physical and budgetary limits imposed to the parties and to the
Tribunal. If opening the floodgates may lead to inundations, keeping them
closed may lead to drought.3
As we will explore in more detail in this chapter, the situation of indivi-
duals and NGOs has been experiencing an evolution in judicial and quasi-
judicial bodies’ decisions. In general terms, NGOs cannot stand as parties
before international tribunals to defend shared and common rights – inas-
much acting as an NGO – but only their personal rights – inasmuch acting
as a private legal entity. Nonetheless, having international locus standi ne-
cessarily implies in acknowledging that they have international legal per-
sonality. Depending on the rules of the Court concerned, NGOs, acting as
such, can be victims, witnesses or expert witnesses, and can also perform
certain assignments for the Court, such as carrying out inquiries, or volun-
tarily presenting amici curiae4 and documentary evidence of facts relevant
to the case, either on their own initiative or through the parties’ memorials
to the case. NGOs experience an improvement in their situation before
quasi-judicial bodies, mostly within the human rights protection systems,
where they are entitled to an enhanced intervention, which also includes
the right, along general lines, to submit petitions and, in particular, to file
complaints concerning alleged violations of human rights, although they
lose such standing rights if the case is forwarded to the Courts.
Evidence shows that quasi-judicial bodies are keener to accept the parti-
cipation of NGOs than Courts and that regional bodies are more sympa-
thetic to their initiatives than world bodies. Additionally, it should be noted
that, as acknowledged by Lauterpacht, ‘there is nothing inherent to the
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structure of international law which prevent individuals from being parties
to procedures before international courts.’5 Hence, the participation of
NGOs as third-parties in Court proceedings is not objectively hindered by
the statutes of the Courts, which can strengthen the participation of INGOs
and NGOs in their proceedings even without reforms in their own rules of
procedure, by expressing a broader willingness in obtaining a more com-
prehensive evaluation of the question under consideration and a better judi-
cial remedy. If the tribunals are not keen to ‘open the floodgates’, would
not common sense lead the courts to conclude that it might be best to let
some water pass through?
In this chapter we will appraise the situation of NGOs before the active
international tribunals and before the more relevant quasi-judicial bodies.
3.1 The Courts
3.1.1 The Permanent Court of International Justice
The PCIJ was established in the aftermath of World War I, through, and
by, the League of Nations, although it was never a part of the League nor
did its Statute form a part of its Covenant. According to its Statute, the
Court was open to the members of the League and to those States men-
tioned in the Annex of the Covenant (art 35), but other States could be par-
ties in cases before the Court (art 34). The fact that NGOs had not been
granted locus standi did not prevent the Court from entrusting any bodies
or organizations to carry out inquiries or give expert opinions (art 50). The
Statute also allowed any ‘international organizations’ considered by the
Court as likely to be able to furnish information on the question for which
the advisory opinion of the Court had been requested, to submit written
statements, or be heard at a public sitting to be held for that purpose (art
66). The PCIJ understood that the concept of international organizations
embraced private institutions such as unions, which were openly admitted
to be heard on the very first Advisory Opinion of the Court, which ad-
dressed the participation of workers’ delegates in the newly created ILO.6
This important precedent in listening to civil society organizations, unfortu-
nately, is not being kept by the ICJ.
The PCIJ had a short operational existence – between 1922 and 1940 –
and dealt with twenty-nine contentious cases between States and delivered
twenty-seven advisory opinions. This does not mean that it did not address
situations where human rights – a key civil society concern - were at stake,
even before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as we can observe
in the Polish Upper Silesia7 and Minority Schools8 cases. These cases are
particularly interesting because in a contentious situation involving
Germany and Poland before the beginning of World War II, the Court ruled
that national minorities living in a foreign country had the right to keep
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their own institutions in order to maintain the very essence of their condi-
tion of minority and that they deserved protection under the principle of
non-discrimination, the imposition of restrictions to those rights by the host
country being hence prohibited. The Court decision ensured such rights to
German speaking minorities living in Poland. However, it could not pre-
vent the events that started a couple of years later, on 1 September 1939.
3.1.2. The International Court of Justice
The ICJ Statute (art 34) defines that only States may be parties before the
Court, but admits that it may give an advisory opinion at the request of
States or whatever bodies are authorized by or in accordance to the UN
Charter (Art 65). The Court may entrust any bodies or organizations to car-
ry out inquiries or give expert opinions (art 50), which, in principle, does
not hinder the Court to assign such tasks to NGOs. The Statute provides a
twofold rule to deal with information provided by third parties: if the
Court is appreciating a case, it may request to public international organi-
zations any information relevant to the question, which can also be pre-
sented by those organizations on their own initiative (Art 34 (2)); if it is
appreciating a demand for advisory opinion, then, the Statute (art 66 (2))
authorizes the Court Registrar to notify ‘any international organization con-
sidered by the Court as likely to be able to furnish information on the
question submitted for the advisory opinion, that the Court will be pre-
pared to receive written statements or to hear, at a public seating to be held
for that purpose, oral statements related to the question’. Hence, at least
theoretically, IGOs could provide information for both contentious and ad-
visory proceedings and INGOs only for the latter.
Although the statutory commands of the PCIJ and the ICJ on the partici-
pation of international organizations in the advisory proceedings are identi-
cal, the ICJ did not follow the practice of its predecessor, because it has ex-
tensively worked to limit the capability to give expert opinions, proprio
motu or under the Court request, to ‘public international organizations’,
considering as such only international organizations of States.9 Hence, pri-
vate institutions, such as INGOs, have neither locus standi before the
Court nor can freely submit information, via amicus briefs, to the ICJ, as
can be observed by the very scant evidence of NGOs trying to do so.
However, since the restriction on the participation in advisory proceedings
does not rely on ICJ Statute, there is some room for improvement in the
participation of INGOs in ICJ proceedings if such restrictions are overrid-
den by new rules, more sensitive to the contemporary status of non-state
actors in the international sphere. A timid movement toward this direction
can be observed, for example, in Practice Direction XII,10 which accepted
written statements or documents submitted by INGOs in an advisory opi-
nion case on its own initiative, but defined that they would not be
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considered as part of the case file. Since those papers will be made public,
any parties to the case can incorporate them to their own submissions to
the Court, a situation that is not particularly new.11
If water cannot pass through the floodgate, it finds its course along an-
other path. The restrictions to act before the Court do not imply that NGOs
are not entitled to persuade States to act on their behalf. This was exactly
the situation of the emblematic ICJ Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion12
released after a consultation of the UN General Assembly, on whether ‘the
threat of or use of nuclear weapons is in any circumstance permitted under
international law?’
The initiative was the main goal of the World Court Project, a coalition
of some NGOs that sought to convince member-states at those fora to sub-
mit the request for the advisory opinion to the ICJ, formulating it in such a
way that nothing but a negative answer could be expected. Lindblom ob-
served that ‘the issue of the strong involvement of civil society in the issue
brought to the ICJ was regarded as a relevant issue by some States as well
as by some of the judges’.13 Judge Oda, for example, when addressing the
historic background of the case, wrote that he had ‘the impression that the
request for an advisory opinion which was made by the General Assembly
in 1994 originated in ideas developed by some NGOs’.14
A remarkable aspect of those considerations was the very nature of the
participation of NGOs in the case: Should it be regarded as ‘political’ or
considered ‘legal’? Definitively, NGOs had not submitted the request for
the advisory opinion. Nonetheless, also unequivocally, they had succeeded
in convincing the majority of the member-states – which do not have nu-
clear weapons and are threatened by them – to assume the request as theirs
and forward it to the ICJ. They also convinced 3.5 million people around
the globe to declare in writing their personal opposition toward nuclear
weapons, documentary evidence that was brought to the Court.
In practical terms, any criticism to the role of NGOs in the issue became
technically irrelevant because the request had been presented by a legiti-
mate international body and demanded a formal answer from the Court.
Additionally, the Court could not disregard the question based on the pro-
cess that had been used to reach the decision to submit the request because
it had been formally approved by the member-states in a legitimate meet-
ing of an international body, it being beyond the scope of the Court to
evaluate the reasoning of the request, which, at least in the case of the
UNGA, was within the scope of the organization: the promotion of
peace.15 Furthermore, since a representative part of the UN member-states
are governed by democratically elected representatives, acceding to civil
society pressure is an expected attitude, within the ‘rules of the game’.
Nevertheless, the outcome of the case was both disappointing and aston-
ishing, because the Court pronounced a non liquet, i.e., refused to formu-
late a definitive answer to the legal question, understanding that ‘law is
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silent or applicable rules are insufficient or obscure’.16 As a result, the
Court decided by seven votes to seven, by the President’s casting vote, that
‘it follows from the above-mentioned requirements that the threat or
use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the law ap-
plicable in armed conflicts, and in particular the principles and rules
of humanitarian law. However, in view of the current state of inter-
national law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court
cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance
of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake’.
The outcome was disappointing because the lobbying effort and the cap-
tious wording of the question had not achieved the ultimate objective of
the World Court Project, i.e., the declaration of the unlawfulness of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons, and represented an astonishing end for
an orchestrated initiative that seemed to be invincible.17 It was also aston-
ishing because it spurred an unprecedented clash of opinions within the
Court and had to be decided by the casting vote of the President.
Moreover, it eroded the understanding of the completeness of international
law supposedly ensured by the proclaimed comprehensive sources of inter-
national law defined in article 38 of the ICJ Statutes, and, thus, the idea of
the illegality and illegitimacy of a non liquet.18 It was a disappointing end
for a so-considered a priori assumption of every legal system.
Another aspect of the activities of the ICJ which deserves our attention
is the increasing presence of human rights law in its cases. As pointed out
by Rosalyn Higgins, until recent times, the Court was a ‘Court of sover-
eign States’, but it has become a Court concerned with human rights be-
cause those rights have found their proper place within international law,
and moved from the margins toward the center of the Court jurisdictional
activities.19 If we compare the works of the PCIJ with those of the ICJ and
these works through time, the deepening and broadening of human rights
can be seen. Higgins, for example, pointed that out when the Court ad-
dressed the concept of self-determination in the South West Africa,
Namibia and Western Sahara cases,20 ‘there were still many within the UN
who insisted that self-determination was nothing more than a political as-
piration. The Court was the forerunner in recognizing self-determination as
a legal right.’21 We can also notice the increasing awareness and participa-
tion of NGOs in the problem-defining processes22 and enforcement of the
Court’s decisions,23 both working towards an improved participation of
NGOs in the activities of the ICJ in a world cast by the challenges of a
global civil society.
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3.1.3. The International Criminal Courts (ICC, ICTY, ICTR)
A natural outcome of the rising centrality of human rights and the increas-
ing participation of individuals in international law was the creation of in-
ternational criminal courts, a kind of judiciary body that would have been
unthinkable in positivist pure inter-state international law. The forerunner
of these tribunals is the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, es-
tablished in 1945 to appraise crimes perpetrated by the Nazis during World
War II. In holding that ‘crimes are committed by men, not by abstract enti-
ties,’ the tribunal acknowledged that individuals, not only States, were sub-
jects of international law, therefore possessing duties, as well as rights.24
Pragmatically, in order to avoid the risks of application of the legal princi-
ple of nullo crime sine lege to its activities, the constitutive acts avoided
the words ‘law’ or ‘code’, nevertheless laying down the conceptual basis
for the further establishment of international criminal tribunals.25
In this aspect, it is worth observing that NGOs played a relevant role in
the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC)26 and likewise
provide valuable and reliable information about the atrocities appraised by
the ICC, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY)27 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). The
UN Security Council, for instance, requested to NGOs the submission of
information concerning violations of international humanitarian law in
Yugoslavia.28
The Statutes of the three tribunals do not provide locus standi for NGOs
before the Courts, since the criminal proceedings are initiated and con-
ducted by the Prosecutor against those who appear to have committed
crimes of war or against humanity. In the ICC, the Prosecutor can initiate
an investigation based on information referred by a State party to the
Statute or by the UNSC, and also by proprio motu, relying, in the latter si-
tuation, on the seriousness of the evidence provided. The Statutes of both
the ICTR and the ICTY have similar provisions, although expressly defin-
ing that the Prosecutor shall initiate investigations ex-officio based on in-
formation obtained, among other sources, from NGOs.29 The proceedings
of the current cases before the tribunals have revealed the importance of
the information gathered and provided by humanitarian NGOs, which per-
form an essential, yet unofficial, ancillary investigative role to the
Prosecutors’ office that might make us doubt the effectiveness of the tribu-
nals if the NGOs did not exist.30
Another noteworthy aspect is the participation of NGOs as victims in
ICC proceedings. While such a right has been enjoyed in some civil law
countries for several decades, it is also true that the participation of victims
in ICC proceedings represents an innovative experience in the history of
international criminal justice,31 moreover if we take into account that legal
entities, not only individuals, can be regarded as victims of those crimes.
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The ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence have a general provision for
victim participation in the Court’s proceedings, considering as such those
‘organizations or institutions that have sustained direct harm to any of their
property which is dedicated to religion, education, art or science or charita-
ble purposes and to their historic monuments, hospitals and other places
and objects for humanitarian purposes’.32 This participation does not repre-
sent, however, the admission of NGO victims as parties to the case, neither
impose to those organizations the duty to present evidence of the direct
harm they suffered, a burden of proof that remains in the hands of the
Prosecutor,33 yet the ‘victims participating in the trial proceedings may, in
principle, lead to evidence pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused and challenge the admissibility or relevance of the evidence’.34
As of January 2012, the ICC Prosecutor has been conducting investiga-
tions in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central
African Republic, Sudan (Darfur), Kenya, Libya and Cote d’Ivoire.
Despite charges of unnecessary destruction of property, none of the cases
evidence NGOs as victims of the accused.
3.1.4. The Court of Justice of the European Union
The Court of Justice of the European Union, the current name of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) is the judicial body of the European
Union and of the European Atomic Energy Community. It is made up of
three courts: the Court of Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service
Tribunal. Their primary task is to examine the legality of European Union
measures and ensure the uniform interpretation and application of
European Union law. 35 The Court evolved together with the institutions of
the European communities and most of its jurisprudence was produced
before the Treaty of Lisbon. For this reason, this section will often make
reference to community law, instead of European law.
NGOs are authorized to seek judicial protection against illegal acts
inflicted on them by EU institutions. Acting as such, they do not do so
within the customary scope of activities of an NGO – the defense of public
interests – but rather do so in their own private interests. This does not
mean, however, that cases brought to the Court on those grounds will not
affect international law.
The 9/11 attacks had several consequences at the international level.
One of those was the freezing of funds and economic resources belonging
to, or owned or held by, a natural or legal person, group or entity suppo-
sedly associated with Usama bin Laden, Al’Qaeda or the Taliban, included
in the lists released by the UN Security Council, which were reproduced,
at the European level, in Council Regulations. A private foundation estab-
lished in Sweden – the Al Barakaat International Foundation – was listed
in Council Regulation 881/2002 and, claiming violation of its fundamental
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rights of due process and respect of property, challenged the inclusion of
its name on the list and the freezing of its assets pursuant to article 230(4)
TEC,36 bringing the case to the CFI, which eventually ended in a judgment
of the Grand Chamber of the ECJ.37 The Chamber understood that the
TEC provided the legal basis for financial sanctions against non-state ac-
tors but, in a remarkable decision, concluded that all Community acts,
including those that implement the UN Security Council resolution, were
reviewable if they violated the fundamental rights of an NGO. The Court
understood that the respect of those rights constituted a condition for the
lawfulness of the Community acts and that, in the specific case, ‘the rights
of the defense, in particular the right to be heard and the right to effective
judicial review of those rights were patently not respected’.38 Moreover,
the Court found that the procedure before the UN Security Council’s
Sanction Committee, in charge of ‘de-listing’ names, was essentially diplo-
matic and intergovernmental, and that the persons or entities concerned
had no real opportunity of asserting their rights before that body, especially
considering that its decisions were made by consensus, each of its mem-
bers having the right of veto. As a result, the ECJ annulled Council
Resolution (EC) 881/2002 insofar as it concerned the Al Barakaat
International Foundation and determined the release of its assets after three
months starting from the date of delivery of the judgment.
In a further case, the CFI appreciated the same issue, stating that the
Council was ‘not entitled to base its funds-freezing decision on information
or material in the file communicated by a member-state, if the said mem-
ber-state is not willing to authorize its communication to the Community
judicature whose task is to review the lawfulness of that decision’, to con-
clude that the Court must ensure that the right to a fair hearing is observed
and that it is even more essential because it constituted the only safeguard
to counterweight the need to combat international terrorism and the protec-
tion of fundamental rights.39
These cases are emblematic because they aimed to ensure that a fair bal-
ance is struck between two kinds of obligations assumed by UN member-
states, putting on one side the obligation, laid down in article 25 of the UN
Charter, to carry out the decisions of the Security Council, making them
prevail over any other obligation they may have entered into under an in-
ternational agreement, and, on the other side, the obligations, laid down in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to allow effective judicial re-
medies against acts violating fundamental rights (art 8) and also to respect
the right of property, protecting anyone against arbitrary deprivation of his
property (art 17). In other words, the Court compared the ‘state-centric’
system of international law, where only States are subjects, with a ‘civil so-
ciety-centric’ system, where individuals and their organizations are also
subjects, and chose the latter, putting fundamental human rights and free-
doms above the State covenants, which represents a remarkable
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achievement in cases brought to court by private nonprofit institutions and
clear evidence of the centrality of civil society issues in contemporary in-
ternational law.
If it is clear that NGOs can freely defend their personal rights before the
CFI and the ECJ, it is not that freely, nor clear, that they can defend com-
mon and shared rights of the society at large, or even the collective rights
of their members before those bodies. In general terms, the locus standi of
NGOs in relation to measures of general application has been construed
very narrowly in the Court case-law.
Taking as an example the Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace
International) and Others v. Commission case,40 we notice that the appli-
cants challenged financial assistance granted by the Commission to Spain
for the building of two power stations, on the grounds that the project
failed to fulfill environmental regulations. The ECJ, upholding a CFI pre-
vious decision, understood that the command of Article 173(4) (now, 230
(4)) of the TEC did not provide locus standi to the applicants in the con-
sidered situation because, consonant with the settled case-law of the Court,
the challenged act had not taken into consideration the specific situation of
the entity or its members when it had been adopted, thus concerning the
entity in a general and abstract fashion, as well as its members.
Additionally, in appraising the applicants’ arguments, aiming to demon-
strate that the case-law took no account of the nature and specific charac-
teristics of the environmental interests underpinning the case, the Court
found that, since they were challenging a Community decision to finance
the building of two power stations, it would affect those rights only indir-
ectly, a situation that was not comprised within the scope of the treaty.
Thus, the Court established that persons, or associations of persons, other
than those to whom a decision is addressed, may claim to be individually
concerned only if the decision affects them by reason of certain attributes
peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differen-
tiated from all other persons and if, by virtue of those factors, it distin-
guishes them individually in the same way as the person addressed.
In another case addressing environmental affairs, European
Environmental Bureau and Stichting Natuur en Milieu v. Commission,41
the applicants supported that it followed from Article 12(1) of Directive
2004/35 that, as NGOs promoting environmental protection and meeting
the requirements under Dutch national law, they were entitled to submit
observations to the competent authority and to request that authority to
take action under that directive. Therefore, they claimed that they had
standing to bring an action for annulment of the decisions that authorized
the use of certain chemical substances (atrazine and simazine) in farming
for the purposes of Article 230(4) of the TEC. However, the Court sus-
tained that the fact that the applicants participated, in one way or another,
in the process leading to the adoption of a Community act did not
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distinguish them individually in relation to the act in question unless the
relevant Community legislation had laid down specific procedural guaran-
tees for them. The Court went further to declare that the standing conferred
upon the applicants in some of the legal systems of the member-states, ac-
cepting that environmental protection associations are directly and indivi-
dually concerned by acts which adversely affect the interests which they
defend, is irrelevant for the purposes of determining whether they have
standing to bring an action for annulment of a Community act pursuant to
Article 230(4) of the TEC. The Court also stressed that even the special
consultative status that the applicants had with the Commission or other
European or national institutions, inter alia under Directive 92/43, did not
support the finding that they were individually concerned by the chal-
lenged decisions, following that ‘Community law, as it now stands, does
not provide for a right to bring a class action before the Community courts,
as envisaged by the applicants in the case’ (Para 63).
In another case, the Association Greenpeace France and Others v.
Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche and Others,42 the applicants, to
the contrary, were successful in annulling a French decree that authorized
release into the environment of genetically modified organisms on the
grounds that 'the opinion of the Committee for the Study of the Release of
Products of Biomolecular Engineering had been delivered on the basis of a
dossier that was incomplete inasmuch as it did not include information that
would allow an assessment of the impact on public health of the ampicil-
lin-resistant gene contained in the varieties of transgenic maize that were
the subject of the application for authorization’. As observed, the case had
not challenged a Community decision, rather attacked the inadequacy of a
member-state’s administrative procedure before a dossier was forwarded to
the Commission.
A third variant of the same theme is observed in the cases Van der Kooy
and Others v. Commission and CIRFS and Others v. Commission, where
the Court recognized that the applicant association had specific locus stan-
di because of its status as negotiator of the provisions challenged by the
Commission and as Commission interlocutor in discussions concerning the
establishment, extension and adaptation of a State aid scheme in the sector
concerned.43
In conclusion, it has been demonstrated that the narrowly construed in-
terpretation of the ‘direct and individual concern’ locus standi under
Article 230(4) TEC has created an unbalanced situation in which NGOs,
defending their private rights, are more powerful in overruling Community
rules than when they defend common and shared rights of the society at
large. Furthermore, although not recognizing the NGOs’ right to bring
class actions before it,44 the Court recognized that they can challenge those
rules with procedural errors, to finally conclude that NGOs with advisory
or consultative status before the Community body that enacted the rule
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cannot challenge it, unless if they can present evidence that they have di-
rectly and individually negotiated it.
Lindblom suggested that ‘an expansion of locus standi cannot take place
without a treaty amendment’,45 pointing out that some authors suggest that
such broadening depends on the expansion of the CFI, with an increase in
the number of judges, the creation of specialized chambers and other mea-
sures.46 It is true that treaty amendment can expand the locus standi, just
as the admission of new judges leads to faster judicial remedies and specia-
lized chambers provide improved decisions, but all these measures are ta-
ken on one side of the ‘table’ and do not consider the extreme and proven
creative capability of civil society. If we move the solution into the realm
of civil society we can foresee, for example, that the more specialized the
NGOs become, the more keen they are on being considered ‘directly and
individually’ concerned.
For example, one of the first movements of civil society to deal with the
restriction was that of creating specialized associations. Settled case-law
understood that such associations formed for the protection of the collec-
tive interests of a category of persons could not be considered to be indivi-
dually concerned, for the purposes of Article 230(4) TEC, by a measure
affecting the general interests of that category, and, therefore, were not en-
titled to bring an action for annulment on behalf of its members where the
latter could not do so individually.47 However, in another case addressing a
shipping sector aid scheme, albeit confirming the settled case-law, the
Court understood that one applicant was in a different position, not by vir-
tue of being an undertaking of the sector affected by the challenged
Commission’s Decision, which was a class of persons envisaged in a gen-
eral and abstract manner, but by virtue of being an actual beneficiary of
individual aid granted under the scheme.48
It seems, then, that there exists some room for improvement of the locus
standi of NGOs before the ECJ proprio motu, as long as they focus their
scope and practice in such a way as to become individually concerned,
with the Community decision affecting them by reason of certain attributes
peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differen-
tiated from all other persons. By doing so, they will create the conditions
to challenge Community law from an individual standpoint, while aiming
at an improved legal framework for the protection of the entire civil
society.
3.1.5. The European Court of Human Rights
In 1949, when the Council of Europe was established by ten founding
member-states aiming to achieve a greater unity between them for the pur-
pose of safeguarding and realizing ideals and principals of common heri-
tage, it was defined that the maintenance and further realization of human
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rights and fundamental freedoms would take a central place, whose viola-
tions could lead to the expulsion of the breaching State.49 According to
Lawson and Schermers, the European Movement, an alliance of NGOs fa-
voring European integration, developed, in 1949, a draft treaty on human
rights in order to supersede the legal weakness of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights approved by the UN in the previous year.50
The proposal was discussed within the Council of Europe and eventually
led to the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950,
which established two bodies to ensure the observance of the engagements
undertaken by the contracting States: the European Commission on Human
Rights (EComHR), designated to establish the facts of each case, and the
European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), responsible for delivering bind-
ing decisions and giving authoritative interpretation of the Convention,
either in judgments or in advisory opinions.51 This supervisory system op-
erated until the adoption of the 11th Protocol in 1994, which became effec-
tive in 1998.52
The Convention originally adopted a criteria, later reproduced in the
American Convention on Human Rights, which consisted of a two phase
protection, where all cases had to be brought firstly to the Commission
and, then, to the Court. The original wording of Article 25 established that
the EComHR might receive petitions from any NGOs or groups of indivi-
duals claiming to be victims of a violation by one of the contracting States
of the rights set forth in the Convention, provided that the considered State
had declared that it recognized the competence of the Commission to re-
ceive such petitions. Stepping in the same pitfalls that the UN Charter had
entered into when granting consultative status with the ECOSOC, the
Convention neither defined an NGO nor even signaled its main characteris-
tics, a task which the members of the Council of Europe would accomplish
only in 1996, with the adoption of the Strasbourg Convention (ETS
124).53 The Convention established that although NGOs had locus standi
to bring a case before the Commission, they could not act in the same case
before the Court, because Article 44 of the Convention reserved such attri-
butes only to the contracting States and the Commission. Fortunately, with
the adoption of the 9th Protocol, in 1990, the procedure before the Court
was adjusted to be coherent with the right granted before the Commission
and, then, not only the contracting States and the Commission, but also
any persons, NGOs or groups of individuals that had submitted a petition
to the Commission under article 25, were entitled to bring a case before
the ECHR. Despite this adjustment, the entire system was eventually re-
placed four years later, with the adoption of the 11th Protocol, which intro-
duced a single court of Human Rights, which became operational in late
1998.
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Therefore, since 1990, the European Convention on Human Rights has
proportioned a clear locus standi to NGOs, a situation which is unique in
the international sphere.
The ECHR case-law provided a broad understanding of an ‘NGO’ for
the purposes of the application of the Convention. There are cases brought
to court by plaintiffs that are commonly regarded as ‘NGOs’, but also by
trade unions, companies, religious entities, newspapers and political par-
ties,54 therefore, the understanding was assumed that ‘NGOs’ were all
those entities that were not created by the State or a governmental body.’55
Since the jurisdiction of the Court also comprises individuals and group of
individuals, nobody was left aside. This demonstrates the understanding of
the complexity of civil society and, once more, the centrality of human
rights in contemporary life, which cannot be hindered by any legal require-
ments or divisions that may be introduced by governments or municipal
law.
The Convention ensured to everyone several valued rights such as the
freedom of thought, conscience and expression, and the freedom of assem-
bly and association. Article 9(1) of the Convention, for example, ensured
to ‘everyone, either alone or in community with others and in public or in
private, the freedom to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,
practice and observance’. Could this guarantee to joint manifestation of be-
liefs be protected through a legal entity, if their members decided to ex-
press it through one? If Article 25 of the original Convention (article 34 in
the current wording) established that NGOs could claim to be victims of a
violation of protected rights, could we infer that they are entitled to repre-
sent their members if their rights are violated? Addressing these situations,
the ECHR understood that a claim brought by an NGO could protect indi-
vidual interests of its members expressed collectively, such as freedom of
expression and assembly.56 However, regarding the other protected rights,
since the Convention requires the submission of the claim by the victim,
and, since there is no provision for the representation of third parties by
NGOs, these entities can stand before the ECHR only if they have directly
suffered a violation of those protected rights, lacking legitimacy when re-
presenting other parties, even their members.57 Juxtaposing those deci-
sions, we can assume that since freedom of expression and assembly are at
the core of the way NGOs act, the ECHR understood that they were also
an organization’s rights, a situation that is not observed in the other pro-
tected rights.
This poses an awkward situation: In Europe, everyone can complain,
even NGOs, but no one can be represented. Definitively, there is some
room for improvement from the ‘victims’ perspective, because it is often
common for victims of human rights abuses to be afraid to present claims
due to menaces of reprisals. That is why the representation of the victim is
ensured, for example, in the Inter-American system for Human Rights and
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that in international criminal tribunals, they are represented by the
Prosecutor, although they have the right to present evidence pertaining to
the guilt or innocence of the accused and challenge the admissibility or re-
levance of the evidence brought to the Court. Some can argue that the
European ‘common heritage of political tradition, ideals, freedom and the
rule of law’, as stated in the Preamble of the Statute of the Council of
Europe, ensures that such menaces will never happen in Europe and that,
therefore, there is no need to empower NGOs with representativeness of
victims. That could be true if the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia had not existed and if ethnical cleansing on European
soil had been just a bad dream.
If NGOs cannot defend collective rights or, better, shared and common
rights, they are being denied their very own essence. In such circum-
stances, they are not NGOs, just private institutions seeking judicial reme-
dies for their own injuries. Therefore, despite the apparent openness of the
ECHR to accept submissions of NGOs, they are not allowed to act as such
before the Court, which authorizes us to affirm that everyone can stand be-
fore the ECHR, except NGOs performing their statutory objectives toward
public interest.
3.1.6 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) is an autonomous
tribunal whose purpose is the application and interpretation of the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),58 exercising both adju-
dicatory and advisory jurisdictions. Reproducing the model established by
the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950, only State parties to
the Convention and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IAComHR) can appear as parties before the Court within the adjudicatory
jurisdiction, being the advisory one limited to member-states and the
Organization of American States (OAS). The direct participation of NGOs
within IACHR activities is statutorily limited to cooperation agreements
seeking the strengthening and promotion of the juridical and institutional
principles of the Convention in general and of the Court in particular.59
Neither individuals nor NGOs have locus standi before the IACHR, yet
they can be heard as witnesses, expert witnesses or act in any other capa-
city.60 The alleged victims (individuals, only), their next-of-kin or their re-
presentatives may lodge requests, arguments and evidence autonomously.61
As mentioned above, NGOs cannot stand before the IACHR as victims, a
condition guaranteed in the European human rights protection system, but
can represent the victims, which gives room for some opportunities to act
before the Inter-American human rights protection system on behalf of
third parties, a situation not allowed in Europe. The presentation of amici
curiae is, however, controversial, since it is neither formally admitted nor
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prohibited. For example, in the Loayza Tamayo Case, the Court, upon the
request of Peru claiming that two amici curiae presented had to be de-
clared inadmissible according to the Court Rules of Procedure, informed
that such documents would not be rejected, but rather added to the file
‘without being formally incorporated into the record of the proceedings’
and that they would be evaluated by the Court in due course.62 Since the
presentation of amicus briefs has not been rejected, it has continued to
occur, albeit without noticeable improvement in their importance for the
judgment of the cases.63 A different evaluation of NGO reports is, how-
ever, observed when they are presented to the Court by the IAComHR. In
the Abella case, the Court understood that an international organ had re-
cognized authority to freely evaluate probative elements such as reports of
NGOs, provided that the conclusions drawn therefrom were consistent with
the facts and corroborated the testimony or events alleged by the complai-
nants, since in such cases involving the violation of human rights it is often
impossible to obtain evidence without the State’s cooperation.64 These un-
derstandings, together with the right to file petitions with the IAComHR
granted to NGOs by art 44 of the Convention, have shown that NGOs are
likely to be more successful if they start acting at the Commission level,
since, according to Lindblom, ‘a large part of cases decided upon by the
Inter-American Court originated in petition filed by an NGO’.65
According to the ACHR, the Commission has the duty to investigate si-
tuations brought to its knowledge of human rights violations in the OAS
member-states, and any NGOs legally recognized in one of those States
are entitled to present such communications regardless of any formal
authorization or request of the affected person to do so, yet they need to in-
form, at least, the name of an effective or potential victim.66 In spite of the
apparent openness, the investigation is not accessible to third parties, since
the Commission report is made available only to the States concerned
(which shall not be at liberty to publish it), severely reducing the opportu-
nities for the presentation of amicus briefs. If the case is not settled be-
tween the parties concerned after the Commission’s report, then the State
party or the Commission can submit it to the Court to seek compensation
or remedies, or the Commission can prepare a second report to be made
available to the public in general in the Commission’s annual reports, then
imposing political constraints on the State concerned.
It can be noted, therefore, that NGOs have a wide open door to begin a
procedure within the Commission, but, due to confidentiality, a narrow op-
portunity to join it after its onset, except in the condition of a witness, an
expert witness or in any other capacity,67 and, later on, during the Court
procedure, as a non-party, by amicus curiae. This particular characteristic
of the Inter-American system of protection of human rights has shaped the
strategy of NGOs, which focus their efforts on presenting complaints, in-
stead of joining the cases afterwards. Providing evidence of this, nearly
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half of the cases addressed by the Commission in its annual reports from
1999 to 2007 originated in NGO denunciations and complaints.
As a final remark, recalling the situation of the International Criminal
Courts mentioned above, again, no one could think of effective judicial
protection of human rights, whether at the international or regional levels,
without NGOs.
3.2 Quasi-Judicial Bodies
3.2.1 The European Social Charter and other regional bodies
Apart from the Convention on Human Rights, there are other European in-
struments protecting human rights that are also relevant. The first one is
the European Social Charter, which laid down social and economic rights,
adopted in 196168 and revised in 1994.69 The Charter was also amended in
199170 and has two Additional Protocols, one from 198871 and other from
1995,72 which introduced a separate supervisory mechanism, the ‘System
of Collective Complaints’.
The collective aspect of the mechanism implies that only organizations
can submit claims on violations of the protected rights before the
Committee of Independent Experts (European Committee of Social
Rights). Those organizations include the European Trade Union
Confederation, the BUSINESSEUROPE (formerly the Union of Industrial
and Employers’ Confederations of Europe), the International Organization
of Employers, INGOs with participatory status before the Council of
Europe that have been put on a list for this purpose (currently there are se-
venty-one),73 and national employers’ organizations and trade unions with-
in the jurisdiction of the State against which they have lodged a complaint.
The Committee of Independent Experts is the body in charge of evaluat-
ing the claims, collecting evidence and preparing a report, which is made
public and forwarded to the Committee of Ministers, to the complaint orga-
nization, to the contracting parties to the Charter and to the Parliamentary
Assembly. If the report appoints breach of the obligations set forth in the
Charter, the Committee of Ministers shall adopt a recommendation ad-
dressed to the State concerned.
Despite having locus standi before the Committee to submit collective
complaints addressing a State’s failure to comply with the Charter, and
being capable of doing so without any victim requirement or connection to
the alleged violation, the procedure has not attracted the attention of
INGOs, for among the fifty-seven complaints presented since 1998, only
nineteen have been presented by INGOs and only eleven INGOs have
done so.
The second one is the special Committee created by the European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
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Treatment or Punishment adopted in 1987.74 According to the Convention,
a Committee was created to ensure the the compliance with the
Convention and was granted unlimited access to information in the places
where individuals are deprived of their liberty, including full access to the
facilities and the right to move inside such places without restriction and to
interview the individuals in custody. The purpose of the Committee is not
the condemnation of the State for the identified abuses; rather the body
aims to prevent ill-treatment, addressing recommendations to the authori-
ties in order to improve detention conditions or to strengthen safeguards
against abuses. The Committee is entitled to assign experts to perform cer-
tain attributes within its competence, but, since the reports of the
Committee and the experts are confidential, there is no evidence of NGO
involvement in their activities, although NGOs usually address the situa-
tion of prisons in their reports.75
3.2.2 The World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a multilateral organization that
provides the common institutional framework for the conduct of trade rela-
tions among its members in matters related to multilateral trade agree-
ments.76 It facilitates the implementation, administration and operation of
those agreements, as well as providing the forum for negotiations towards
improved commercial relations. The organization is not responsible for
making commercial decisions based on its own discernment, since the rules
applicable to international commerce were negotiated by member-states in
the so-called WTO agreements. Due to this particularity, WTO meetings
are subject to extensive pressure and monitoring by NGOs.
Acknowledging this, the constitutive act of the WTO established in its
Article V(2) that the organization’s ‘General Council may make appropri-
ate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental
organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO’, which
was further clarified in the Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with
Non-Governmental Organizations, adopted on 18 July 1996.77
The Guidelines recognized the role NGOs can play to increase public
awareness with respect to WTO activities and their contribution to the ac-
curacy and richness of public debate, and agreed to improve transparency,
making derestricted documents available on the WTO website, and to de-
velop communication with NGOs through various means, ‘such as inter
alia the organization on an ad hoc basis of symposia on specific WTO-re-
lated issues, informal arrangements to receive the information NGOs may
wish to make available for consultation by interested delegations and the
continuation of past practice of responding to requests for general informa-
tion and briefings about the WTO.’ An important remark was made in the
final paragraph of the Guidelines, in which, while recognizing that the
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WTO has the purpose to be a forum for negotiation of commercial agree-
ments, the ‘current broadly held view’ had the understanding that the con-
sultative arrangements and the commitment to transparency did not imply
in the direct involvement of NGOs in the work of the WTO or its meet-
ings, acknowledging that NGOs could play such a role at the national le-
vel, which has the ‘primary responsibility for taking into account the differ-
ent elements of public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-
making’.
By doing so, the General Council aimed to re-direct NGO pressure to-
ward the member-states, in an attempt to avoid the assumption of the exis-
tence of a global civil society, a marked countersense to the purpose of the
WTO and the global scope of a multilateral trading system that aims to
protect the environment, foster economic growth and ensure to less devel-
oped economies a share commensurate with their needs.78 Of course, it did
not work as planned, as we can observe in the rising NGO pressure, some-
times giving place to turbulence as observed in Seattle, in 1999, and the in-
terference of NGOs in the disputes between the member-states, via amicus
briefs.
In a bird’s-eye view, if a commercial dispute arises as to whether a coun-
try has adopted a trade policy measure or has taken some action that one
or more WTO member-states considers to be breaking the WTO agree-
ments, or to be a failure to live up to obligations, the case is referred to the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), which establishes a consultation proce-
dure (in up to 60 days) aiming to reach a settlement between the parties. If
one is not reached, then the DSB establishes a Panel of experts to consider
the case based on the mentioned WTO agreements. This is the phase in
which most NGOs try to interfere, presenting amicus briefs.
Once the Panel has been established, the parties present their cases in
writing, which are evaluated by the panelists before the first hearing. Then,
the countries involved submit written rebuttals, often addressing the amicus
briefs presented, and present oral arguments at the Panel’s second meeting.
If one of the parties raises scientific or other technical matters, the Panel
may consult experts or appoint an expert review group to prepare an advi-
sory report. Although there is no impediment to NGOs performing such
tasks, we have not identified such a precedent within the WTO. After the
evidence and arguments have been collected, the Panel submits the de-
scriptive (factual and argumentative) sections of its report to the commen-
tary of the parties, which is followed by an interim report, including its
findings and conclusions. A final report is, then, submitted to the parties
and, three weeks later, it is circulated to all WTO members. If the Panel
decides that the disputed practice does break a WTO agreement or an obli-
gation, it recommends that the practice be made to conform to WTO rules,
often suggesting how this could be done. The report becomes the DSB’s
ruling on recommendation within 60 days, unless a consensus rejects it.
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The parties can appeal the Panel’s ruling based on points of law, refer-
ring the case to the Appellate Body. The appeal can uphold, modify or
reverse the Panel’s legal findings or conclusions, but cannot reexamine evi-
dence or appreciate new issues brought by the parties. We have identified
the submission of amicus briefs in this phase, but the admissibility of their
arguments suffers the same restriction imposed to the parties to the case,
i.e., they shall be limited to issues of law covered in the Panel report and
legal interpretations developed by the Panel. Again, the decision is sub-
mitted to the DSB, which can accept or reject it, being the latter possible
only by consensus.
Neither the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes annex 2 to the WTO Agreement (DSU) nor the
Appellate Review79 has rules concerning the participation of civil society
before the settlement system. Nonetheless, civil society, mostly through
amicus briefs usually supported in social and environmental concerns, aims
to interfere in the outcome of these disputes. It is beyond any doubt that
the more the States publicly dispute multilateral trade agreements, the more
attention they will attract from the media and civil society, and the more
amicus briefs of self-proclaimed legitimate parties to these multilateral
cases will be presented, leading to more pressure toward governmental of-
ficials and more media coverage, retro-feeding the cycle.80
A remarkable aspect of this public awareness is observed in the activities
of the dispute settlement panels.81 These bodies inherited from the sixty
years of practice under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) the notion that dispute procedures concerned only the litigating
parties, and therefore were not open to third parties, moreover civil society.
However, in 2005, the European Communities (EC), the United States and
Canada requested that the public could observe their oral hearings, a prac-
tice later adopted by the Appellate Body in 2008 under requirement of the
same parties. Although most people had believed this to be impossible
without a modification in the WTO Agreement,82 currently more than a
quarter of the Panels have public hearings, a practice which appears to be
a consolidated trend to incorporate in the WTO the fundamental feature
– born with the French Revolution – of a fair and public hearing in judicial
proceedings.83
If public hearings appear to have had a smooth acceptance, the same is
not observed in the case of amici curiae, because the latter do not encom-
pass the passive attitude of observers, rather an active one, and with a con-
crete potential to interfere in the outcome of the dispute. The DSU and the
WTO Working Procedures provide a place for people acting as ‘parties to
the dispute’, participants’, ‘third parties’ and ‘third participants’, but none
of them comprise NGOs, only member-states.
The first WTO case to deal with the issue was the United States –
Shrimp/Turtles,84 which addressed the imposition, by a US law, of certain
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measures aiming at the protection of sea turtles during shrimp catching,
which received two amicus briefs. Having in mind that the briefs had been
presented voluntarily by the petitioners, and therefore, that the Panel had
not actively ‘sought’ that information or technical advice under the terms
of Article 13 DSU, the panelists understood that the documents could not
be accepted by the Panel, observing, however, that any of the parties to the
dispute were free to add whatever documents they reputed supportive to
their arguments as part of their own submissions.85 Since the briefs, in gen-
eral terms, possessed arguments in favor of the contested US law, the US
annexed to their second submission part of the briefs prepared by the two
US-based NGOs that had prepared them, the Center for Marine
Conservation and the Center for International Environmental Law.
When the case was referred to the Appellate Body, it understood that the
narrow literal interpretation of the verb ‘seek’ by the Panel was inaccurate
– actually an err – stating that accepting non-requested information from
non-governmental sources was not incompatible with the joint interpreta-
tion of Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the DSU, therefore, admitting a rather
broader interpretation of the verb ‘seek’, which had not to be understood
as a prohibition to accept unsolicited information, but as a discretionary
competence to analyze, accept or reject whatever information is submitted
to the Panel, required or not. When addressing the suggestion made by the
Panel regarding the admission of the briefs with the parties’ submissions,
the Appellate Body understood that it was within the scope of the Panel’s
authority pursuant to articles 12 and 13 of the DSU and that even the sub-
mission of other briefs as attachments to the arguments of the parties to the
Appellate Body had to be understood prima facie as within their own sub-
missions, being the submitting party responsible for their content. Since
the US informed that the legal arguments of its submission were in the
main document and that they accepted the arguments in the briefs to the
extent that they were supportive of their arguments, the Appellate Body fo-
cused its analysis solely on the main submission.86
The second case that dealt with NGOs’ amicus curiae was the United
States – Carbon Steel. A first brief was presented to the Panel that, while
recognizing its competence to accept it, decided to not consider the docu-
ment due to its late presentation.87 In the following phase, another two
briefs were presented. The European Community, which had called for the
Panel, argued that amicus briefs could not be admitted by the Appellate
Body, since the previous case had addressed such a possibility at the Panel
level under Article 13 of the DSU, an argument that was challenged by the
US, which supported that the Appellate Body had the same authority to set
its own working procedures under article 17(9) of the DSU. Eventually,
the Appellate Body concluded that, although not objectively regulating the
admission of those briefs, the DSU and working rules did not hinder the
body to accept them. Nonetheless, recalling its understanding on the
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previous case, the body stressed that NGOs did not have the right to sub-
mit those briefs, since participation in the WTO dispute settlement system
was open only to its member-states.88
This second case is interesting because the challenged briefs were sub-
mitted by the American Iron and Steel Institute and the Specialty Steel
Industry of North America, two clearly business-oriented NGOs, therefore
aiming to protect the relevant interests of the US-based steel industry,89 in
a marked shift in the profile of NGOs seeking to interfere in the interna-
tional judicial and quasi-judicial bodies’ decisions. One might say that it
is not totally unexpected - perhaps it could even be regarded as ‘natural’-
since the WTO is the intergovernmental organization that represents the
quintessence of business relations in the international sphere.
Notwithstanding, it is beyond any doubt that there is a concrete need to
clearly define what a non-governmental organization is for the purposes of
interaction of international bodies with these entities, in order to separate
those organizations that defend ‘the spirit, purposes and principles of the
UN Charter’ from those, such as the ones that presented the amicus briefs
in the US – Carbon Steel case, which were working against the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade, the very objective of the
multilateral organization they were addressing.
The most relevant case for the purpose of analyzing the issue of amicus
curiae before the WTO is the European Communities – Asbestos, which
was initiated by Canada challenging French measures determining the ban
of asbestos and products containing asbestos in the country.90 In the Panel
phase, five amicus briefs were presented, two of them being incorporated
into the EC submission. Two others were not taken into account by the
Panel because they did not bring relevant information to the case and the
last one because it had been submitted too late. The Panel eventually up-
held the French prohibition on asbestos. When the case was brought to the
Appellate Body, a new round of brief submissions began. Seeking to estab-
lish an organized procedure to deal with such non-party documents, the
Appellate Body, supported by article 16(1) of the working procedures,
adopted Additional Procedures providing, inter alia, that any person,
whether natural or legal, other than a party or a third party to this dispute,
wishing to file a written brief with the Appellate body, had to apply for
leave from the Appellate Body to file such a brief by a determined date.91
Although amicus briefs had been received in previous WTO disputes
and in other cases before international tribunals, as we have addressed in
this chapter, never before had such submissions been facilitated by rules
established by a judicial or quasi-judicial body. The outcome was both ex-
pected - thirty briefs and applications for leave to file an amicus brief were
received – and unexpected - they were all rejected. The Appellate Body
was successful in attracting the anger of both WTO member-states as well
as NGOs.
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From the NGO’s side, the criticism was based on the fact that the short
deadline (8 days - 16 November 2000 Noon) did not inform that Central
European Time had to be considered, leading several submissions to be re-
jected due to the time difference. Even those eleven requests that were sub-
mitted within the conditions imposed by the Additional procedures were
denied ‘simply’ stating that the Body had reviewed and considered each of
the applications and had decided to deny their application for leave due to
failure to comply sufficiently with all requirements, therefore understand-
ing that none of the applicants had the capacity to ‘make a contribution to
the resolution of the dispute that was not likely to be repetitive of what
had already been submitted by a party or third party to the dispute.’
Perhaps the arguments were actually repetitive or, maybe, at that moment,
the Appellate Body had made up its mind to confirm the Panel ruling that
had upheld the French asbestos ban. However, the introduction of proce-
dural rules for the admission of amicus briefs politically implied in the
consideration of some of them by the Appellate Body or, at least, a rejec-
tion with more legally solid reasons.
From the WTO members’ side, the criticism was supported by the fact
that the WTO agreement had limited the interaction with NGOs to the
General Council (Article V.2), which apparently excluded the Appellate
Body’s capacity to establish rules concerning the participation of NGOs in
the disputes, but, mostly, based on the broad interpretation given by the
Appellate Body to Article 17(9) DSU, which establishes that ‘working pro-
cedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation with the
Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated to the
Members for their information’. Upon request of the Informal Groups of
Developing Countries, a special meeting of the General Council was con-
vened and occurred on 23 January 2001.92 During that meeting, the
Brazilian representatives argued that the problem at stake was neither the
need for transparency in the WTO proceedings nor the participation of
NGOs in the WTO; rather it was essentially legal, and relied on the (broad)
interpretation of the expressions ‘working procedures’ and ‘seek’, and the
adoption of additional procedures by the Appellate Body, which might cre-
ate or subtract rights and obligations for WTO members, with implications
in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, since the new rules could be un-
derstood as a clear invitation for NGOs to actively participate in the dis-
putes. In summary, Brazil stressed its understanding that, when exercising
the authority to draw up their own working procedures, the Appellate
Body and Panels should proceed with special circumspection, bearing in
mind the distinction between procedural and substantive matters.
The meeting ended with the Chairman concluding, firstly, that there was
a need to consider whether it would be possible to put clear rules in place
for amicus briefs, although there might not be a consensus on the point.
Second, in light of the views expressed and in the absence of clear rules,
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he believed that the Appellate Body should exercise extreme caution in fu-
ture cases until members-states had considered what rules were needed.
Since the issue is extremely controversial, no rules have been enacted so
far, and the acceptance of amicus briefs continues to rely on the discretion
of the Panel’s and Appellate Body’s members.
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CHAPTER 4
NGOS in International Custom
In the early societies, the recurring behavior of individuals defined what
was permitted or not in order to meet the needs and protect the values of
the group. As communities developed, those rules became more compre-
hensive and, with the advent of writing, came the first codifications of cus-
tomary rules, which further received the addition of new written rules
enacted by religious leaders, lords, kings and parliaments. If it is clearly
noticeable that custom has become cumbersome at the national level, in
light of the massive activity of permanent legislative bodies, the same does
not occur in the international sphere, where there is no centralized legisla-
tive body and custom continues to play a relevant role, being regarded as
one of the primary sources of international law, together with the treaties
and the general principles of law. It can be observed, for instance, in
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, which provides that the tribunal will
decide applying ‘international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law’.
In a nutshell, we can regard international custom as those non-written
rules that became obligatory due to the recurrent behavior of States.1 If
customary rules can be deduced from the general behavior of States, how
can we affirm that they are ‘accepted as law’? In practical terms, only
when someone says that it is not. The need to confirm that a certain State
practice is ‘law’ usually arises when a country disrespects it. Not without
reason, major evidence of customary law is identified in the decisions of
international tribunals or arbitrators.2 Some authors suggest that by doing
so, these decisions not only recognize the existence of custom but also cre-
ate it, hence making it extremely difficult to delineate where recognition
has ended and where creation has begun.3 Once a custom has been recog-
nized in a court or arbitral decision, this very decision is reflected in the
teachings of highly qualified publicists, and both become subsidiary means
for the determination of those same rules of law, retro-feeding the existence
of the concerned custom.
Traditionally, two different fundaments have been recognized for cus-
tomary law: the first one (Voluntarism School) is supported in the classical
idea of an inter-state society governed by contractual arrangements be-
tween their members; the second (Objectivism School), is based on the
contemporary idea of a transnational society where custom is created by
the spontaneous behavior of States as an answer to the concerns of modern
society.4
The first theory assumes that international law is created by the volun-
tary consent of the States, whether in written or tacit agreements. It is ob-
served in the Lotus case,5 when the PCIJ affirmed that ‘the rules of law
binding upon states therefore emanate from their own free will as ex-
pressed in conventions or by usage generally accepted as expressing princi-
ples of law and established in order to regulate their relations between the
coexisting independent communities or with a view to the achievement of
common aims.’
Such a conception is extremely positivist and it is incapable of justifying
why new States are bound by customary laws whose creation they have
not participated in, and therefore have not expressed their ‘free will’.6
Additionally, it cannot explain why States remain bound even when they
express this ‘free will’ terminating or denouncing a treaty, due to the jus
cogens established in article 43 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,7 which prescribes that the invalidity, termination or denunciation
of a treaty, shall not in any way impair the duty of any State to fulfill any
obligation embodied in the treaty to which it would be subject under inter-
national law independently of the treaty.
The second theory justifies basing the creation of international customary
law on the existence and joint activity of multiple subjects of international
law – States and intergovernmental organizations – which, together with
other relevant players, such as individuals, multi-national corporations, pri-
vate financial systems and INGOs,8 impose a dynamic rhythm on interna-
tional law, which can create new rules or modify those established, either
by custom or treaties, through the adoption of new patterns of behavior.9
However, as noted by Shaw, ‘amidst a wide variety of conflicting behavior,
it is not easy to isolate the emergence of a new rule of customary law and
there are immense problems involved in collating all necessary
information’.10
Nonetheless, it seems that a certain agreement prevails that the creation
of a new custom neither requires the participation of the (now greatly ex-
panded) entire international community nor demands the repetition of a
new pattern of behavior over a large period of time.11 With regards to the
element of time, in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ noted
that
‘it is over ten years since the Convention was signed, but that it is
even now less than five since it came into force in June 1964, and
that when the present proceedings were brought it was less than
three years, while less than one had elapsed at the time when the re-
spective negotiations between the Federal Republic (of Germany)
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and the other two Parties for a complete delimitation broke down
on the question of the application of the equidistance principle.
Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessa-
rily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary
international law on the basis of what was originally a purely con-
ventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within
the period in question, short though it might be, State practice,
including that of States whose interests are specially affected,
should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense
of the provision invoked; and should moreover have occurred in
such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or
legal obligation is involved.’12
Since custom constitutes ‘evidence of general practice accepted as law’,
two basic elements must co-exist: one, objective, represented by the recur-
rent practice (consuetudo) and the other, subjective, which is its acceptance
as law, i.e., the certainty that that behavior is deemed obligatory because it
represents essential values and is required from all members of the interna-
tional community (opinio juris vel necessitatis).13 Only the co-existence of
both elements can create a custom, which by these circumstances differs
from ‘usage’ that, albeit being a recurrent behavior, does not represent a
legally binding obligation.14 Custom can be either international, when it
comprises a widespread behavior of States from all regions and with differ-
ent economic standings, or regional, usually based within continental lim-
its.15 In certain very specific situations, Court precedents have recognized
the existence of international custom even at the local level.16 This concep-
tual framework poses an inherent circularity to customary international
law, as argued by D’Amato, since States behave accordingly because they
believe that it is law but, by behaving in the same manner, they constitute
it as law.17 Notwithstanding acknowledging this ‘chicken-egg’ dilemma
and the traditional criticism to customary international law, it is beyond the
scope of this work to appraise the role of custom as a source of interna-
tional law. For that reason, we will assume that custom does indeed create
international law.
4.1 The legal status of NGO consultative arrangements
Providing evidence of a custom comprises an empirical survey on States’
and intergovernmental organizations’ behavior and an appraisal on how
those subjects of international law understand that behavior. In this chapter,
we will direct our attention to the duration, consistency, repetition and gen-
erality of those practices. We will conduct our appraisal taking up Herman
Meijers’ concept of ‘stages of growth’ for guidance.18 According to his
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understanding, a rule of customary international law is formed in two
stages, although often overlapping, in which the first is dedicated to the
formation of the concerned rule, and the second, to its transformation into
a rule of law. To correctly appraise both stages, it is also necessary to pose
sub-questions to each of them, addressing in what way those acts took
place, who performed them and when they were performed. Merging his
conception with Article 38(1) of the Statutes of the ICJ, Meijers regarded
the first stage as comprised within the ‘evidence of general practice’ - with
the practice embodying ‘custom’, - and the second one as hidden in the re-
quirement that there also has to be ‘evidence’ that the ‘general practice’ is
‘accepted as law’.
It follows that the identification of the legal status that NGOs have in
the international sphere depends upon the evaluation of the practices that
States and intergovernmental organizations have toward those private enti-
ties. If a conduct is repeated in a consistent and general manner over a cer-
tain period of time, then it can be regarded as a ‘customary rule’ in dealing
with NGOs, hence accomplishing the first stage. Once a certain qualified
number of subjects have expressed their will to adopt such customary be-
havior as a rule of law, the second stage is fulfilled and the concerned pro-
cedure becomes a rule of customary law.
As we could see in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ does
not place significant importance on the duration of State practices, rather
putting more emphasis on the consistency and repetition of the acts of
those States that were specially affected. This is also noticeable, for exam-
ple, in the previous Asylum case, where the Court affirmed that one of the
contending parties had to prove that the custom rule invoked was ‘in accor-
dance with a constant and uniform usage practiced by the States in ques-
tion’ (the consuetudo) and that that usage was the ‘expression of a right
appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty incumbent on the ter-
ritorial State’ (the opinio juris vel necessitatis).19 Thus, if a certain conduct
is repeated in a virtually uniform way by a certain number of subjects,
even for a short period of time, it can lead to the creation of a custom and,
further on, customary law, depending on the obligatory aspect of that
custom.
The evaluation of the States’ and IGOs’ practices toward NGOs must
address the status of these private institutions before those public entities.
Appraising the major worldwide20 multilateral international organizations
(The UN System, WTO and OECD), we have identified the following pat-
terns of practice regarding the participation of NGOs in the decision-
making proceedings, supported either by treaty (items ‘a’ to ‘e’) or custom-
ary (items ‘f” to ‘h’) provisions:
a. Bodies where NGOs are full members:
None
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b. Bodies where NGOs are affiliate members and participate with voting
rights in the decision-making structures:
None
c. Bodies where NGOs are affiliate members and participate without vot-
ing rights in the decision-making structures:
UNWTO
d. Bodies where NGOs have no membership but participate with voting
rights in the decision-making structures:
ILO
e. Bodies where NGOs have no membership but have consultative status
with the decision-making structures granted by the constitutive acts of
the considered international body, fund or programme:
ECOSOC, FAO, ICAO, IMO, ITU, UNCDF, UNCTAD, UNEP, UN-
HABITAT, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNRWA, WHO, WIPO,
WMO, WTO (except amicus briefs in disputes), ICJ (amicus briefs in
advisory proceedings, if requested);
f. Bodies where NGOs have no membership but have some level of inter-
action with the decision-making structures granted by the governing or-
gan of the considered international body, according to defined formal
procedures:
IFAD, UNDP, UNIFEM, UNODC, UPU, WFP, Secretariat (DPI),
World Bank (Inspection Panel), World Bank & IMF (Civil Society
Policy Forums in annual meetings), OECD (Advisory Committees);
ICJ (amicus briefs in advisory proceedings voluntarily submitted);
UN (participation in conferences under ECOSOC Res 1996/31);
g. Bodies where NGOs have no membership but have some level of inter-
action with the decision-making structures granted by the governing or-
gan of the considered international body, on a case-by-case basis:
General Assembly (Observer status); WTO (amicus briefs in dis-
putes); ICC, ICTR & ICTY (investigation supportive roles);
h Bodies where NGOs do not have membership, participation in the deci-
sion-making bodies or consultative status:
Security Council
The collected data evidences that disregarding interaction with NGOs can-
not be taken as a customary practice in worldwide international organiza-
tions, since only one international body does so. At the other extreme,
complete peer interaction is indeed not observed. The bulk of the situations
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evidence a practice of interaction with NGOs heavily concentrated on
treaty-based provisions, with a second relevant group of initiatives sup-
ported by unilateral written sets of procedures that aim to reproduce the
same pattern of relationships established in the treaties. Consultative status
is evidently backed by established and substantial practice. Could this
widespread practice within worldwide multilateral international organiza-
tions be regarded as a rule of custom, accomplishing Meijers’ stage 1?
Unequivocally yes, because through a consistent repetition a custom is
shaped (the consuetudo) and worldwide international organizations, while
interacting with NGOs, are repeatedly acting in a virtually uniform fashion,
establishing consultative relationship according to similar accreditation cri-
teria and functional objectives. The consistency requirement was stressed
by the ICJ in the Asylum case – a ‘constant and uniform usage’ - and also
reinforced in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, which demanded a
practice ‘both extensive and virtually uniform’. The existence of such cus-
tomary rule cannot be challenged on grounds that the international organi-
zations’ behavior in establishing consultative relationship with NGOs has
some subtle differences, hence not being rigorously uniform, because it is
not expected that in the practice of States the application of the rules must
be perfectly aligned, it being unnecessary ‘for a rule to be established as
customary (that) the corresponding practice must be in absolutely rigorous
conformity with the rule’, as observed in the ICJ decision in the
Nicaragua v. United States case.21
The problem, in the case of consultative relationship between NGOs and
worldwide intergovernmental organizations, relies on the appraisal of
whether the mentioned acts just contribute to the creation of a rule of cus-
tom (Meijers’ stage 1) or are capable of converting this rule of custom into
a rule of law (stage 2), since, according to him, ‘they are often barely dis-
tinguishable’, both contributing to the custom and to the law-making.22
An aspect that seems relevant to the definition of the nature of the con-
sultative relationship with NGOs is the fact that the original provision for
such procedure was introduced in the UN Charter, which determined that
the ECOSOC should adopt suitable arrangements for consultation with
NGOs which are concerned with matters within its competence. Although
leading in an opposite direction, if compared to the situation addressed by
the ICJ in the Nicaragua v United States case, where the Charter gave ex-
pression to principles already present in customary international law, it is
true that in the situation of the consultative status granted to NGOs, the
Charter established a new pattern of behavior, because ‘the law has in the
subsequent four decades developed under the influence of the Charter, to
such an extent that a number of rules contained in the Charter have ac-
quired a status independent of it’.23
If there is no doubt about the acceptance ‘as law’ of the consultative
procedures established by international conventions, there is, however, a
148 NGOS: LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
relevant dissension as to the other forms of evidence that could be accepted
as a demonstration of State practices. On one side, said liberal, stand those
who support the notion that State behavior is evidenced by a myriad of ac-
tive attitudes, either at individual (diplomatic correspondence, public state-
ments by heads of governments and other unilateral acts, including domes-
tic law and court decisions) or collective levels (resolutions of the UN
Assembly, recitals in international instruments, drafts of the International
Law Commission),24 as well as passive attitudes represented by the tacit
acceptance of some practices, represented by the absence of objections.25
At the opposite, conservative extreme, others argue that what is important
is what States ‘do’ and not what they ‘say’, therefore regarding the treaties
entered into by the States as relevant, but not the statements made by their
diplomats.26 Between both, there are also those who accept a moderate ex-
pansion in evidence but exclude some specific ones.27
Evidence shows that eleven out of the fifteen UN specialized agencies
have provisions for consultative arrangements with NGOs in their statutes,
and the remaining four have established these arrangements under deci-
sions from their governing bodies. Similar patterns of behavior can be ob-
served throughout the entire UN system’s programmes, funds and relevant
subsidiary bodies, except for one: the Security Council. Given its unique
characteristic of being a body entitled to impose the use of force and eco-
nomic sanctions against any member-state except the five permanent mem-
bers with veto powers, it could be regarded as the exception that confirms
the rule of the comprehensive adoption of the practice of granting consulta-
tive status to NGOs by similar intergovernmental bodies within the UN
system. Therefore, the extensive adoption of the same pattern of acts ex-
pressing the will to engage in structured consultations with NGOs may
constitute a ‘settled practice’ within the UN system that produces a fact of
law according to international law, i.e., that creates customary international
law (the opinio juris vel necessitatis).
Furthermore, if we take into account that some reputed authors support
that the UN Charter, being the basic document of contemporary interna-
tional law, ‘would be accepted by international law doctrine as a kind of
constitution of the international community’,28 it follows that the consulta-
tive rights ensured to NGOs by the UN Charter could be understood as ex-
tensive not only to the entire UN system but also to any other intergovern-
mental organizations. In a certain way this assumption can be regarded as
correct and effective, since NGOs’ consultative rights have been incorpo-
rated on a similar basis in the statutes of regional intergovernmental organi-
zations created after the UN, such as the Organization of the American
States, the Council of Europe, the African Union and Mercosur.
Resuming Meijers’ concept of ‘stages of growth’ for the creation of cus-
tomary international law, we are able to acknowledge that recognizing the
consultative rights to NGOs is a ‘general practice’ established by those
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same multilateral international organizations ‘whose interests are specially
affected’ by the practice, or, putting the same idea into consultative status
wording, ‘concerned with matters within the entity’s competence’. In this
aspect, it is noteworthy that, as well as NGOs, most of the mentioned inter-
governmental bodies have been established to work in specific technical
areas, attentive to some determined needs of people. Due to this character-
istic, the representatives of the member-states are usually experts that,
knowing ‘the needs and the potential for international cooperation in their
particular field’,29 regard NGOs as relevant depositories of knowledge and
effective partners in dealing with the issues at stake, not only because they
have evidenced experience in dealing with those matters and in aggregat-
ing experts in the area, but also due to their capacity for testing and imple-
menting pilot projects that, once proven successful, can be extended to the
entire world and, most relevantly, their capacity for mustering general sup-
port for public policies that they have helped to draft and test. Interaction
with NGOs represents a serious concern for worldwide intergovernmental
organizations whose interests are specially affected by public opinion and
the work of those private institutions. Schermers and Blokker, for example,
regarded this interaction as mandatory when they affirmed that ‘a public
international organization should maintain contact with the citizens of their
member-states’.30
It is beyond any doubt that international organizations have not only in-
troduced consultative procedures but actually implemented them, holding
several consultative procedures, forums, meetings and symposiums regu-
larly, clearly fulfilling the ‘evidence’ condition of customary practice.31
The juxtaposition of all the elements indicates that there is evidence of an
intra vires general practice of worldwide and regional multilateral interna-
tional organizations engaging themselves in consultative interaction with
NGOs within the scope of their activities that may constitute a customary
international law for the purposes of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.
Albeit extensive at the international level and highly supported by the
practice of States at the municipal level - where interaction sometimes
gives NGOs some space in public-policies decision making32 – it is a fact
that the strength of these consultation rights extensively recognized by
multilateral bodies has not yet been appreciated by the ICJ. The first reason
for that is the proper apparently unanimous acceptance of those rights,
since no State has challenged them before the Court.33 The second one,
most relevant yet concealed behind widespread practice, is the fact that it
will probably never be confirmed by the ICJ, since NGOs do not have lo-
cus standi before the Court and States cannot stand before the tribunal to
seek judicial protection for the rights of third parties. The apparently un-
ique option of having it addressed directly by the Court would seem to be
possible through a request of an advisory opinion on the subject by a
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legitimate international body, such as the UN General Assembly.34
However, as we have appraised in the previous chapter, it does not imply
that international judicial or quasi-judicial bodies have not already dis-
cussed the participation of NGOs, often through the presentation of amicus
briefs, in contentious cases brought by third parties. In those cases, it
seems that quasi-judicial bodies are keener to accept the participation of
NGOs than the Courts, and that regional bodies are more sympathetic to
their initiatives than international bodies. If it is true that NGOs can stand
as parties before some international tribunals to defend their personal
rights, as is the case in the European Court of Justice and the European
Court of Human Rights, it is less probable that those rights could be re-
garded as encompassing the right to intervene in third parties’ contentious
cases in those situations where this right has not been confirmed by the
rules of procedure of the concerned tribunal.
Taking the submission of amici curiae as an example, it can be seen
that, although the ICJ is statutorily authorized to notify ‘any international
organization considered by the Court as likely to be able to furnish infor-
mation on the question submitted for the advisory opinion, that the Court
will be prepared to receive written statements or to hear, at a public sitting
to be held for that purpose, oral statements related to the question’,35 this
practice neither occurs nor is the voluntary submission of these briefs en-
couraged, since the Courts Practice Direction XII,36 despite ensuring ac-
ceptance of written statements or documents submitted by NGOs in an ad-
visory opinion case on their own initiative, defined that they will not to be
considered as part of the case file, except if brought by a party.
From another perspective, if we consider, as affirmed in the Nicaragua
v. United States case, that ‘as to the facts of the case, in principle the Court
is not bound to confine its consideration to the material formally submitted
to it by the parties (cf. Brazilian Loans, PCIJ Series A, no. 20/21, p. 124;
Nuclear Tests, ICJ Reports 1974, pp. 263-264, paras. 31, 32)’,37 there
could be potentially legitimate participation of NGOs in the Court pro-
ceedings, since amici curiae usually address factual situations. However,
we have not found evidence that those briefs have been effectively ac-
cepted by the Court.38
The situation of NGOs before other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies is
not materially different, since the presentation of amicus curiae is highly
controversial either at the international or regional levels. If we take, for in-
stance, the case of WTO settlement dispute procedures, we have observed
that some Panels have accepted the submission of factual briefs based on
their legal capability to ‘seek’ information to the case pursuant to articles
12 and 13 of the DSU,39 a procedure that was later adopted by the
Appellate Body, although restricted to legal matters.40 When the Appellate
Body, laying down article 16(1) of the Working Procedures, adopted
Additional Procedures41 providing, inter alia, that any person, whether
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natural or legal, other than a party or a third party could file a written brief
in the European Communities – Asbestos case,42 the decision was heavily
opposed by several member-states.43
Therefore, the appraisal of the major worldwide international organiza-
tions has shown that even though NGOs enjoy consultative rights in mat-
ters falling within the competence of specialized international entities, sup-
ported either on treaties or governing bodies’ decisions, this right is re-
stricted to the executive-like bodies, with severe restrictions on the
adoption of the same pattern of behavior by judicial organs, either by the
Courts themselves or by the States. Recalling Meijers’ model, evidence
suggests that international customary law (originated in treaty law, and
further widely reproduced in State practice) has legitimized NGOs, ensur-
ing to them the right to engage in consultative procedures with specialized
organizations, agencies, funds and programs within the matters of their
competence, fulfilling the requirements of stages 1 and 2 of the model. In
this particular aspect, we should recall that the ICJ, in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases, affirmed that a conventional rule in its origin can
pass into the general corpus of international law, becoming accepted as
such by the opinio juris, binding even those countries that were not part to
the original conventional instrument.44 Regarding the participation in pro-
ceedings before judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, despite the existence of
some room for interaction, evidence shows that there is no consistency and
generality in the practice on the matter, which makes both stages
unattended.
Assuming that there is a settled intra vires customary practice in interna-
tional organizations, it is worth appraising to what extent this customary
practice is ultra vires, affecting the member-states. Should they become
personally bound by the decisions made, for instance, as a member of a
UN organ?
According to Meijers, the answer is evident: when voting on the adop-
tion of rules concerning the granting of consultative status to NGOs in a
given UN organ governing body, they are not acting as a State, but as a
part of that UN organ, therefore not configuring in such a act a kind of
State practice for the purposes of Article 38(1) of the Statutes of the ICJ.45
Intergovernmental organizations are independent bodies that act by them-
selves within the limits of the powers that have been attributed to them by
their member-states. They do not have the competence to establish their
own competences.46 Since the States are not keen to be individually bound
by the acts of those organizations that they have created and that they can-
not personally control, as a rule, the constitutive instruments do not attri-
bute representative powers to the organizations, following that the States
are not bound by the customary practices of the international organizations
in which they participate.
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However, should the same rationale be applied when States gather in
conferences to approve the establishment of a new intergovernmental orga-
nization whose constitutive acts recognize the NGOs’ consultative rights?
There is no disputing the fact that the creation of IGOs in multilateral
treaties represents the concerted personal will of the contracting parties,
containing ‘legal standards specifically agreed between the parties to gov-
ern their mutual rights and obligations, and that the conduct of the parties
will continue to be governed by these treaties, because of the principle of
pacta sunt servanda’.47 Hence, we will dwell any longer on the issue.
However, if establishing consultative relationship with NGOs in a specific
convention binds the contracting States in that case, it is worth asking if
the repetitive recognition of such rights constitutes an opinion juris that ob-
liges the States to do so in the future.
In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ regarded the consis-
tency and repetition of the acts of the States that were specially affected as
a relevant aspect of the creation of customary law. The Court also affirmed
that a rule, conventional in its origin, can pass into the general corpus of
international law, becoming accepted as such by the opinio juris.48 In an-
other case, the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriyu/Malta), the
Court affirmed that ‘it is of course axiomatic that the material of customary
international law is to be looked for primarily in the actual practice and
opinio juris of States, even though multilateral conventions may have an
important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from cus-
tom, or indeed in developing them.’49
Hence, one can acknowledge the consistent repetition of NGO consulta-
tive provisions in multilateral conventions either as a recording of custom-
ary rules already in existence or as a settled extensive practice of specially
affected States leading to their development. As we observed in the first
part of this chapter, it is a fact that consultative rights have been continu-
ously and extensively ensured to NGOs in a virtually uniform manner in
several multilateral agreements since 1945. It is also a truism that this pro-
cedure has not received the opposition of the States, rather their effective
support, not only expressed through the negotiation and signature of the
conventions but also through the subsequent deposit of their ratifications.
It is also unchallenged that the rules have been adopted by a qualified ma-
jority of those States specially affected by the provision, since all the sur-
veyed organizations, with the exception of the OECD, concentrate the qua-
si-totality of independent States. All of this evidence suggests the existence
of customary international law adopted by States.
Furthermore, in order to support our analysis, we may draw our attention
to the judgment of the Nicaragua v. United States case. In that situation,
the Court understood that ‘where two States agree to incorporate a particu-
lar rule in a treaty, their agreement suffices to make that rule a legal one,
binding upon them.’ This is undisputed, since it relies on the principle of
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pacta sunt servanda. However, the Court went further to add that ‘in the
field of customary international law, the shared view of the parties as to
the content of what they regard as the rule is not enough. The Court must
satisfy itself that the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of States is
confirmed by practice’ which includes, inter alia, ‘the attitude of States to-
ward certain General Assembly resolutions’.50
The ICJ ruling suggests that not only multilateral conventions, but also
General Assembly resolutions, can have a role in the definition of a State
practice for the purpose of establishing customary law.
In another case, the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the Court
maintained the same line of thought. In that situation, the Court appraised
the successive resolutions passed by the General Assembly, starting with
Resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961, and found that the existence
of a substantial number of negative votes and abstentions, made them ‘still
fall short of establishing the existence of an opinio juris on the illegality of
the use of such weapons’ to conclude that ‘the emergence, as lex lata, of a
customary rule specifically prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons as such
is hampered by the continuing tensions between the nascent opinio juris,
on the one hand, and the still strong adherence to the practice of deterrence
on the other.’51
Despite confirming the lack of opinio juris on the subject, the Court af-
firmed, implicitly, that it could be created if the opposition against the nas-
cent opinio juris vanished. A central element in this case appears to be the
role of General Assembly resolutions in the formation of customary rule.
Since the Court was assessing a sequence of UNGA resolutions that de-
clared the illegality of nuclear weapons, it had to appraise the legal
strength of these documents. When the Court declared that they ‘still fall
short of establishing the existence of an opinio juris’ (emphasis added) it
understood that they, at least in thesis, can contribute to the creation of cus-
tomary law.
Judge Schwebel, however, understood in his dissenting opinion that the
General Assembly ‘has no authority to enact international law’ and that it
‘can adopt resolutions declaratory of international law only if those resolu-
tions truly reflect what international law is’, i.e., if they are ‘adopted unani-
mously (or virtually so, qualitatively as well as quantitatively) or by con-
sensus’ and if they ‘correspond to State practice’. Since in the considered
case, the resolutions ‘have been adopted by varying majorities, in the teeth
of strong, sustained and qualitatively important opposition’ of States that
‘bring together much of the world’s military and economic power and a
significant percentage of its population’, it more than sufficed to ‘deprive
the resolutions in question of legal authority’ to give birth to a ‘nascent
opinio juris’.52
Judge Schwebel’s opinion raises some interesting points: firstly, it asserts
that General Assembly resolutions cannot create international customary
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law, but only declare it, and secondly, it affirms, implicitly, that the two-
third majority of member-states that passed the resolution, according to ar-
ticle 18(2) of the UN Charter, could not constitute a qualified majority
since the resolution had not obtained the support of those countries that re-
present, in his own words, ‘much of the world’s military and economic
power and a significant percentage of its population’.
In his first point, he assumes implicitly that State declarations, as is the
case of UNGA resolutions, do not have the legal strength to bind the de-
claring States, because they cannot constitute law. This understanding,
however, is not supported by Court precedents, which in the Nuclear Tests
cases53 affirmed that:
‘It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral
acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect of
creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and of-
ten are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State making
the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms,
that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal un-
dertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a
course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An undertaking
of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even
though not made within the context of international negotiations, is
binding.’
If States are bound by their declarations, it is relevant to evaluate to what
extent form affects content. Also in this aspect, the Court understood that
‘the question of form is not decisive’ and that ‘this is not a domain in
which international law imposes any special or strict requirement’ to con-
clude that ‘the sole relevant question is whether the language employed in
any given declaration does reveal a clear intention’.54
Hence, having in mind that there is no essential difference if a statement
is made orally or in writing, as long as it clearly demonstrates the intention
of the parties, it would be senseless to understand that statements made
collectively in writing would not be able to create legal obligations to their
signatories. As affirmed by the Court, the principle of good faith is a basic
principle governing the creation and performance of legal obligations and
it is also at the root of the binding character of unilateral declarations.55
Therefore, one can assume that UNGA resolutions, depending on their
wording, can play a relevant role in the establishment of customary inter-
national law if they represent collective undertakings of the member-states
that have approved them. In doing so, they are material evidence to deter-
mine actual State practice.56 The binding character of UN resolutions is
highly influenced by several factors, namely their addressees (member-
states, UN bodies), their terminology (shall as opposed to should; demand
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as opposed to recommend, etc), their purpose (decision on something, de-
claration of intent, recommendation for doing something), their compatibil-
ity with the Charter and other treaty provisions or customary law; and
forms of adoption (who is in favor, who is against).57
Judge Schwebel, in his second point, trails the path laid down by De
Visscher, where some States make heavier footprints than others due to
their greater weight.58 As noted by Shaw, even though custom should to
some extent reflect the perceptions of the majority of the States – as is the
case of the UNGA Nuclear Weapons resolutions – it is ‘inescapable that
some States are more influential and powerful than others and that their ac-
tivities should be regarded as of greater significance’.59
If the assumption of a ‘heavy footprint’ is correct, then we could argue
that the recognition of NGO’s consultative rights should be regarded as a
binding obligation imposed to States by the behavior of a qualified major-
ity60 of them, which have ensured such rights to NGOs in major interna-
tional conventions in a consistent, repetitive and general manner, since
1945. Furthermore, we could also argue that all General Assembly resolu-
tions addressing such consultative arrangements are notorious evidence of
subsequent practice of this opinio juris for the sake of Article 31(3)(b) of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, while interpreting a
treaty,61 and, borrowing the expression coined by Judge Schwebel in his
dissenting opinion, ‘authentic interpretations of principles or provisions of
the United Nations Charter’.
Hence, evidence suggests that the consultative rights ensured to NGOs,
firstly by the UN Charter, and, subsequently, by the statutes of several
other multilateral organizations, represent the expression of an opinio juris
that has migrated from the realm of treaty law to international customary
law, therefore legitimating the adoption of consultative procedures by the
governing bodies of several other organizations. Additionally, this custom-
ary international law binds not only the intergovernmental organizations
but also their member-states that have extensively expressed in a virtually
uniform manner their free will to be bound by such rule, abdicating from
the exclusive representation of the interests of the nations in the interna-
tional sphere to give space, in consultative procedures, to the opinion of ci-
vil society organizations in matters within the competences of the interna-
tional bodies concerned. Finally, not only multilateral treaties, but also
statements individually or collectively made by States regarding rights
granted or ensured to NGOs bind the declaring States, indeed having the
capacity to constitute general practice and bind the entire international
community if made by a qualified majority of States specially affected by
their content. Since objects of law cannot bear rights, only subjects, it is
worth appraising the impact that these customary practices have made on
the legal personality of NGOs.
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4.2 The legal status of NGOs in general
When States gather at conferences and adopt multilateral conventions,
whether creating new intergovernmental organizations or addressing a con-
cern of contemporary society, they evidence their free will to assume obli-
gations toward the international community. In 1945, the States understood
that NGOs were legitimate interlocutors that had to be heard in social and
economic matters and agreed to include in the UN Charter a provision es-
tablishing a consultative procedure. This decision acknowledged that the
public sphere was no longer equal to the governmental sphere, rather lar-
ger, in comprising other organizations created by social contracts entered
into and between individuals: NGOs.
At that precise moment the State’s delegates were not able to conceptua-
lize a ‘non-governmental organization’, although one can infer that they
understood that the term referred to government-like bodies on grounds
that they operated in the public sphere, but that, being private, had to be
differentiated from the governments, hence leading to the expression ‘non-
governmental’. Once it had been acknowledged that the public sphere com-
prehended not only States and State-created organizations, and that other
bodies had legitimacy to be heard on matters affecting civil society at
large, borrowing the De Visscher expression, the UN founding States took
the first step to form a road through a vacant land.62 With the further adop-
tion of consultative relationship in newly created international organiza-
tions, new footprints were added to the initial path. As the empirical survey
demonstrates, several organizations, both with universal or regional charac-
ters, have recognized such consultative rights and have operated maintain-
ing close ties with NGOs, transforming the initial uncertain direction taken
in 1945 into a secure road regarded as the only regular way to deal with
the contemporary challenges of the society.
The rule of law established by the custom of the States and the intergo-
vernmental organizations does not rely solely on the formal consultative
procedures, rather on the effective partnership with NGOs in dealing with
contemporary developmental challenges. In this part of this chapter, we
will address the effectiveness of consultative rights, as well as other State
practices in dealing with NGOs, and their contribution to the definition of
the legal status of NGOs in the international sphere.
As acknowledged by the UN Secretary General, the importance of
NGOs can be seen in their influence in the debate regarding development,
‘in particular through the adoption of policies and strategies that emphasize
the need to place people at the centre of the development processes, the
importance of participatory approaches, and the priorities that need to be
given to poverty alleviation, social equity, environmental protection and re-
generation, and cultural identity’, which have, in the last decades, become
essential components of development strategies.63 The recognition of the
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important role played by NGOs was laid down in the UN Charter and it is
currently evidenced at all levels of the UN System: policy making, re-
search, information, education and advocacy, and operational activities.
The innumerable contractual arrangements regulating international coop-
eration, according to a UN agency report, have made UN-NGO relations
evolve into a ‘symbiotic relationship’64 that far exceed the original scope
of the provision of the UN Charter, restricted to economic and social mat-
ters. Currently, a diversified and pulsing NGO sector is acting in the entire
UN system according to its thematic interests and often participates in the
decision-making activities through a variety of informal types of collabora-
tion. It has made NGOs legitimated actors in the multilateral system, and
‘continuing and indispensable participants with governments and secretar-
iats in support of international cooperation’.65
Could this relationship with NGOs be regarded as custom? Moreover,
could it constitute a rule of customary law? To what extent do State and in-
tergovernmental practices recognize NGOs as subjects of international
law? In order to try to answer these questions, the analysis of the status of
NGOs in the international arena must address the practice of the States to-
ward NGOs in relevant manifestations of their will, such as treaties and
conventions, and their participation in conferences and on policy agenda
setting.
4.2.1 Role in the practice of treaties and conventions
As we have seen in Chapter 2, NGOs have a ‘recognized and indispensable
participation’ in some labor,66 human rights67 and environmental68 conven-
tions, as well as participatory rights in the Council of Europe,69 together
with the consultative rights ensured in the statutes of several UN specia-
lized agencies addressed in the first part of this chapter. The observation of
these multiple provisions clearly demonstrates that NGOs currently exer-
cise duties at the: (i) advisory level (Consultative status in general and par-
ticipatory status, in the Council of Europe); (ii) decision-making level
(ILO); and (iii) executive level (Ramsar and Geneva Conventions).
a. Advisory level
At the Advisory level, as we have observed, several multilateral conven-
tions have given NGOs the right to be heard in consultative procedures in
matters falling within the competence of the intergovernmental body. Their
situation has been improved at the European level due to several acts
adopted by the Council of Europe member-states and governing bodies.
Following the practice established in the UN, in 1952 the Council of
Europe introduced consultative arrangements with NGOs.70 Due to the re-
levant place that democracy played in Western European countries, the
practice evolved in Europe at a faster pace than that observed at the UN,
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which suffered the restraints of the Cold War regarding the recognition of
the role of NGOs and pluralist democracy in the member-states. This de-
mocratic background and the acknowledgement of the importance of active
participation of citizens in conducting public affairs fostered the creation of
a favorable environment for the adoption of the Strasbourg Convention in
1986.71
In 2003, recognizing that the system of co-operation introduced by con-
sultative status ‘largely permitted the development and strengthening of co-
operation between the Council of Europe and the voluntary sector’ and that
the evolution of the rules ‘to reflect the active participation of INGOs in
the Council’s policy and work programme’ was ‘indispensable’ , the situa-
tion improved again, with INGOs achieving important regional advance-
ments by the recognition of participatory rights at the Council of Europe,
although without membership and voting power.72
The difference between ‘participation’ and ‘consultation’ is fundamental
in international law.73 With regard to ECOSOC, for instance, the UN
Charter established that participation was granted to States not members of
the Council and specialized agencies (arts 69 and 71), leaving the consulta-
tive arrangements with NGOs to article 71. Hence, at the European level,
NGOs have obtained a treatment only reserved to States and IGOs at the
international level.
Based on the arguments concerning the creation of international custom-
ary law presented in the first part of this chapter, there is evidence of the
existence of a regional customary practice of interaction with INGOs at the
European level that has determined the evolution of consultative rights into
participatory rights aiming, as asserted in the 2003 resolution, to facilitate
participation and access of INGOs to the decision making bodies of the
CoE with the purpose of allowing them to ‘continue to draw the Council’s
attention to the effects of changes in European societies and the problems
facing them’. The Strasbourg Convention, on the other hand, expresses the
recognition of the Council of Europe member-states that NGOs operating
at the international level deserve the recognition of a specific legal status
that can enable them to operate in several countries.
b. Decision-making level
From the decision-making perspective, NGOs have achieved the highest le-
vel of participation, even though unique in character, at the ILO, a major in-
tergovernmental organization. Together with member-states they choose the
employers’ and workers’ delegates to the International Labor Conference,
the plenary policy-making body. Every three years, the delegates of each
category (member-state, workers and employers) organize themselves into
electoral colleges to elect their representatives to the ILO Governing Body,
a non-plenary policy-making organ.
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The situation of NGOs in the ILO provides an interesting starting point
for the enhancement of their participation in the decision-making processes
of intergovernmental organizations. According to Schermers and Blokker,
an international organization exists if three elements are observed: (i) it is
created by an international agreement concluded between States or, more
rarely, with the participation of other international organizations; (ii) it is a
legal person with at least one organ with a will of its own, therefore being
able to bear rights and obligations; and (iii) it has been established under
international law.74
All three elements are fulfilled by the ILO, which still has ensured the
participation of NGOs in its decision-making process, by the establishment
of a provision that the member-states should nominate their delegates ‘in
agreement with the industrial organizations ... which are the most represen-
tative of employers or work people ... in their respective countries’.75
Hence, even though not addressing the international legal personality of
NGOs, a treaty almost one century old established a way in which civil so-
ciety organizations could participate in an intergovernmental organization.
It cannot be regarded as a rule of custom, since it is effective in one single
intergovernmental body, but may be a seed for a future State practice.
c. Executive level
At the executive level, NGOs perform two different roles. In the four
Geneva Conventions (1949) and its additional Protocols (1977), the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was allowed to enter the
conflict areas to exercise its humanitarian functions for the protection of
prisoners of war and civilians, therefore helping to ensure respect for the
convention by the conflicting parties. The duty attributed to the
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
(IUCN) by the Ramsar Convention is different, since it was authorized to
act as the substantive Secretariat of the Convention,76 performing the conti-
nuing bureau duties under the Convention.
The situation of the ICRC in international law is extremely peculiar. It is
a private non-profit association with room for only twenty five members,
all Swiss citizens, established according to the Civil Code of Switzerland,
a State that only joined the UN on 10 September 2002. Notwithstanding, it
is widely recognized that this private entity holds an international legal
personality.77
The IUCN, on the other hand, is an international association of govern-
mental and non-governmental members established under the Swiss Civil
Code that currently has more than 1100 members, being composed of
roughly 200 governments (87 States and 120 government agencies, as well
as political and/or economic integration organizations) and 900 NGOs.78 It
is also unique in its genre because it merges the participation of NGOs,
States and intergovernmental organizations into one single membership
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organization performing public tasks that include the exercise of the roles
of Secretariat to a major environmental treaty. The international character
of its work and the presence of several States as members have led to the
admission of the IUCN as Observer to the UN General Assembly, as has
the ICRC.79
Both cases express the flexibility of international law and the failure of
the positivist model, in which States, being the only subjects of interna-
tional law are the only legal entities capable of bearing rights and obliga-
tions under it. Schermers and Blokker, addressing the theme of the interna-
tional legal personality of international organizations, asseverated the exis-
tence of three schools of thought: (i) the first supported that the
recognition of international personality only existed if it had been explicitly
attributed to the organization in its constitutive acts; (ii) the second sup-
ported that it was a status achieved ipso facto, if the organization had at
least one organ with a will of its own; and (iii) the third, currently prevail-
ing, supports that ‘organizations are international legal persons not ipso
facto, but because the status is given to them, either explicitly or, if there is
no constitutional attribution to this quality, implicitly’.80
Nevertheless, could these theories explain the emergence of individuals
and some NGOs – as is the case of the ICRC – as subjects with rights in
the international sphere? It does not appear probable, because all three
have as common ground the presumption that the considered organization
has been created by States, disagreeing only as to whether the concerned
organization has an original legal personality (defended by the second
school) or has derived powers (first and third schools). They do not com-
prise the hypothesis that individuals can bear rights and obligations under
international law, as declared, for instance, by the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, which held that ‘crimes are committed by men, not
by abstract entities,’ therefore affirming that individuals, not only States,
could be subjects of international law and, as a consequence, acquire duties
and rights.81 They also do not comprise that ‘the subjects of law in any le-
gal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of
their rights and their nature depends upon the needs of the community’, as
declared by the ICJ in the Reparation for injuries case, which, albeit ad-
dressing the case of the UN, and therefore, not appraising the situation of
individuals and NGOs, has irremediably torn down the State-only theory
of international legal personality.82
It appears that, as long as one private institution, the ICRC, is widely re-
cognized as having international legal personality83 and that, together with
a second one, the IUCN, can bear rights and obligations under a multilat-
eral treaty, and that several other NGOS can have consultative rights or
even participatory rights under the aforementioned arrangements, one can-
not argue that it is impossible to recognize their international personality.
The practice of a qualified majority of States has shown it to be possible.
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Even though the number of situations such as those of the ICRC and
IUCN does not suggest the existence of a settled universal practice in
granting extended rights and obligations to NGOs, it is a truism that the in-
ternational customary practice of consultative status and the European
practice of participatory rights at the CoE level, have attributed some rights
to NGOs. And, after all, if being an international person means being cap-
able of bearing rights and duties, this does not suffice, as pointed out by
Schermers and Blokker, to answer the question regarding what rights and
duties they will have.84
4.2.2 State practice in NGO participation in conferences
Practice has shown that each UN organ convening an international confer-
ence is entitled to establish its own rules for participation of NGOs in the
event, directly or based on the recommendation of the preparatory body for
the conference. These rules generally cover the criteria for both accredita-
tion and participation and, as expressed in a UN Secretary General report,
in 1994, ‘the rights to attend and participate have varied from one confer-
ence to another’ but there is a visible trend ‘towards greater flexibility in
granting NGOs access to international conferences’.85 The UNSG report
has surveyed the practice of all twenty-five international conferences con-
vened by the UN between 1976 and 1996, in which the following pattern
of behavior can be observed:
a. Eight conferences defined the ECOSOC consultative status as a general
criteria for participation;
b. Fifteen conferences defined the ECOSOC consultative status as a preli-
minary criteria for participation, but only accepted those NGOs which
were directly concerned with the scope of the conference;
c. Thirteen conferences disregarded the ECOSOC consultative status as a
necessary criteria for participation, defining that only NGOs which
were directly concerned with the scope of the conference could
participate.
The recurrent recognition of ECOSOC consultative status as criteria for
participation in UN convened conferences (23 out of 25) during the sur-
veyed twenty years led to the establishment of the right of accreditation of
NGOs with consultative status in UN convened conferences in 1996, when
the ECOSOC defined that those organizations as a rule shall be accredited
for participation.86
The expansion of the scope of consultative rights ensured to the NGOs
by the UN Charter and similar provisions in the constitutive acts of other
UN agencies, funds and programmes has led to the establishment of rules
for the participation of other NGOs, either at local, national or regional le-
vels, in those conferences.87 Surprisingly, those rules were defined by the
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ECOSOC in the same resolution that granted participatory rights to the
organizations with consultative status, in a marked widening of the inter-
pretation of both the ECOSOC mandate and the scope of the consultative
status under article 71 of the UN Charter.88 Therefore, since 1996, the up
to then large freedom of UN Agencies to establish the procedures for parti-
cipation in conferences became restricted by the rules defined by the
ECOSOC.
The possibility of an enlargement in the interpretation of the content of
the UN Charter provision was appraised by the ICJ in the Certain expenses
of the UN advisory opinion.89 The situation at stake had its core in a dis-
pute as to whether a UNGA Resolution on the UN operations in the
Congo and the operations of the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East
could be regarded as a modification of the balance between two internal
bodies of the organization (the General Assembly and the Security
Council). In that case, the Court, according to the previous occasions when
it had had to interpret the UN Charter, regarded it as a multilateral treaty,
albeit with certain special characteristics. Following the principles and
rules applicable in general to the interpretation of treaties, which included
consideration on ‘the structure of the Charter’ and, moreover, the ‘manner
in which the organs concerned have consistently interpreted the text in
their practice’, the Court concluded that the practice of the organization
throughout its story could bear out the elucidation of the disputed term in-
cluded in a UN Charter provision.90 From a certain perspective, the Court
implicitly understood that the UN Charter could be modified, if the prac-
tice evidenced a wider interpretation of one of its provisions.91
Based on the Court ruling, the unopposed adoption and implementation
of the ECOSOC Res 1996/31 and the large participation of NGOs in UN
convened conferences, the evidence suggests that the consultative status
has been expanded to include other opportunities of interaction in matters
falling within the scope of the ECOSOC, i.e, that NGOs could be heard ra-
tione materiae in other situations.
In a subsequent report on the participation of NGOs in the UN activities
prepared by the UN Secretary General in 1998, he affirmed that the invol-
vement of NGOs in the global conferences ‘reached unprecedented levels
and led to an important breakthrough in the perception by UN officials and
member-states alike of the role of NGOs’, that are ‘no longer seen only as
disseminators of information, but as shapers of policy and indispensable
bridges between the general public and the intergovernmental processes’.92
This report was circulated for consideration of NGOs, UN bodies and
member-states. Not surprisingly, it received different commentaries that re-
flect the perception of each of the parties on the placement that each type
of entity must have on the international chessboard. The commentaries
were consolidated in another UNSC report.93 Although nearly all member-
states that responded recognized the relevant contribution of NGOs to
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operations of the UN system, several of them stressed (para 16) that their
participation in the decision-making process ‘could give rise to significant
distortions’ and could ‘undermine the principle of sovereign equality of
States and equitable consideration of the interests of all the regions of the
world’.94 Some States also supported that the NGOs should limit their in-
teraction ratione personae to the ECOSOC (para 15). The report does not
provide information about the number of member-states that responded to
it nor is it clear as to the characteristics of those States that are comprised
within the ‘several’ and ‘some’ supporters of certain ideas and statements
contained in the document. Hence, we cannot use the information of the re-
port as evidence of State undertakings towards NGOs.
Nevertheless, it is acknowledgeable that the accreditation of NGOs with
consultative status in UN convened conferences has passed to the realm of
international customary law, because, recalling Meijers’ ‘stage of growth’
model, there is extensive, constant and virtually uniform ‘evidence of gen-
eral practice’ in their accreditation as participants to the events, and also
‘evidence’ that the ‘general practice’ is ‘accepted as law’, moreover after
the adoption of ECOSOC Res 1996/31.95
In regard to the situation of NGOs in general, i.e., those without consul-
tative relationship with the ECOSOC, the settled practice determines that
they must be invited to participate, their accreditation remaining a preroga-
tive of member-states, exercised through the respective preparatory com-
mittee. Such accreditation should be preceded by an appropriate process to
determine their eligibility, according to the requirements set forth in
ECOSOC Res 1996/31. In this aspect, generally, the resolution defined a
procedure in which the interested NGO must apply to the secretariat of the
conference providing information concerning its purpose and activities and
its relevance for the conference agenda, as well as its interest in the goals
and objectives of the meeting, together with documentary evidence such as
statutes, annual reports, and membership and governing body directories.
If the evidence satisfies the preliminary secretariat criteria for admission,
the applications will be disseminated to member-states for comments,
which shall be communicated to the NGO concerned for rebuttal, if
deemed necessary. After that, the secretariat will decide upon their
accreditation.96
The accreditation, however, cannot be regarded as identical to the one
ensured to State representatives and intergovernmental organizations’ offi-
cials. Attendance does not represent the admission of a negotiating role to
NGOs, which also cannot vote because this right is ensured only to mem-
ber-states, there being no dispute as to that. When accredited, they are en-
titled to attend the sessions of the preparatory committee as well as the
conference itself, but this attendance does not mean that they can join all
meetings held at the conference because some of them, according to UN
tradition, have restricted participation. As a rule, all accredited participants
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have access to plenary meetings. There are, however, closed meetings,
open to certain defined participants of the conference (regional groups, G-
77, G-20, etc.) where the admission of NGOs to the venues depend on in-
vitation of a participant and/or authorization from the chairperson of the
session. Finally, there are other kind of meetings that definitively are not
open to NGOs, such as the ‘true’ negotiation meetings between diplomats
on sensitive issues, the actual Summit of Heads of State and those of the
operational structures of the conference (credentials, main committee,
etc).97
The interference in the conference’s agenda, however, is rather unclear.
NGOs have proven to be successful in setting the wider agenda even be-
fore the conference is convened (as in the case of Landmines and
Biodiversity conventions), showing therefore a powerful influence. But,
concerning the definition of the conference’s agenda itself, they have to
rely on lobbying the intergovernmental officials and diplomats and on the
presentation of short oral briefs in accordance with established UN practice
and at the discretion of the chairperson and the consent of the body con-
cerned. The submission of written presentations is a right widely recog-
nized but they shall not be issued as official documents except if in accor-
dance with United Nations rules of procedure.
Albeit the differentiation between NGOs with consultative status and
those without it in the rules for participation in UN convened conferences,
it is noteworthy the perception, particularly by the UN officials, and some
member-states alike, that the participation of NGOs in those multilateral
meetings represents an opportunity in terms of transparency, democracy
and efficacy of the decisions eventually taken, since the greater transpar-
ency results in stronger agreements between the governments that became
accountable for their actions.98 Probably, this is the reason for their regular
admission as observers in the regular Conference of the Parties established
by some environmental conventions.99
From a substantive perspective of the conferences, it is a truism that the
influence of NGOs in the international sphere has gone far beyond that
which the traditional ‘social-environmental’ binomial appears to evidence.
For example, the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards100 has its origins in a proposal
presented to the ECOSOC by the International Chamber of Commerce, an
NGO with consultative status before that Council, half a century ago.101
In the realm of humanitarian law, the influence is more than a century
old, going back to the ICRC efforts to establish the 1864 Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in
Armies in the Field, to pass through the four 1949 Geneva Conventions
and their 1977 Additional Protocols, to finally reach the more recent 1997
Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction.102 In the
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latter case, the convention is the result of the work of an NGO coalition –
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines – which started in 1992 with
six NGOs but that managed to draw the attention of the media and raise
public society awareness on the use of the most cowardly weapon ever in-
vented, which continues to make victims years after the end of the hostili-
ties.103 The role of the NGOs was acknowledged in the Preamble to the
Convention.104 The campaign was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997
for its successful work.
From the international environmental law perspective, the multiplicity of
participants in multilateral negotiations can be observed in particular, with
an increase in the participation rate of NGOs, not only represented by ac-
cess to the negotiation venues, but also by their increasing role ‘as catalysts
to initiate such negotiations and to assist in the implementation of the re-
sulting agreements’.105 The IUCN, for instance, played an essential role in
the drafting of the CITES,106 as well as of the Biodiversity Convention,
which originated from a draft text prepared by the IUCN under request of
the UNEP in 1989.107 The unprecedented procedure in assigning the draft
of a multilateral convention to an NGO was, however, severely criticized
by some diplomats, who argued that the situation might represent the usur-
pation of the functions of governments and UN officials. Notwithstanding,
the actual convention materially relies on the proposed draft.108
NGOs have been extremely successful in mobilizing public opinion and
States toward the adoption of environmental and humanitarian questions, a
situation evidenced by the international conventions mentioned above,109
even though other authors suggest that they have had a minimum impact
on the negotiations.110 This may be particularly true if we appraise the ne-
gotiations themselves, since, as observed above, NGOs have no negotiation
or voting rights, nor are admitted to the closed meetings where the relevant
agreement is obtained, only being allowed to attend those plenary meet-
ings, which are often filled with a sequence of speeches with poor practical
results or, in the best of circumstances, for the public ratification of what
had been agreed upon behind closed doors. However, it we take the entire
negotiation procedure, starting with the sowing of the issue by the prepara-
tion of technical reports, creation of public awareness, mobilization of dip-
lomats from ‘heavy foot-printer’ countries and/or senior UN officials to
call the conference; passing through the conference itself and the adoption
of the convention, to end with the pressure for its ratification, entering into
force and effective monitoring, we could regard that they do have a rele-
vant impact on the outcome.
In spite of their undisputable achievements, the influence of NGOs on
the agenda for the adoption of new multilateral treaties relies on the politi-
cal sphere, as pressure groups, and cannot be regarded as evidence of cus-
tomary law. Nevertheless, NGOs have attained some participatory rights in
conferences based on international customary law, which can be
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summarized as follows: (i) the guaranteed accreditation to UN convened
conferences if the concerned NGOs have consultative status with the
ECOSOC; (ii) the right of any accredited NGO to participate in all open
meetings, either preparatory or at the conference itself; and (iii) the right to
circulate written statements to the participants of the conference, which
shall not be issued as official documents except if in accordance with
United Nations rules of procedure.
4.3 NGOs’ unchallenged rights under international customary
law
A crucial aspect to consider regarding whether a given international cus-
tomary practice has become an international customary rule of law is the
appraisal of the existence of substantive objection by States. As Shaw
noted, ‘one can conclude by stating that for a custom to be accepted and
recognized it must have the concurrence of the major powers in that parti-
cular field’.111 However, one does not need to prove that the concerned
rule has been recognized as a rule of customary law by a sufficient number
of subjects in international law, because that ‘would imply that the recogni-
tion as existing customary law is conditional to the formation of customary
law’.112 International custom, therefore, is created by the extensive and
constant practice of States in a virtually uniform manner, and does not re-
quire a formal announcement of a State declaring that it is bound by it. We
could say that it is created by the recurrent silent reproduction of the same
pattern of behavior by a major number of specially affected States during a
relevant period of time, capable of defining it as a settled practice.
However, States can oppose its creation, but for that purpose, they must
evidence their disagreement to the custom in formation, by objecting to it,
and must be relevant players in the field. Objections presented by isolated
States are too fragile to be considered as capable of avoiding the establish-
ment of a custom.113 If we take the ICJ decisions on the subject into con-
sideration, we can observe that the silence of nations in a given matter is
particularly relevant to the formation of customary international law. In the
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, for example, the general toleration of the
international community to the notorious new fisheries’ rules established
by Norway imposed those rules even against a ‘heavy foot-printer’ such as
the United Kingdom - ‘a coastal State on the North Sea, greatly interested
in the fisheries in this area, as a maritime Power traditionally concerned
with the law of the sea and concerned particularly to defend the freedom
of the seas’ - because the UK government remained silent during an ex-
tended period of time, therefore granting its tacit consent to the new
rules.114
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Therefore, objection in due time is essential, and must be made public,
and on a continuous basis, against the acts which have led to the new rule
of law. Under those circumstances, some authors support that the practice
will evidence that the establishment of the new rule was made without the
participation of the protesting State and, once it has become a rule of law,
is not binding to that State.115
The problem with the practice of ‘persistent objection’ is whether the
objection of a country that is not among the major relevant ones is capable
of avoiding the establishment of a customary rule of law that will bind it
in the future. As the ICJ pointed out in the North Sea Continental Shelf
cases, ‘State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform’. Due to
the use of the word ‘extensive’, the participation of all States is not neces-
sary to establish a customary rule of law; ‘extensive practice’ cannot be ta-
ken as ‘universal practice’, rather as ‘qualified practice’. Although the legal
conception exists that all States are equal at the international level, some of
them are more influential and, in certain situations, more representative
than others. Hence, the appraisal of whose States’ practice must be consid-
ered to evidence the existence of a given customary law and whose persis-
tent objection will produce ‘libratory rights’ depends on the context, sub-
ject and territorial scope of the considered practice and States.
In the case of the role and rights of NGOs under customary international
law, based on the facts appraised in this chapter, and, moreover, on the
non-existence of evidence of objection in due time from a substantive
number of States, we can conclude that:
(i) The consultative rights ensured to NGOs, firstly by the UN Charter,
and, subsequently, by the statutes of several other multilateral organiza-
tions, represent the expression of an opinio juris that has migrated from
the realm of treaty law to international customary law. These consulta-
tive rights comprehend:
a. the right to engage in consultative arrangements with UN specia-
lized agencies, funds and programmes within the field of compe-
tence of the concerned NGO;
b. the right to be accredited in any UN convened conference, if the
concerned NGO has previously obtained its consultative status
with the ECOSOC, in general, or with the UN body convening the
conference, in particular;
c. once accredited, the right to submit written statements and reports
to the participants of the conference and the right of access to the
venues of all open meetings of the preparatory works and during
the conference itself;
(ii) The participatory rights ensured to NGOs at the European level have
evolved from the previous consultative rights and also represent the
expression of an opinio juris that has migrated from the realm of
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treaty law to international customary law at the regional level. These
participatory rights are summarized in Council of Europe Committee
of Minister Res 2003(8);
(iii) There are solid evidences that NGOs possess international legal per-
sonality because they bear duties and rights under multilateral
treaties;
(iv) There is no worldwide settled practice capable of forming an interna-
tional customary rule of law regarding the NGOs’ right to orally
address the participants of UN convened conferences or to perform
negotiating roles;
(v) There is no worldwide settled practice capable of forming an interna-
tional customary rule of law regarding the NGOs’ right to submit
amicus curiae briefs to judicial and quasi-judicial bodies.
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CHAPTER 5
NGOs in General Principles of Law
5.1 A civilized world built on the seeds of Natural Law
Article 38(1)(c) of the Statutes of the ICJ established that the Court will
adopt ‘the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ as a
source of law. The purpose of this provision is to close the gap that may
exist in those situations where the non-existence of treaty provisions or in-
ternational customary law on a subject is identified, therefore authorizing
the Court to reach its decision supported on the general principles that
guide the legal systems, hindering the Court’s capability to create Law ex
nihilo and also avoiding, at least in theory, the possibility of a non liquet.1
In 1919, when the Advisory Committee of Jurists of the League of
Nations2 was drafting the statute of the PCIJ, a dispute arose between the
positivists and the jusnaturalists, the latter represented by Baron Descamps,
himself an active supporter of the ‘civilizing’ efforts of the European na-
tions, particularly in Africa,3 which proposed that the Court had to decide
based upon the ‘conscience juridique des peoples civilisés’. The final result
is the product of a compromise between both schools. The text of Article
38(1)(c) is an exact word-for-word reproduction of the one observed in the
Statute of the PCIJ. For that reason, a trace of the Eurocentric spirit of
those times can still be noticed, as expressed in the reference to ‘civilized
nations’, which indirectly assumes that uncivilized nations exist(ed).4
Such a kind of Eurocentric understanding was not particularly new, since
it can be observed, for example, in the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which ad-
mitted Turkey ‘aux avantages du droit public et du concert européens’.5 If
the expression might be regarded as contemporary at a time when
European nations were struggling to dominate Africa, the Middle East and
most of Asia under colonial regimen, it was definitively unacceptable in
1945, when the Statute of the ICJ was approved. This aspect was ad-
dressed by Judge Ammoun in his Separate Opinion on the North Sea
Continental Shelf case, when he supported that the Court could omit the
adjective ‘civilized’, because:
‘The discrimination between civilized nations and uncivilized na-
tions, which was unknown to the founding fathers of international
law, the protagonists of a universal law of nations, Vitoria, Suarez,
Gentilis, Pufendorf, Vattel, is the legacy of the period, now passed
away, of colonialism, and of the time long-past when a limited num-
ber of Power established the rules, of custom or of treaty-law, of a
European law applied in relation to the whole community of
nations.’6
Despite any debate on the appropriateness of the reproduction of such ad-
jective in a new treaty provision, there has been a noticeable shift from the
end of World War I to the end of World War II with respect to the content
of the expression ‘civilized nations’.
If it was Eurocentric in the 1920s, less than three decades later, when
the UN Charter was adopted, the idea was abandoned by the founding na-
tions, which reaffirmed their faith in ‘fundamental human rights’ and in
‘equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small’ to estab-
lish, among the purposes of the newborn organization, the ‘development of
friendly relations among nations based on respect of the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples’. It certainly delivered a deadly
blow to colonialism and to any differentiation between nations on grounds
of ‘civility’. Therefore, for the purpose of the interpretation of the Statute
of the ICJ, the adjective became senseless, seeing as all nations had (and
have) to be regarded civilized, an assumption that we strongly support.
Additionally, for the sake of our appraisal, we will assume that the refer-
ence to ‘nations’ must be understood as ‘States’, since they are the tradi-
tional subjects of international law. As we have mentioned elsewhere, in
the beginning of the 20th century there were few independent States and a
large part of the world’s territory and population were under the colonial
domination of a couple of European nations, which imposed upon them
their legal system and ‘superior’ condition.7 Finally, we also assume that
the mainstream doctrine understands that the General Principles of Law
have their roots laid down in Natural Law.8
If the general principles of law constitute a concrete manifestation of the
idea of Natural Law in contemporary international law – a fact acknowl-
edged by Judge Ammoun’s reference to Vitoria, Suarez, Gentilis,
Pufendorf and Vattel - then, it is arguably possible to establish an evolu-
tionary chain of international law, starting with Natural Law, passing
through the General Principles of Law, reaching International Custom, and
finally, ending in Treaty Law. This chain is, for instance, identifiable, in
both the cases of prohibition of individual submission of one person to an-
other (slavery) and the collective submission of one people to another (co-
lonialism), now regulated in treaty law.
Given that Natural Law is the base of the juridical conscience of human-
kind, it is the seed of the evolutionary process of the general principles of
law that will further constitute the basis of jus cogens, whose commands
cannot be derogated by the States, as declared in article 43 of the Vienna
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Convention on the Law of Treaties.9 One cannot assume that the general
principles of law are static, for they experience a slow but steady develop-
ment. Of course, the more complex the legal system, the less they appear,
though this discretion does not mean that they do not have ‘great norma-
tive potential and dynamic force’.10 Not without reason, the ICJ has never
released a decision exclusively supported in those principles, even though
they have been mentioned en passant in some decisions and can be per-
ceived, hidden in the rationale, in several other cases. What appears to be
beyond any doubt is that they are necessarily the offspring of Natural Law,
the first step in the transformation of those abstract notions into more ob-
jective rules of law. In the continuous sophistication of the legal system,
they will be, themselves, the source of customary and even written rules of
law, validating the mentioned evolutionary chain.11
Daillier and Pellet affirmed that, even though they are transitory and re-
cessive sources of traditional international law because their repetitive ap-
plication transforms them into customary rules of law, general principles of
law are expanding in new dominions.12 The shift in the very concept of
‘civilized’ and the recognition of the principle of self-determination of peo-
ples portray the latter perspective. Hence, even considering that Natural
Law is an old tree, dating back, at least, to the early Greeks, it is still cap-
able of sowing seeds, as we will evidence hereinafter.
5.2 Offspring in Municipal Legal Systems
Since the establishment of the PCIJ, there has been some doctrinaire debate
on the correct sense of the expression ‘general principles of law’, which,
according to Carreau, has led to five distinct theories, according to which
they could be regarded as: (i) general international law; (ii) a fundamental
norm of international law; (iii) a general norm; (iv) political-juridical prin-
ciples; and, finally, as (v) principles common to the major contemporary le-
gal systems applicable to the international order.13
Given the apparent existence of a converging understanding that the
general principles of law are evidenced in municipal legal concepts of the
major contemporary legal systems,14 we will assume so for the appraisal of
the impact that they have on civil society at large, and NGOs in particular,
and to what extent they are capable of being transposed to international
law. This assumption, however, imposes a practical problem: bearing in
mind the existence of 193 States that are members of the UN, how could
one identify them?
The Statute of the ICJ provides the answer, when it states in Article 9
that at every election, the electors (the UNGA and UNSC) shall bear in
mind not only that the persons to be elected should individually possess
the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to
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the highest judicial offices, or are jurisconsults of recognized competence
in international law, but also that in the body as a whole the representation
of the main forms of civilization and of the principal legal systems of the
world should be assured. This principle has found its expression in the
practice of dividing the seats at the Court among the several regions of the
globe.15
Given the geographical mix in the composition of the Court and consid-
ering that the elected individuals are qualified to occupy the highest judi-
cial offices in their own countries or are recognized jurisconsults in interna-
tional law, one could argue that all major contemporary legal systems are
represented in the Court, which is also composed of individuals who have
profound knowledge of their own legal systems and their general princi-
ples. Hence, the Court is capable of delivering in its judgments and advi-
sory opinions, an understanding supported on the general principles of law
recognized by the civilized nations if its members collectively agree on the
matter.16 For that reason, it seems appropriate to appraise the Court deci-
sions on the matter.
5.3 Blooming in ICJ decisions
The ICJ has never justified its ruling upon the application of article 38(1)
(c) of its Statute, because it has always found sufficient support in custom-
ary or written international law. It has also neither addressed an issue di-
rectly involving international NGOs, nor appraised a case concerning the
rights of civil society at large in any of its judgments or advisory opinions.
But in some cases brought before it, it has appreciated specific situations
where it has recognized that some rights had their roots in general princi-
ples of law. These cases will drive our analysis on the extent of individuals
and NGOs’ rights in international law. For such a purpose, we will add
some decisions of the PCIJ, whose statutes were materially the same.
In the Minority Schools case,17 the PCIJ appraised the question as to
whether a person belonged or not to a racial, linguistic or religious minor-
ity under the Treaty with regard to the Protection of Minorities adopted on
28 June 1919. In the case, Germany supported that it was a matter of ‘sub-
jective expression of the intention of the persons concerned’ and that such
an intention had to be respected by the authorities even where it appeared
to be contrary to the actual state of facts. Poland, on the contrary, sup-
ported that it was a ‘question of fact and not one of intention’ and that any
person that declared to belong to a minority contrary to the facts was com-
mitting an abuse which could not be tolerated. During the judgment, the
Court understood that there were a multitude of cases in which the ques-
tion of whether a person belonged to a minority did not appear clearly
from the facts, notably in those circumstances, with regards to the
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language, of people who spoke the two languages or none of them in a
‘correct literary’ manner and, with regards to the race, of people born from
mixed marriages. In those situations, it would be possible that people who
did not belong to the minority could be treated as though they belonged
thereto, but it would be better to over-extend the minority rights than limit
them. Hence, the Court’s final decision understood that concerning the
rules applicable to Upper Silesia, ‘every national had the right freely to de-
clare according to his conscience and on his personal responsibility that he
did or did not belong to a racial, linguistic or religious minority’ and to de-
clare what was the language of a pupil or child for whose education he
was legally responsible, even though such declarations could comprise,
when necessary, the exercise of some discretion in the appreciation of the
circumstances by the authorities, and did not constitute an unrestricted
right to choose the language in which instruction had to be imparted or the
corresponding school.
The PCIJ decision addressed a key element of pluralist democracy, i.e.,
the respect to the rights of minorities and the illegality of the imposition of
bureaucratic restraints on the exercise of such rights. Even though not
clearly mentioning a specific general principle of law on the matter, be-
cause the question was regulated by a treaty provision, it undoubtedly went
through the entire line of thought and, moreover, imposed to the States the
duty to assume the good faith of the individuals while applying for the ex-
ercise of the ensured rights.
The germane question of non-discrimination and non-separation based
on race was later addressed by the ICJ in the South West Africa case, where
it was understood that the condition of ‘general principles’ could be ascer-
tained as fulfilled by the ‘presence of laws against racial discrimination
and segregation in the municipal systems of virtually every State’.18
In another judgment, in the Corfu Channel case,19 the ICJ ruled that
Albania was obliged to notify, for the benefit of shipping in general, the
existence of a minefield in its territorial waters, warning the approaching
ships of the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them, on
grounds that such obligations were based on well-recognized principles,
such as ‘elementary considerations of humanity’. Again, even though not
clearly mentioning that the obligation was laid down in general principles
of law, the decision affirmed the existence of certain rules applying to the
common life of men in society arisen out of Natural Law, subsumed on the
‘elementary’ considerations of humanity, which, however, the Court did
not detail.
In the Reservation to the Convention on Genocide advisory opinion,20
the ICJ addressed the legal implications of certain States’ reservations to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide,21 which had been objected to by some other States. The Court
concluded that the convention had special origins and a unique character.
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In regard to its origins, the Court acknowledged that ‘it was the intention
of the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as "a crime under
international law" involving a denial of the right of existence of entire hu-
man groups, a denial which shocks the conscience of mankind and results
in great losses to humanity, and which is contrary to moral law and to the
spirit and aims of the United Nations.’ In regard to its character, the Court
asserted that the principles underlying the Convention are principles which
are recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any
conventional obligation, therefore recognizing their jus cogens nature.
Unfortunately, in a subsequent case, South West Africa,22 the ICJ backed
away from its understanding in the Corfu Channel and in the Reservation
to the Convention on Genocide cases to regrettably affirm that humanitar-
ian considerations were not sufficient in themselves to generate legal or
right obligations if they were not sufficiently expressed in legal form.
Notwithstanding, the interpretation of the concept laid down in Article 38
(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ was extensively addressed in Judge
Tanaka’s remarkable dissenting opinion.23
At the very beginning of his analysis, he supported that as long as the
general principles of law are not qualified, the ‘law’ had to be understood
‘to embrace all branches of law, including municipal law, public law, con-
stitutional and administrative law, private law, commercial law, substantive
and procedural law, etc.’, even though it did not imply in their mechanical
transference to international law. Rather, the interpreter had to search for
the ‘fundamental concepts of each branch of law as well as to law in gen-
eral’ in order to reach the understanding that they are recognized by civi-
lized nations as the ‘juridical truth’.24
With regards to human rights law, he remarkably ascertained that what
was involved was not the ‘application by analogy of a principle or a norm
of private law to a matter of international character, but the recognition of
the juridical validity of a similar legal fact without any distinction as be-
tween the municipal and the international legal sphere,’ because human
rights are based on Natural Law, the ‘only and the same law that exists and
is valid through all kinds of human societies’ either in domestic or interna-
tional spheres.
Judge Tanaka also affirmed that the ‘principle of protection of human
rights is derived from their concept of man as a person and his relationship
with society which cannot be separated from universal human nature’, to
further conclude that their existence does not depend on the will of the
State, because States ‘are not capable of creating human rights by law or
by convention; they can only confirm their existence and give them protec-
tion’, adding that they have always existed together with the human being,
‘independently of, and before, the State’. The recognition of the inalienable
and inviolate character of certain rights ‘deeply rooted in the conscience of
mankind and of any reasonable man,’ that exist independently of the will
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of the State and, accordingly, cannot be abolished or modified even by
their constitutions, will be resumed in item 4.4 below.
In the Nicaragua v. United States case,25 the ICJ addressed the content
of a UN General Assembly resolution entitled ‘Declaration on Principles
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operations
among States in accordance to the Charter of the United Nations’.26 It un-
derstood that the consent to the text of such a resolution had to be consid-
ered as the acceptance of the validity of the rule or set of rules declared by
the resolution by the parties. Moreover, it considered that there was ‘an ob-
ligation on the United States Government, in the terms of Article 1 of the
Geneva Conventions, to "respect" the Conventions and even "to ensure re-
spect" for them "in all circumstances", since such an obligation does not
derive only from the Conventions themselves, but from the general princi-
ples of humanitarian law to which the Conventions merely give specific
expression.’ Similarly to the Corfu Channel and the Reservation to the
Convention on Genocide cases , the Court understood that certain general
principles of law, chiefly principles of humanitarian law, had to be re-
spected even if they were not protected by treaty provisions, therefore ac-
knowledging the imperative character (jus cogens) of those principles,
which cannot be changed by way of agreement between States.
In the LaGrand case,27 the Court recognized that individuals possess the
personal right to have consular assistance under Article 36(1) of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations28 and that the US had failed in
its obligation of consular notification to the detriment of German nationals,
therefore deciding that it committed the US to effectively allow the review
and consideration of the conviction and sentences of the fifty-two indivi-
duals by taking into account the violation of the rights set forth in the
Convention. This case is interesting because it evidenced the existence of
fundamental rights of individuals in a treaty apparently aimed at regulating
the relationship between States. Even if we consider that consular relations
were conceived to protect the individuals of one State when they are in an-
other State, it is noteworthy that the Court interpretation led to the estab-
lishment of higher standards of State practice in a sensitive matter in an era
where there are hundreds of millions of international travelers per year.29
In the Avena case,30 the Court, supported on the previous ruling in the
LaGrand case, reaffirmed that individuals possess the personal right to
have consular assistance under Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations and, since the US had failed in its obligation to inform
the Mexican nationals upon their detention of their rights under the con-
vention; to notify the appropriate Mexican consular post without delay
about the detention of Mexican nationals; and to ensure to Mexico the right
to communicate with and visit its nationals in prison and to arrange for
their legal representation, it had the obligation to make reparations in an
adequate form. However, in response to the Mexican claim that the
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consular notification and consular communication under the Convention
were fundamental human rights whose infringement ipso facto vitiated the
entire process, the Court, acknowledging the sensitiveness of the issue,
sensibly understood that this was not a matter that it had to appreciate in
the case (para 124).
In the Wall advisory opinion,31 the UN General Assembly asked the
Court about the legal consequences arising out of the construction of a wall
surrounding East Jerusalem and the occupied Palestinian territories in the
West Bank, therefore encompassing the assessment of whether the con-
struction was in accordance with certain rules and principles of interna-
tional law. In its opinion, the Court understood that such rules and princi-
ples could be found in the UN Charter and certain other treaties, in cus-
tomary international law and in the relevant resolutions adopted pursuant
to the Charter by the General Assembly and the Security Council.
As regards international humanitarian law, the Court, refuting the Israeli
argument that the State was not bound by the Fourth Hague Convention of
1907, because it was not part of it, raised the particularly sensitive prece-
dent of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, which had found
that the ‘rules laid down in the Convention were recognised by all civilized
nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and customs of
war’ (para 89). Despite the clear reference to the recognition of the rules
by civilized nations, an apparent reference to the source defined in article
38(1)(c) of its Statute, the Court concluded that ‘the provisions of the
Hague Regulations have become part of customary law’, as acknowledged
by all the participants in the proceedings before the Court.
5.4 New seeds in contemporary international law
As mentioned above, once the general principles of law are evidenced by
customary practices or treaty provisions, they seem to disappear, in a fash-
ion similar to the seed, which, upon giving birth to a new plant, can no
longer be observed. However, in both circumstances, it would be impossi-
ble to have the plant if the seed had not been sown there. Like the seeds of
an oak, the general principles of law do not have to germinate at the same
time at the international level.
Apart from those traditionally recognized specific principles of interna-
tional law,32 as well as those that could be regarded as procedural,33 some
others are flourishing. The general principles of law must be understood as
truly ‘general’, i.e., as covering all branches of law and not only the men-
tioned ones, shaped on a faraway pure inter-state understanding of interna-
tional law. If it is a truism that international law has evolved to aggregate
new fields directly related to the human being – the human rights law and
humanitarian law – it is also true that it has evolved to embrace the
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common concerns of humankind, as expressed by international environ-
mental law, and also political participation in public affairs. For that rea-
son, the principles themselves are very extensive and ‘can be interpreted to
include not only the general theory of law, but the general theories of each
branch of municipal law, so far as recognized by civilized nations. They
may be conceived, furthermore, as including not only legal principles but
the fundamental legal concepts of which the legal norms are composed
such as person, right, duty, property, juristic act, contract, tort, succession,
etc.’ 34
International law is no longer concerned only with the relations between
States; it now regulates domains formerly reserved to State regulation and,
for that reason, it is fed by them. Recent decades have shown the offspring,
mostly from municipal law, of several other general principles of law re-
lated to civil society at large, which have been transposed to international
law, as we will see hereinafter.
5.4.1 Environmental Protection
The Rio Declaration made reference to some Principles on Environment
and Development that included, among others, the States’ responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause da-
mage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction (Principle of Prevention of Transboundary
Environmental Damage).35
A corollary of this obligation is the enforcement of two other germane
principles. The first is the ‘Polluter Pays Principle’, making the party re-
sponsible for pollution responsible for bearing the costs for the damage
done to the environment, firstly mentioned in Principle Twenty-One of the
Stockholm Declaration36 and further reproduced in the sixteenth principle
of the Rio Declaration. The second is the Compensation for Victims of
Pollution and other Environmental Damage Principle, recognized as the
thirteenth principle of the Rio Declaration, by which ‘States shall develop
national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollu-
tion and other environmental damage and shall also cooperate in an expe-
ditious and more determined manner to develop further international law
regarding liability and compensation for adverse effects of environmental
damage caused by activities within their jurisdiction or control to areas be-
yond their jurisdiction.’
The legal doctrine attributes the birth of these principles to the Trail
Smelter case, which dealt with claims of trans-frontier air pollution and de-
rived damages caused to privately owned agricultural and forest lands in
the state of Washington by the fumes discharged from the smelter of the
Consolidated Mining and Smelting Co. located at Trail, British Columbia.37
This case gave birth to the Convention for Settlement of difficulties arising
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from operation of Smelter at Trail signed between the United States and
Canada,38 which provided that Canada would pay the sum of USD 350,000
as a compensation for ‘all damage which occurred in the United States prior
to 1 January 1932, as a result of the operation of the Trail Smelter’ (Article
I). The convention also agreed to the establishment of an arbitral tribunal to
access the damages caused before the date thereof, with the power to define
the possible remedies, indemnities or compensations.
Together with these principles, originated in municipal legal systems and
further transposed to international law, some others were incorporated di-
rectly in the realm of international law.39 They are:
– The State Cooperation Principle, recognized as the Rio Declaration’s
seventh principle, by which it is defined that ‘States shall cooperate in
a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health
and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the different contribu-
tions to global environmental degradation, States have common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the
responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable
development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global
environment and of the technologies and financial resources they
command’;
– The Precautionary Principle, firstly mentioned at the international level
in the UN World Charter for Nature,40 and later formally recognized as
the fifteenth principle of the Rio Declaration, which is worded as fol-
lows: ‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation’.
– The Sustainability Principle, i.e., the balanced exercise of economic ex-
ploitation of natural resources with respect for human developmental
and environmental needs of present and future generations, which is en-
shrined in several principles of the Rio Declaration, notably from the
first to the ninth;
– The Public Participation Principle, which was declared in the tenth
principle of the Rio Declaration and later recognized by the Aarhus
Convention;41
– The Environmental Impact Assessment Principle, covering the proper
appraisal of proposed activities that are likely to have a significant ad-
verse impact on the environment, recognized in the seventeenth princi-
ple of the Rio Declaration.
As can be observed, these general principles of law concern environmental
issues. Some of them have been incorporated into effective international
hard law (treaty) provisions, such as the State Cooperation principle,
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defined in the Convention on the Law of the Seas;42 the rights for public
access to information, public participation and access to justice, in govern-
mental decision-making processes on matters concerning the local, national
and trans-boundary environment, defined in the Aarhus Convention, and
the precautionary principle adopted, for instance, in the Biological
Diversity Convention43 and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent
Organic Pollutants.44 Other principles took a different direction and, as pre-
scribed in the Rio Declaration, were transposed to regional or municipal
law from international law, namely the precautionary principle45 and the
Environmental Impact Assessment principle.46
Recalling Judge Takada’s opinion in the South West Africa case, if the
‘general principles of law’ are to be interpreted as including ‘the general
theories of each branch of municipal law’, they necessarily comprehend
environmental law, since it is indisputable that the environment is a com-
mon concern of people and that it embraces areas considered as common
heritage of Humankind,47 and that the current rhythm of the planet’s degra-
dation may impose severe harm to the long-run life of our civilization. One
cannot leave unnoticed that Grotius, in Mare Liberum wrote, back in 1609,
‘that all surely might use common things without the damage of all and,
for the rest, every man contented with his portion shall abstain from an-
other’s’.48 If we assume that environmental protection is a general principle
of law applicable to international law, it follows that, while completely dis-
regarding the abstract States’ boundaries, it actually poses a severe chal-
lenge to the concept of State sovereignty, construed upon the idea that the
State would have absolute and exclusive control over its territory and peo-
ples and things therein. As facts have shown, no theory could be more fal-
lacious from an environmental perspective. Therefore, the traditional func-
tion of international law, conceived of as a ‘tool’ to mediate the relation-
ship between States in a ex-territorial environment (given that it would not
regulate the activities within State boundaries), had to be adjusted to cover
the entire territory of the planet, proposing that each State would have
‘common but differentiated responsibilities to conserve, protect and restore
the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem’, i.e., assuming that their
active and passive attitudes would affect the territories and peoples of all
other States. The general principles of law applicable to environmental pro-
tection have brought about a shift in the perception of international law,
which has definitively moved to a neo-Grotian approach, founded on the
idea of an international society supported in a community of interests and
responsibilities. But, as practice has demonstrated, it definitively must in-
volve people, the ultimate actor of the degradation and beneficiary of a
healthier environment. Hence, civil (and, consequently, political) participa-
tion is fundamentally necessary.
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5.4.2 Civil and Political Participation
Since the Bill of Rights, adopted by the parliament of England in 1689,
men and women have sought the freedom to govern their own lives with-
out the interference of self-proclaimed sovereigns. Not without reason, the
Bill of Rights established that suspending the laws or the execution of laws
by real authority was illegal and that the election of members of
Parliament ought to be free, as well as freedom of speech and debates or
proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any
court or place out of Parliament.49
In 1776, the United States Declaration of Independence recognized that
people had the inherent right of political independence, ‘to which the Laws
of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them’, being these same laws the
source of the self-evidence that all men are created equal and endowed
with certain unalienable rights, for whose guarantee governments are insti-
tuted, ‘deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.’ When
the US Constitution was approved, in 1787, it established a republican de-
mocratic regime by which citizens would elect their representatives to the
legislative bodies and their representatives for the election of the President.
When the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen was adopted
in 1789, in France, it recognized that the sovereignty resided essentially in
the Nation, i.e., in the people, and that no body or individual can exert
authority which is not emanated expressly from it (article III). The
Declaration also stated that law is the expression of the general will and
that all citizens have the right to contribute personally, or through their re-
presentatives, to its formation (Article VI). The French Revolution, as
pointed out by Cassese, introduced the concepts of individual, nation, peo-
ple and equal sovereignty, which started to circulate among States, leading
to a new perspective in which State became to see themselves no longer as
supreme potentates but as ‘simple managers of human communities’.50
These three documents are supported in general principles of law that
ensured people the right to govern themselves, being construed upon them.
Jointly, they can be regarded as the most important legal foundations of
the civil and political participation of people in the conduct of State’s
affairs.
One fact that cannot go unnoticed is the current incapacity of States to
control the development of the right that people have to govern their lives.
In this particular aspect, it is noteworthy to mention that reputed scholars,
not long ago, could affirm that
‘The right of self determination has never been recognized as a gen-
uine positive right of ‘peoples’ of universal and impartial applica-
tion, and it will never will, nor can be recognized in the future.’51
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As one can observe in the East Timor case, less than thirty years after this
peremptory (yet, fortunately, wrong) anticipation of the future, the ICJ re-
cognized self determination as a right with an erga omnes character. If a re-
levant part of legal scholars is capable of writing accurately about the past,
it is also a fact, aptly pointed out by Sir Robert Jennings, that the ‘isolation
of academic international lawyers is especially worrying … if they remain
studying the international law that was devised for yesterdays problems’.52
Hence, the study of international law cannot remain self-restricted by
theories conceived of in a period in which individuals were regarded as
mere objects of law and people were either under colonial domination or
under oppressive governments. The world has changed dramatically. The
centrality of the human being in international law is undisputed. As we
have seen in Chapter 3, an individual and an NGO were capable of obtain-
ing from an international tribunal a ruling against an intergovernmental
body decision supported in a UN Security Council resolution. This would
have been considered a heresy by positivists a couple of decades ago, but
now it is a reality and fully supported by international law. As affirmed by
Michael Reisman,
‘International law still protects sovereignty, but – not surprisingly –
it is the people’s sovereignty rather than the sovereign’s
sovereignty’.53
The general principles of law strongly embedded in natural law could sur-
vive the positivist tide that swept international law in the 19th century,
which, fortunately, is gone, albeit some scholars insist on affirming that it
is still ruling. As noted by Brierly, any criticism to the abstract character of
Natural Law ‘do not affect the permanent truths in the conception of a law
of nature, and though today we generally use a different terminology, we
recognize the validity of these truths as fully as ever’.54 The principles
have been largely recognized and adopted by all other nations since then,
albeit with some periods of suspension due to dictatorships and tyrannies,
either laic or religious. Some evidence of this is presented as follows.
a. The International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
In 1966, the UN General Assembly adopted the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR),55 which was ratified by 167 States,
from all regions of the world, covering nearly 90% of the entire world’s
population.56 The comprehensiveness of the States’ ratifications and the
very nature of the document – a covenant – make it clear that the rights set
forth in the agreement have been recognized by all contemporary legal sys-
tems and, therefore, could be regarded as rooted in general principles of
law recognized by all civilized nations.
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The CCPR acknowledged that men and women have equal and inalien-
able rights, being the States obliged to promote universal respect for, and
observance of, those human rights and freedoms, derived from the inherent
dignity of the human being, hence, from the Natural Law, the ‘only and
the same law that exists and is valid through all kinds of human societies’.
As noted by Cançado Trindade, ‘all initiatives in strengthening of the inter-
national protection of Human Rights are ultimately part of the process of
construction of a universal culture of observance of Human Rights’.57
The first right is the ‘right of self-determination’. If it is arguable that it
is not properly new in the international realm, since it was recognized
within the purposes of the UN in the organization’s Charter (article 1(2)),
one must notice that the right of self-determination has been extensively
qualified in the CCPR, which, in addressing civil and political rights, ex-
panded it beyond the narrowly interpreted boundaries of the ‘right of peo-
ple to be independent’ that had been imposed by the context of colonial-
ism. In the covenant, self-determination is more than being independent
from foreign control, moreover because very small parts of the world were
under that regime in 1966, when it was adopted.
From an individual perspective, the CCPR recognizes self-determination
in the voluntary participation in medical or scientific experiments (Article
7); in the freedom from slavery, servitude and forced labor (Article 8); in
the freedom of movement and residence settlement (Article 12); in the free-
dom to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own
choosing in any trials (Article 14); in the prohibition of arbitrary or unlaw-
ful interference in his privacy, family, home or correspondence (article 17);
in the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as well as the freedom,
either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teach-
ing (article 18);58 in the freedom of expression and the right to hold opi-
nions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information
(Article 19) and in the freedom to freely marry (Article 23).
From a more collective perspective, the CCPR recognized:
– that everyone shall be entitled to a fair trial by a competent, indepen-
dent and impartial tribunal established by law, which will be public, ex-
cept when the interest of the private lives of the parties so requires and
in some situations where reasons of morals, public order or national se-
curity in a democratic society deem it necessary (Article 14);
– the right of peaceful assembly without restrictions, except those im-
posed in conformity with the law and which are necessary in a demo-
cratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, public
order, the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others (Article 21);
– that everyone has the right to freedom of association with others, in-
cluding the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his
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interests, and that no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this
right other than those which are prescribed by law and which are neces-
sary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or pub-
lic safety, public order, the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others (Article 22);
– that (Article 25) every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status and without unreasonable restrictions:
L To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through
freely chosen representatives;
L To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall
be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;
L To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country.
As can be observed, the CCPR only accepted restrictions to the collective
exercise of individual political rights – the right of peaceful assembly and
the freedom of association - under the guidance of parameters commonly
deemed necessary in democratic societies. The right to live in a democracy
can also be perceived in the references to voting and candidacy in periodic
universal elections and in the right to take part in the conduct of public af-
fairs, directly or through representatives.
Democracy is the ultimate expression of the general principle of law that
recognizes a people’s right to self-determination. This right is laid down in
Natural Law. Vitoria has argued, back in the 1500s, that people had the im-
manent power to rule themselves. As we have said, its existence does not
depend on the ‘will’ of the State, moreover if we take into consideration
that the creation of a new State itself results from this very right to self-de-
termination exercised by people against the controlling power of another
State.59
According to Cassese, the ideological and political origins gave to self-
determination a multifaceted and ambiguous concept that is
‘at the one and same time, both boldly radical (in that it promotes
democratic self-government, and free access of peoples to the role
of international actors) and deeply subversive and disruptive (in that
it undermines territorial integrity and may lead to the fragmentation
of international community into a myriad of national and ethnic en-
tities, all poised to fight one another)’.60
What appears to be beyond any doubt is that self-determination has two di-
mensions: an external, related to colonial or foreign oppression, and an
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internal, related to participation of people of all racial, religious and social
background in public affairs, through a pluralist democratic government.61
This latter dimension has been ensured, as observed, on article 25 of the
CCPR and has been proclaimed by the UN General Assembly on the
‘Declaration on Friendly Relations’62 and on the ‘Declaration on the grant-
ing of independence to colonial countries and peoples’.63 At European le-
vel, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe64 provided a clear link between
democracy, political pluralism, human rights and the rule of law.65
Democracy is also deeply imbedded in the UN, its specialized agencies,
funds and programs, and any other international or regional bodies. These
intergovernmental bodies are, in regard to States, democratic par excel-
lence, at least formally. The freedom of association is widely recognized,
even in those organizations that, having a territorial scope, are logically
open to only certain potential candidates. Within the organizations, election
to the governing bodies is a rule, and all members who have fulfilled their
obligations can vote and submit their candidacy. All assemblies and gov-
erning bodies’ meetings are public and open to members. Votes are
counted by head and the decisions are taken by majority (simple or quali-
fied),66 the casting vote being adopted only in situations of deadlock. All
states have equal rights, whether large or small, rich or poor, new or old.
Hence, undoubtedly, while operating at the international level, States
have accepted democracy as a rule.
The CCPR also ensured another peculiar civil and political right: every-
one shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the
law. The purpose of this provision was to ensure that no one could be
deemed not protected by the CCPR on grounds of non-recognition of legal
personality, i.e., of his condition of subject of law. History is full of evi-
dence of this tortuous practice: slaves were not regarded as persons, but
things; children could be sold by their parents because they ‘belonged’ to
them; indigenous people had no soul, hence were not regarded as persons
by the Christian conquerors, and so on. Fortunately, these outrageous prac-
tices have been buried once and for all by a multi-lateral covenant ratified
by the wide majority of States that, recognizing the undisputable physical
existence of human beings, assumed the undertaking to respect and ensure
respect of their legal existence, as subjects of law, everywhere.
Everywhere?
Not exactly, because the CCPR regarded ‘everywhere’ as within the ter-
ritorial boundaries of the State-parties and within their municipal legal sys-
tems (Article 2). Notwithstanding it, although not declaring the legal per-
sonality of individuals at the international level, there is no rule that an in-
dividual cannot be a subject of international law,67 and for that reason, the
CCPR has sown a seed of great potential growth.
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b. The Aarhus Convention
The democratic axioms of the CCPR have flourished in another realm: en-
vironmental protection, through the Aarhus Convention, which has linked
international environmental law to international human rights.68 A relevant
aspect of the Aarhus Convention is the recognition of access to informa-
tion, public participation in decision-making, and access to justice in envir-
onmental matters as rights. This treaty provision was construed upon sev-
eral binding precedents, either at the international and regional levels, such
as the 1985 EEC Directive on the assessment of the effects of certain pub-
lic and private projects on the environment,69 the 1990 EEC Directive on
the freedom of access to information on the environment,70 the 1991 UN/
ECE Espoo Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment,71 the 1991
UN/ECE Helsinki Convention on the Transboundary Effect of Industrial
Accidents,72 the 2003 CoE Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for
Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment,73 and
the 1993 North-American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation.74
Ideally, public participation has been conceived as involving the partici-
pation of civil society in partnership with governmental officials to reach
an optimal result in decision-making and policy-making in environmental
affairs. Though the convention does not prescribe a full recipe for this par-
ticipation, it requires, at minimum, ‘effective notice, adequate information,
proper procedures, and appropriate taking account of the outcome of public
participation’.75
A remarkable aspect of this convention relies on its capability to put to-
gether, in a treaty provision, general principles of law regulating distinct
aspects of life in society. In Chapter 1, we recalled Grotius’ ideas concern-
ing peoples’ rights over common things, having quoted his assertion that
‘all surely might use common things without the damage of all and, for the
rest, every man contented with his portion shall abstain from another’s’.76
A corollary of his axiom is the necessary civil society participation in any
decision-making and monitoring procedures that may materially impact the
environment in order to avoid the ‘damage of all’, because public scrutiny
appears to be the best and legitimate strategy to avoid abusive use of the
‘common thing’. For this reason, democratic participation is fundamental
to ensure that the protection of the environment is duly fulfilled.
The global dimension of the environmental challenges of our times and
their definitive linkage with human rights, a fact made clear in the Rio77
and Johannesburg78 Declarations, demand a cooperative approach at the in-
ternational level, a conclusion largely evidenced by the several bilateral
and multilateral agreements, international conferences and intergovernmen-
tal organizations and funds dealing with the subject.
The Aarhus Convention recognized this linkage in its first article, in
which it declared that the convention had the objective to ‘contribute to the
protection of the right of every person of present and future generations to
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live in an environment adequate to his or her health and well-being’. To
ensure that substantive right, the convention established procedural rights
to be guaranteed by the States, being these rights the above mentioned ac-
cess to information, public participation in decision-making, and access to
justice.
One aspect that may go unnoticed is the very substantive right to a
healthy environment. The convention did not provide this right; rather it
implicitly assumed that it existed and that it had been construed upon other
sources of law, albeit some countries have declared that it constitutes only
an aspiration.79 If the convention did not ensure the right to a healthy en-
vironment, what did it guarantee?
Given that the right was recognized as pertaining to the realm of every
person, existing or to be born, it ensured the right to participate in the deci-
sion-making procedures that affect the life of civil society at large. It re-
cognized the right of self-determination, either on an individual or collec-
tive perspective. By doing so, the convention set a valuable precedent, be-
cause it established - in a document regulated by international law - that
individuals have the democratic right to participate in the decision-making
processes that affect matters not only comprised in the realm of one single
State.
If the worldwide adoption of democratic practices has ensured people
the right to participate at the municipal level, according to the rules estab-
lished in each State, the convention established a participatory practice that
went beyond the generic right set down in article 25 of the CCPR when it
considered, as ‘public authority’, the institutions of any regional economic
integration organization constituted of sovereign State members of the
Economic Commission of Europe if these States have transferred to them
their competence over matters governed by the convention (article 2(2)(d)).
One example is the European Community, which signed and ratified the
convention, whose institutions – the European Commission, the Council of
the European Union, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee
of the Regions and the European Environmental Agency – are to be con-
sidered ‘public authorities’. By doing so, it legitimated the participation of
individuals in decision-making at the regional level, a condition reinforced
by the provision in article 3(7) that the States parties to the convention
shall promote the application of the principles in international environmen-
tal decision-making processes and within the framework of international
organizations in matters relating to the environment.
Furthermore, when it considered that NGOs promoting environmental
protection had to be regarded as ‘public concerned’, i.e., as the public af-
fected or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmen-
tal decision-making, it gave them legitimacy to have access to information
and to participate in the decision-making and also, most importantly, locus
standi, i.e, the right to seek judicial protection if those rights were not
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respected by the public authorities. The convention regulated this right in
article 9, establishing that any person could seek judicial measures before a
court of law or another impartial body established by law, but defined that
each party to the convention should do so ‘within its national legislation’.
Considering that the European Union is party to the convention, we under-
stand that any conflicts involving its institutions must be referred to the
Court of Justice of the European Union that, according to its statutes, is
the judicial organ of the EU.
To guarantee that the participation in the decision-making process is not
only formal, but also substantial and equitable, the convention ensured ac-
cess to comprehensive information. To confirm that these rights are effec-
tive, it provided judicial protection. By doing so, the States and intergo-
vernmental organizations parties to the convention relied on the general
principle of law that ensures the right of self-determination of the peoples,
which is experiencing a steady development, notably at the European
level.
5.5 Democracy: a general principle of law?
In the previous chapters we have addressed on some occasions the partici-
patory rights ensured to NGOs within the Council of Europe. As we have
stated, the relationship of the Council with NGOs had begun in 1951, fol-
lowing the adoption of consultative arrangements by the UN Charter. In
2003, consultative rights were expanded to become participatory rights,
even if these did not mean either the admission of NGOs as members of
the Council nor voting rights.80 As we saw in Chapter 3, NGOs have locus
standi before the European Court of Justice and can seek judicial protec-
tion against illegal acts inflicted to them by Community institutions, in-
cluding the restrictions to participate in the decision-making processes in
environmental matters, covered by the Aarhus Convention. Even if we
consider the apparent stumble of the Strasbourg Convention, which has
been ratified by few States since its adoption in 1986, why do NGOs ex-
perience such a remarkable legitimacy in Europe?
While it is undisputed that the richest NGOs are in the US, the space
conquered by NGOs in Europe does not seem to have been ‘bought’ by
multi-million dollar programs or luxurious headquarters at noble addresses.
Rather, the legitimacy of NGOs in Europe appears to have stronger, deeper
roots, laid down in human beings, on their right to be regarded as persons
that are capable of deciding their own destiny and of sharing the results for
the benefit of the community. Of course, one could argue that the pacific
and cooperative society that we observe today in Europe is recent and that
its people have shed much blood and have fought many wars throughout
centuries to reach such a stage. This fact was acknowledged in the
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preamble of the Charter of Paris, which declared that Europe was ‘liberat-
ing itself from the legacy of the past’. It is true, but it must be understood
as liberation from the legacy of tyranny and ‘over-mighty’ States, because
the seeds of international law as it is conceived and practiced today have
its origins in European thought and, more precisely, in some general princi-
ples of law forged on the continent.
In this chapter, we have studied the general principles of law as a source
of international law. As we have sustained, they are often hidden behind
customary rules of law and treaty provisions that are frequently invoked as
the main sources of international law. Disregarding the general principles
as a relevant source of law only because they are not quoted in judicial de-
cisions does not seem to be adequate. Relegating them to a secondary role
only because they are often mentioned in the preamble of the conventions
rather than in the articles, is also incorrect. It is inappropriate to assume
that because they are imbedded in the rationale of the legislator and the
judge, orienting them as to what is right and what is not. And, given their
contribution towards the formation of Law, they have played an important
role, albeit discreet and sometimes unperceived. After all, as pointed out
by Lauterpacht, the general principles of law, being the expression of nat-
ural law, have the role to correct and supplement positive international law
and, thus, prevent its disconnection from justice.81
One of the principles that we have appraised is the principle of self de-
termination. We have seen that it cannot be taken as a principle that will
vanish when every part of the world has become independent, because it
cannot be taken as a synonym for ‘freedom from colonialism’. It is more.
It is the right that the peoples have to determine, by themselves, their fu-
ture, as affirmed by Vitoria five centuries ago. It is the right to participate
in public affairs, as stated in the CCPR. It is the right to have access to in-
formation and to participate in the decision-making processes, as ensured
by the Aarhus convention. Moreover, it is the right to be heard, to discuss,
to propose, to share views, opinions and concerns, as ensured by the CoE
participatory rights. It is the right to pursue judicial remedies from the
State against unlawful acts practiced by the very same State. Finally, as
noted by Thornberry, the principle possesses a ‘sense in which people is
entitled to exercise a continuing democratic control over governments’, it
is, he adds, a ‘continuing right that is not exhausted by the achievement of
independence’.82
Hence, self-determination, in the contemporary world, is the right to
have a democracy, to participate in the conduct of public affairs.83 It was
acknowledged in the UN Charter, which, albeit not mentioning ‘democ-
racy’, invoked in its very first words – We the Peoples of the United
Nations – a fundamental principle of democratic doctrine, i.e., that the so-
vereignty of the member-states, and consequently, the legitimacy of the
Organization, had its origins in ‘the people’.
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Beyond a shadow of a doubt, the CCPR clearly embodies an ideological
commitment toward Western liberal political thought. The right to partici-
pate in public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives is,
par excellence, an expression of pluralist democracy. Actually, Western
ideology is not only a source of interpretation of the covenant, it is also its
dominant factor.84 Given the CCPR liberal accent, one cannot expect de-
mocracy to be restricted to national boundaries. In the 21st century, citizen-
ship goes beyond the traditional borders of the nation-state.85 As argued by
Dominicé,
‘Le principe de légitimité démocratique fait-il aujourd’hui irruption
in droit des gens. Le droit des peoples à vivre dans les régimes
démocratiques fait son chemin en droit international en liaison tout
d’abord avec le recherché de la paix.’86
If democracy has been adopted as a rule while the States are interacting
among themselves in the realm of international law and if democracy is
also a right that citizens have in the realm of their countries, ensured by in-
ternational law provisions, it appears that there are general principles of
law, State practices and treaty provisions that permit the integration of
these two realms in order to legitimize the right of people to participate in
the determination of the future of humankind, not only through the State,
but also through other actors, the IGOs and NGOs. But, firstly, it seems ap-
propriate to address the conceptual framework of legal personality in inter-
national law, a task that we will bear in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
NGOS in International Public Law Doctrine
6.1 International legal theory and non-state actors
In the previous chapters, we have addressed the legitimacy of NGOs under
several sources of international law. Generally speaking, NGOs are com-
prised within the comprehensive category of non-state actors, which, in
turn, can easily be defined as those actors that are not States. Of course,
this double negativity may be considered worthless, since nothing can truly
be defined as ‘not-something’. Classical international legal theory has pro-
ven, however, to be an exception.
It is well-known that classical international legal theory has been con-
strued to privilege the States to the detriment of anything else. Hence, once
the theoretical conception of State was defined and its attributes and char-
acteristics became well understood, everything that did not fulfill all of the
statehood requirements could be regarded as a ‘non-state’ and discarded as
something irrelevant to international law. If the rather straightforward bino-
mial division of State/Subjects – Non-State/Objects had worked well dur-
ing a certain period of history, it is definitely incapable of maintaining its
performance today.1 Appraising its contemporary shortcomings requires
understanding first what a State is in classical international legal theory, a
task that we will start with the help of a legal dictionary. According to
Black’s Law Dictionary, a State is ‘a people permanently occupying a fixed
territory bound together by common law habits and custom into one body
politically exercising, through the medium of an organized government, in-
dependent sovereignty and control over all persons and things within its
boundaries, capable of making war and peace and of entering into interna-
tional relations with other communities of the globe’.2
This succinct definition provides the two physical elements classically
required for the existence of a State: People and Territory; in the absence
of either one of them, no State is deemed possible. The dictionary entry
also puts forward other intangible aspects of statehood: the organization of
people into a political body, independent control over the territory and all
people and things therein according to its own set of rules, and capability
to interact with other similar entities. While the first aspect may be under-
stood as the fictional figure of the State itself, the latter two are attributes
of its sovereignty. With them, one reaches the third element required to
achieve statehood: the existence of a sovereign political body capable of
controlling the two aforementioned physical elements.
These three elements gave form to a legal order established in Europe in
the 17th century and reflect the motivations and presuppositions in the his-
tory of the continent, which led to the creation of the concept of the
(European) Modern State, later extended to the entire world.3 When the
Peace of Westphalia consecrated the rule cujus regio, ejus religio, putting
an end to the Thirty Years’ War, it also blessed the statehood trinity: peo-
ple, territory and sovereignty. Moreover, it laid down the basis to justify
the claim that only States could possess international legal personality, be-
cause no territory in the world could be governed by more than one sover-
eign, who would concentrate in his hands full power over the territory and
the people therein. Once the sovereign States were juxtaposed on the world
map, a puzzle was formed and any other territory still not under the control
of one of those European States became subject to conquest, speeding up
the process of colonialism.4 If every inch of land and every human being
was under the sovereign power of a State, then only States would be cap-
able of representing them, following that only States could interact be-
tween each other. Furthermore, given that no State could regulate, accord-
ing to its own rules, its relationship with another State, a new set of rules
above and beyond any specific national legal system5 – international law –
had to be established.
In this chapter we will not address the foundations of international law -
as was done in Chapter 1 – nor will we address the role of States as repre-
sentatives of their peoples in the realm of international law – a task to be
performed in the next chapter. We will, however, appraise one specific and
fundamental concept in international law: international legal personality.
In any legal system, there are subjects of law, i.e., those natural persons
and legal entities recognized by law as capable of possessing rights and
bearing duties under that system. By doing so, the concerned legal system
regard those individuals and entities a ‘legal person’ (the expressions ‘legal
person’ and ‘subject of law’ are, thus, interchangeable).6 Another relevant
characteristic of Law is the uniform treatment that objects receive in any
legal system: they have neither rights nor duties.7
None of the existing legal systems gives the same rights or imposes the
same duties indiscriminately on all its subjects of law. It goes without
questioning that differentiation is necessary and also desirable. For exam-
ple, in the parent-child relationship, domestic law often imposes a heavier
burden of duties on parents when their children are very young, but the
balance shifts when children have reached adulthood and their parents have
become elderly and dependent. In both cases, we have exactly the same in-
dividuals, in the same familiar relationship, and with the same duties and
rights: material and emotional support. But, once the context has changed,
the same happens with the balance of duties and rights.
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Some authors support that the dichotomy subject/object is a positivist
trap that hinders the full comprehension of the views of participants of in-
ternational law, sustaining that the meaningful inquiry concerns ‘not what
persons are technically subjects but who actually participates in the global
process of decision-making and who perform what functions’.8 Despite the
quality of the argument, given that the dichotomy is traditionally observed
in municipal legal systems, we consider appropriate its use in international
law.
When international legal theory flourished in the 17th century, it pro-
posed a shift from the universal political organization that existed in
Western Europe in the Middle Ages (in which all rulers had to share
authority with vassals beneath them, and with the Pope and, in certain ter-
ritories, with the Holy Roman Emperor above) towards a state-centric mod-
el, in which each territory would be governed by a single sovereign. The
situation at that time contributed towards the perspective encountered
nowadays. At the international level, intergovernmental organizations did
not exist, individuals did not possess rights and duties under international
law, and no one had ever dreamed of NGOs; at the domestic level, the
right to self-determination was not even an embryonic theory, slaves and
servants abounded everywhere and democracy definitively was not a rule;
it was, rather, a revolutionary exception proposed by Spinoza in his
Theological-Political Treatise. Therefore, a new set of practices, aimed at
regulating this relationship, was established and, for that purpose, assumed
that only sovereign kingdoms and principalities – the States – possessed le-
gal personality. In other words, the theory assumed that international legal
personality was a corollary of State sovereignty, a situation that drives us
back to the necessary appraisal of the statehood trinity. This circular move-
ment can be observed, for instance, in the Montevideo Convention on
Rights and Duties of States, which established that the existence of a per-
manent population, living in a defined territory under the command of a
government, capable of entering into relations with other States would lead
to the qualification of a State, considered, as such, a person of international
law.9 Despite having a regional scope - the Americas - the convention ad-
dressed substantive aspects of statehood.10 Hence, it is arguable that a
State obtains international legal personality once it evidences that it has so-
vereignty over a given territory and people. But, at this point some pro-
blems arise.
Let us begin with the territory, the immovable physical element. How
could one declare that one has sovereignty over a given territory? This is a
factual situation that leads to a legal one. Would this claim require defined
and settled boundaries? No, since history has shown that a State can be re-
cognized even with border disputes and, according to the ICJ, ‘there is for
instance no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully delimited
and defined, and often in various places and for long periods they are not,
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as is shown by the case of the entry of Albania into the League of Nations
(Monastery of Saint Naoum, Advisory Opinion, 1924, P.C.I.J., Series B,
No. 9, at p. 10)’.11
Moving on to the second physical element, how many people are
deemed necessary to live in a territory to allow the recognition of a State?
As Shaw has pointed out, ‘there is no specification of a minimum number
of inhabitants’.12 Additionally, the ICJ, while addressing the Declaration
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations13 in the Western Sahara case, pointed out that certain populations
did not constitute a ‘people’ entitled to self-determination, thus supporting
that the analysis had to focus not only on quantity, but also on quality.14 In
that case, the Court understood that ‘territories inhabited by tribes or peo-
ples having a social and political organization were not regarded as terrae
nullius’,15 to later conclude that to pass the essential test ‘where a group,
whether composed of States, of tribes or of individuals, is claimed to be a
legal entity distinct from its members’ it is necessary to appraise the ‘many
ties of a racial, linguistic, religious, cultural and economic nature’ and the
existence of ‘common institutions or organs, even of quite minimal charac-
ter’.16 Thus, it is not a people, rather a Nation that is required to form the
legal entity, i.e., the State.17 This is a truism since, after the fall of the
Berlin Wall in 1989, we have seen the dismemberment of existing solid
States (USSR and Czechoslovakia) and the fusion of others (Germany)
based on nationhood.
The permanent habitation of a certain nation in a given territory is not
enough if both are ruled by a third party. In those circumstances, they are
not a State, rather a colony or an occupied territory. Thus, we reach the
third element of the trinity: sovereignty. When a nation settles in a territory
on a permanent basis and is capable of living therein according to its own
rules under the command of its own independent government, one could
argue that the territory is self-governed and, apparently, has fulfilled all
conditions for statehood.
However, to become a State and, thereafter, acquire legal personality un-
der international law, a self-governed people and territory must be recog-
nized as a State by other States.18 This is an awkward aspect of interna-
tional law: despite, for instance, the clear provision in the Montevideo
Convention that ‘the political existence of the State is independent of re-
cognition by the other States’ (article 3), only the other States’ recognition
will entitle the newborn State to interact with them. Up until this moment,
the effectiveness of its independence had been limited to own its territorial
boundaries.
Hence, the existence of a State’s international legal personality is, in a
certain way, conditioned not only to the fulfillment of specific objective
criteria – a people, a territory and an independent government – but also to
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the subjective attitude of the other States, which, having international legal
personality, will entail, or not, relations with the newcomer.19 Some
authors have suggested that widespread international recognition makes the
appraisal of statehood criteria more flexible, while little recognition im-
poses a more rigorous analysis of them.20 This is true, moreover if we take
into consideration that some States remain recognized as such even after
the debacle of their governmental structure amidst civil war. In this particu-
lar aspect, Rosalyn Higgins went straight to the point when she affirmed
that ‘once in the club, the rules by which admission is tested – and that al-
ways with a degree of flexibility – become less important’.21 Should inter-
national legal personality, then, be regarded as membership to a club?
This is an aspect of substantive importance that puts positivists and nat-
uralists in opposition. According to the former, only States could be re-
garded as subjects of international law.22 The latter, on the contrary, relying
on Natural Law, have recognized that other actors possess rights and duties
under international law.23
Since the Reparation for injuries case,24 it has become clear that States
are not the only entities bearing international legal personality, and, there-
fore, that such condition does not depend upon sovereignty over a given
people and territory. In that case, the ICJ clearly set out broad principles
that could be applied to any non-state actor on the international plane.25
Similarly, a private association, the ICRC, is widely recognized as bearing
international legal personality26 and, together with a second one, the IUCN,
bear rights and obligations under a multilateral treaty.27 Furthermore, since
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, it has been stated that in-
dividuals could be subjects of international law with locus standi before
Criminal Tribunals and, as a consequence, acquire duties and rights, a con-
dition fully acknowledged in the statutes of the subsequent International
Criminal Tribunals.28
If one bears in mind the ‘Club’ perspective, it is possible to argue that
the recognition of the international legal personality of the ICRC was laid
down by the States’ free will, since they were not obliged to assign any
specific humanitarian attributions to a private institution at the international
level. The same could be argued in regard to the substantive secretariat at-
tributions assigned to the IUCN in an environmental convention.
Additionally, all intergovernmental organizations, having been created by
States, could be regarded as specific collective bodies established to coor-
dinately perform certain attributions that were in the realm of the States,
therefore, acting as States’ delegates on the matters concerned. In sum, the
States, the members of the Club, would decide who would join them at the
bridge table, and under which terms and conditions.
The Club concept is supported on the doctrine of the ‘derived’ legal per-
sonality of intergovernmental organizations, through which the legal per-
sonality of a relevant entity has not arisen out of the general principles of
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international law, but rather from the desire of the States, which have dele-
gated certain limited functional capacities to them.29 The idea was ob-
served, implicitly, in the Reparation for injuries case, when the ICJ af-
firmed that the UN Charter equipped the organization with organs and had
given it special tasks, with the intention to allow the enjoyment of ‘func-
tions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the possession
of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate
upon an international plane’.30 Daillier and Pellet support the same under-
standing in regard to private entities, such as the aforementioned ICRC and
IUCN, which would have a derived, functional and relative international
legal personality granted by the States.31
If the theory, at first glance, seems to suffice to explain the rights and
duties of legal entities, it is not capable of justifying the rights and duties
of individuals in international law. It lacks coherence. As clearly affirmed
by Cançado Trindade,
‘The doctrinal trend which still insists in denying to individuals the
condition of subjects of international law is … unsustainable [and]
apparently trying to make believe that the intermediary of the State,
between the individuals and the international order, would be some-
thing inevitable and permanent. Nothing could be more
fallacious.’32
In this particular aspect, if we assume that the State itself is the product of
the self-determination of people, both in its internal and external dimen-
sions – an idea that nowadays appear to be unchallenged - then the State
would necessarily have derived powers, since it was created to act on be-
half of the individuals that compose the represented nation.33 George
Scelle, for instance, considered ‘non le gouvernement, mais le peuple,
comme élément capital de l’Etat et même comme élément unique’.34
At this moment, it is appropriate to pose a question: why were States
created? We know that scholars are debating it since immemorial times
and that several theories have been conceived to answer this question.
However, it is beyond the scope of this essay appraise them in detail. For
that reason, we beg the pardon of the reader to straightforwardly answer
the question affirming that States were created by people to protect their
lives, liberties and estates. It were real people, not the abstract State, who
were actually living, occupying space, planting, hunting, fighting, disput-
ing things and moving across the territories that would be used to conform
the States. Independent of any legal theory, States were created to protect
the lives, liberties and estates of those people. And for that purpose, they
had to have a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force to ensure
it.35
208 NGOS: LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
If the sovereign State failed in protecting its own people or enacted laws
that were against Natural Law, then, according to Aquinas, Vitoria and
Grotius, just to quote some of the founders of international law, people
could disobey the sovereign or even rebel. The naturalist understanding of
the role of the State is fundamental for the protection of the human condi-
tion of individuals. The positivist doctrine that regarded the State as an or-
ganism to whom everyone had to profess his unconditional allegiance al-
lowed authoritarian practices that led to massive killings in Nazi Germany,
perpetrated by the government against the German people. Fortunately, this
kind of omnipotent State was also burnt in the crematoriums of Auschwitz,
and gave birth to a new understanding of the place of the individual within
the State in which participation was essential, because men are free as long
as it acts in the public realm. As Arendt puts it:
‘Action, the only activity that goes on directly between men...corre-
sponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not
Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world. While all aspects of
the human condition are somehow related to politics, this plurality
is specifically the condition - not only the conditio sine qua non,
but the conditio per quam - of all political life’36
On another perspective, some authors support that the Modern State flour-
ished together with the establishment of bureaucracy.37 If this assertion is
true, then one could argue that, under the peoples’ perspective, the State
has a functional purpose of satisfying the needs of the nation it governs. In
the colonial context, for example, Brownlie argued that it was very prob-
able that the populations of non-self-governing territories within the mean-
ing of Chapter XI of the UN Charter possessed legal personality, albeit a
special one.’38 The immanent international legal personality of the indivi-
duals, then, legitimized them to declare independence. Hence, if a Nation
is unsatisfied, it is capable of reforming the State, or even rejecting it,
creating a new one. The former situation can be observed, for instance, in
the changes of regimens (Capitalism v. Socialism; Republic v. Monarchy;
Unitary v. Federative governments), the latter being the case in particular
of Yugoslavia, whose statehood has been in a legal limbo since the creation
of the States of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.39 Modern his-
tory has evidenced that even powerful States and bureaucracies are incap-
able of continuing to protect people’s lives, liberties and estates through
the use of force if these same people decide to live under different arrange-
ments and exercise their right to self-determination.
We will resume the appraisal of the legal condition of the State in the
next chapter, but assuming that the nations have the right of self-determina-
tion if they permanently occupy a territory and are capable of creating an
independent government, then, they possess the inherent right to interact
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with other nations, doing so through the States. As noted by McDougal
and Reisman,
‘Traditional international law is a legacy of conceptualizations in
which collective entities, often endowed with mystical characteris-
tics, all but supplanted the individual human being. Let’s emphasize
that the ultimate actor in every interaction is the individual.’40
Of course, the States continue to be the main participants in the interna-
tional legal system, although, as recognized by Weeramantry, ‘international
law is moving inexorably out of the idea that its subjects are only sover-
eign States [and] individuals are moving closer to center stage in public
international law’.41 Definitively, we are not defending the idea that every
individual or nation should interact directly with others at the international
level. This would cause the collapse of the relations. If it (interaction) does
not work at the town level, it certainly will not be functional at the global
level. Direct democracy may be feasible among a handful of people, but
does not prove to be so at a greater range. NGOs are evidence of this.
When a small group of individuals decides to ‘do something for the pla-
net’, they start working and deciding everything together. According to the
growth of their activities and the admission of new members to the group,
they begin to divide up tasks and assign responsibilities. Further on, writ-
ten rules are enacted by the group and a permanent staff is hired, capable
of passing other rules, fundraising, lobbying the authorities, drawing the at-
tention of the media, interacting with peer organizations, attracting more
donors and members, until they have reached a situation where the NGO
has become rich, powerful and managed by a competent professional staff
capable of ‘doing something for the planet’. An NGO is hence, in sum, a
quintessential representative of Weberian civil service.
We have made this anecdotal parallel with the State to show that the
same social machinery that gave birth to States is capable of giving birth
to other representatives. If individuals possess international legal personal-
ity and the right to self-determination, which encompasses the right to par-
ticipate in public affairs, directly or through representatives, then they can
determine the way they will be represented in the international realm.
But, if States and NGOs consider themselves legitimate representatives
of their constituencies, they must necessarily assume that those constituen-
cies are the original bearers of the rights that they are defending, from
which it follows that States and NGOs really do have a derived and func-
tional legal capacity, which is, also, relative, since none of them are en-
titled to act against the fundamental rights of their constituencies. For this
reason, for example, no one can argue that States have created human
rights or support that States are not obliged, by jus cogens, to respect cer-
tain rules strictly connected with them. It was acknowledged by D’Amato,
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who affirmed that ‘human rights brought two things: first, that the indivi-
dual has legal standing to make claims and second, that a State cannot de-
fend itself against such claims by the notion of sovereignty.’42 If the sover-
eignty of the individual is stronger than that of the State, and States were
created by individuals under their right to self-determination, it necessarily
follows that, de facto, States possess a relative legal capacity toward their
constituencies. Likewise, NGO – and also IGO - officials are obliged to
act in strict conformity with the objectives of the organizations established
in their statutes and can be overthrown by the members if they do not be-
have accordingly.
Hence, supported in qualified worldwide legal doctrine, we can affirm
that individuals possess international legal personality43 and, consequently,
are capable of creating legal entities to represent them in the realm of inter-
national law.
This assertion will most certainly be criticized based on certain long-es-
tablished positivist legal doctrine. But the strength of the criticism is also
its weakness. When such theories of international legal personality were
laid down, several factors were not yet interacting in the international
sphere. International Human Rights Law, for example, did not exist. Would
it be possible to conceive of a theory in which States would only be bound
when they chose to be, as supported by positivist scholars, if International
Human Rights Law were before their eyes? We do not believe so.
Moreover, could legal doctrine construe a theory of sovereignty in which
the State would be empowered to do whatever it wanted within its bound-
aries if International Environmental Law existed? We can hardly agree.
Presenting a concluding remark: would it make sense to submit for trial or
appreciate claims brought by an object of law in an International Court?
If not, then why do some contemporary authors insist in the positivist
theory in which only States have original legal personality and any other
non-state actors are objects, or, slightly better, have a derived, functional
and relative legal personality?
In our opinion, it is because the theory was construed upon some func-
tions performed by the States on behalf of the represented nations, but that
were regarded as States’ fundamental rights. As pointed out by Shaw, ‘the
fundamental rights of States exist by virtue of the international legal order,
which is able, as in the case of other legal orders, to define the characteris-
tics of its subjects’.44 He further summarizes these rights as being indepen-
dence, legal equality and peaceful co-existence. To those rights, we can
add the right to engage in relationships with other States, to declare war
and make peace, and to submit claims before international tribunals.
If the fundamental rights of States exist by virtue of the international le-
gal order, the fundamental rights of human beings are positioned above
and beyond any legal order and, once they are inserted into positive law,
all legal order tends to be rebuilt accordingly to the their exigencies.45
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Therefore, considering that human rights are naturally inherent to people
and are at the core of the Social Contract theories that legitimate the power
granted to the State, their expansion into the realm of international law ne-
cessarily drives adjustments in international law theory, especially in the
aspects concerning the recognition of international legal personality.46
This shift is noticeable and has been addressed in the previous chapters.
Firstly, through the recognition that the public sphere is no longer equal to,
but wider than, the governmental sphere and that peoples have the right to
be heard at the UN – ‘We, the peoples of the United Nations…’ To allow
the exercise of this right in an organized manner, other legal entities repre-
senting those peoples were legitimized for consultancy: the NGOs. As we
have seen, these consultative rights expanded throughout the entire UN
system and now permeate all its bureaucratic bodies and decision-making
structures, whether permanent or not, as is the case of the conferences.
Human rights – hence, people - have been placed at the center of judicial
decisions,47 and individuals have become capable of being prosecuted by
international criminal courts, as well as entitled to bring claims against
States at the regional level if their fundamental rights have been impaired
or threatened by States, a postulating capacity extended also to NGOs,
which, in turn, are continuously interacting with tribunals through amicus
briefs. Court decisions, despite not mentioning it explicitly, are often ruling
in strict accordance to general principles of law laid down in Natural Law,
which are inherently linked to the rights of the people. Finally, civil society
organizations are performing executive tasks in humanitarian and environ-
mental affairs, together with States and IGOs, a fact that cannot be re-
garded as a mere coincidence, because all three of these legal structures re-
present, in different manners and scopes, the interests of people, which, in
humanitarian and environmental issues, are not restricted to the territorial
boundaries of the States.
The evidence addressed in the previous chapters has led us to conclude
that individuals have international legal personality, although the effective-
ness of the inherent rights of such a legal personality depends on the col-
lective representation of individuals through legal structures defined under
international law, which exercise, on their behalf, several activities defined
therein. Hence, the fundamental rights of the States have to be reinterpreted
as the fundamental rights of the nations they represent. This can be noted,
for instance, in the parallelism between the State’s rights under the Draft
Declaration on Rights and Duties of States48 prepared by the International
Law Commission and those peoples’ rights enshrined in the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights,49 which are compared below.
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Declaration on Rights and Duties of States Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
Every State has the right to independence
and hence to exercise freely, without
dictation by any other State, all its legal
powers, including the choice of its own
form of government.
All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
Every State has the right to exercise
jurisdiction over its territory and over all
persons and things therein, subject to the
immunities recognized by international
law.
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely
dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any
obligations arising out of international
economic co-operation, based upon the
principle of mutual benefit, and
international law.
Every citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity, without any distinctions and
without unreasonable restrictions to take
part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen
representatives.
Every State has the duty to refrain from
intervention in the internal or external
affairs of any other State.
All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
Every State has the duty to refrain from
fomenting civil strife in the territory of
another State, and to prevent the
organization within its territory of activities
calculated to foment such civil strife.
Any propaganda for war shall be
prohibited by law. Any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that
constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by
law.
Every State has the right to equality in law
with every other State.
All persons shall be equal before the
courts and tribunals. Everyone shall have
the right to recognition everywhere as a
person before the law.
Every State has the duty to treat all
persons under its jurisdiction with respect
for human rights and fundamental
freedoms, without distinction as to race,
sex, language, or religion.
All persons are equal before the law and
are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this
respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such
as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other
status.
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Declaration on Rights and Duties of States Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
Every State has the duty to ensure that
conditions prevailing in its territory do not
menace international peace and order.
Every State has the duty to refrain from
resorting to war as an instrument of
national policy, and to refrain from the
threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with international law and
order.
Every State has the duty to refrain from
giving assistance to any State which is
acting in violation of article 9, or against
which the United Nations is taking
preventive or enforcement action.
Any propaganda for war shall be
prohibited by law.
Any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes
incitement to discrimination, hostility or
violence shall be prohibited by law.
Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of association with others, including the
right to form and join trade unions for the
protection of his interests. No restrictions
may be placed on the exercise of this right
other than those which are prescribed by
law and which are necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, public
order (ordre public), the protection of
public health or morals or the protection
of the rights and freedoms of others.
Every State has the duty to settle its
disputes with other States by peaceful
means in such a manner that international
peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.
Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention.
No one shall be deprived of his liberty
except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedure as are established by
law.
All persons shall be equal before the
courts and tribunals. In the determination
of any criminal charge against him, or of
his rights and obligations in a suit at law,
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal
established by law.
No one shall be imprisoned merely on the
ground of inability to fulfil a contractual
obligation.
Every State has the duty to refrain from
recognizing any territorial acquisition by
another State acting in violation of article
9.
All peoples have the right of self-
determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
Every State has the right of individual or
collective self-defence against armed
attack.
Every human being has the inherent right
to life. This right shall be protected by law.
No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life.
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Declaration on Rights and Duties of States Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
Every State has the duty to carry out in
good faith its obligations arising from
treaties and other sources of international
law, and it may not invoke provisions in its
constitution or its laws as an excuse for
failure to perform this duty.
Where not already provided for by existing
legislative or other measures, each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes
to take the necessary steps, in accordance
with its constitutional processes and with
the provisions of the present Covenant, to
adopt such laws or other measures as
may be necessary to give effect to the
rights recognized in the present Covenant.
Therefore, if States continue to play the role of main Actors in international
relations and also the main subjects of international law – and we are not
disputing that – they do so as representatives of the Authors, the indivi-
duals, men and women of the several nations. This Hobbesian-like concep-
tion, for instance, was acknowledged by Nijman that supported that indivi-
duals possessed a primary international legal personality and that States
possessed a secondary one.50
But individuals, having retained those rights granted by Natural Law that
cannot be derogated by their representatives, the States, also regard, as le-
gitimate, the expression of their opinions, concerns and needs through an-
other kind of organization, the NGOs, which do not limit themselves to the
puzzle-like physical division of the planet, seeing any fictional territorial
boundaries established by States as irrelevant. NGOs and States cannot be
regarded as representatives of individuals in the same dimension because
States exercise their representative role circumscribed to a physical dimen-
sion, while NGOs perform it based on a thematic one. It follows that, if
States are legitimated to represent all concerns of people within a territorial
boundary, NGOs can be legitimate representatives of specific concerns of
people without territorial limitations.
The path that leads to the recognition of the international legal personal-
ity of NGOs has been solidly paved by the States’ acknowledgement that
thematic organizations could better address common concerns of the sev-
eral nations of the world, which could not be satisfactorily managed on a
national basis. When States assumed that they could not deal alone with
those issues, and for that purpose, established hundreds of thematic inter-
governmental organizations, either at the regional or international levels,
they implicitly recognized that territorial boundaries could hinder, perhaps
even threaten, the satisfaction of their peoples’ rights and aspirations and
that they had to cooperate. But, how could States cooperate in a world
where international legal theory is based on the axiom cujus regio, ejus
religio?
Once the context changes, the balance of duties and rights has to follow
suit. Again, we are not postulating that the State is not the most important
subject of international law. It is and will continue to be. Rather, we
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postulate that individuals possess a primary international legal personality,
which is primordially exercised by the States as representatives of their na-
tions, the States therefore having, in regard to the nations they represent, a
derived and functional legal capacity under international law. Accordingly,
in order to make the system work properly to pursue the satisfaction of the
aspirations of the peoples and the protection of their rights, the States are
entitled to exercise, on behalf of the nations they represent, some rights at
the international level, which are counterbalanced by duties before other
peoples, represented by other States, and their own people. For that reason,
States are bound in a twofold manner to people: to their own, through me-
chanisms of accountability and transparency democratically established,
and to other States’ people, through the respect of the covenants estab-
lished with their representatives, the other States, and of jus cogens, in a
kind of direct relationship with every human being.
Given that States are the main representatives of people at the interna-
tional level, they can engage themselves in agreements with other States to
address some issues coordinately, through intergovernmental organizations.
But, once States assumed that territorial boundaries were limitations that
had to be discarded, that the interests at stake were uniformly affecting all
nations in the globe, or, at least, at the regional level, and that to satisfy
those interests they had to cooperate, the sacrosanct statehood trinity,
which according to the positivists was the source of the State’s interna-
tional legal personality, suffered an impact.
As we have mentioned, just a couple of years after the creation of the
UN, the ICJ recognized that the newborn entity possessed international le-
gal personality, though noting that ‘the subjects of law in any legal system
are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights,
and their nature depends upon the needs of the community.’ 51 In this case,
the UN General Assembly had requested the Court’s advisory opinion on
whether the UN possessed the capacity to bring claims against States under
international law. The Court understood that, given the fact that the expres-
sion ‘international legal personality’ sometimes gave rise to controversy,
the Court would adopt it to refer to an entity with the capacity to maintain
its rights by bringing international claims.
This very aspect, the capacity to present claims before international
courts, has been considered by some scholars as a justification for denying
international legal personality to individuals and, consequently, to NGOs,
on the grounds that they lacked such power.52 We must regard this aspect
with caution. Verzijl, one of the supporters of the theory, argued that the
'true test’ of legal personality would seem to be not whether an individual
or legal entity possessed rights under a given legal order, but whether they
were in position to pursue or enforce them within that order.53 Hence, ac-
cording to him, if an individual was not entitled to pursue a right, it would
not be a subject of law. Lauterpacht, on the contrary, sustained that one
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could not exaggerate the importance of such a procedural rule, because a
person may be in possession of a plenitude of rights without at the same
time being able to enforce them in his own name.54 Rosenne adopts the
same rationale, considering misleading the traditional international law in-
clination to classify the individual as anything but a subject of international
law because it confused the ability of the individual to act on international
plane.55 Cançado Trindade also asserts that ‘justiciability’ of a right cannot
be erected as a conditio sine qua non of its existence and recognition.56
As the ICJ ruled in the Reparation for injuries case, in any legal system,
the subjects of law do not necessarily have the same rights. It is often com-
mon to have an unbalance between the capacity of being a defendant and a
plaintiff in national legal systems. This can also be verified in international
law. As we have seen in Chapter 3, individuals can stand as defendants in
international criminal tribunals, but they are not allowed to bring a claim
against States in the same Courts, a task that is performed solely by the
Prosecutor. However, they are entitled to bring claims against States to the
European Court of Justice and to the European Court of Human Rights,
and also to quasi-judicial bodies such as the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights. Likewise, NGOs have identical rights before the same
fora. Thus, arguably the procedural convention precluding individuals and
NGOs to bring a claim in international courts was somewhat tempered,57
being such movement one of the most remarkable developments in con-
temporary international law.58 We understand that the lack of capacity to
stand before the International Court of Justice, either as a defendant or a
plaintiff, does not impair the recognition of the international legal personal-
ity of individuals.59 On the Avena and LaGrand cases, for instance, the ICJ
understood that individuals possessed rights – thus, were subjects of law -
which, in those particular cases, were pursued with the intervention of the
States.60 One cannot challenge the position of the individual as a subject of
international law by supporting the claim on the failure to distinguish be-
tween the entitlement to rights and the capacity to enforce them. The fact
that the beneficiary is incapable of taking independent steps in his own
name to enforce his rights does not mean that he is not a subject of law.61
In any case, given that individuals and NGOs have access to certain inter-
national tribunals to challenge the States, then, we could also support that
they have passed Verzijl’s ‘true test’.
Some authors also argue that international legal personality cannot be re-
cognized to individuals or NGOs on grounds that they cannot enter into in-
ternational agreements with States. We have not found evidence that this
has ever happened between individuals and States, but we will not make
the same mistake incurred by Verzijl in regard to self-determination, by af-
firming that it is substantively impossible for it to happen in the future,
specially bearing in mind the wealth of some individuals and the small di-
mensions of some States. However, as we have pointed out in Chapter 2,
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there are several types of soft law agreements entered into by States and
NGOs, and also some hard law ones such as the Headquarter Agreement
signed between the ICRC and Switzerland in 1993, which extended to this
private organization the same treatment, including immunity of correspon-
dence and personnel, which is granted to intergovernmental
organizations.62
The appraisal of the situation of individuals and NGOs in treaties, cus-
tomary practices, Court decisions and general principles of law vehemently
suggests that it is not possible to continue supporting the theory that States
are the only subjects of international law. So, borrowing from a lapidary
statement coined by Rosalyn Higgins, we may ask: Why have we erected
an intellectual prison of our own choosing and then declared it to be an un-
alterable constraint? 63
To which we can respond: Because we have forgotten that international
law is deeply imbedded in Natural Law. This amnesia can be attributed to
the efficient work carried out by positivist scholars in divulging their theo-
ry that States were only bound by their covenants, which has gained appar-
ent strength due to the exponential growth of written international law, i.e.,
treaties and conventions, since then.64
The theory began to collapse when the major multilateral treaty – the
UN Charter – accepted the admittance of civil society organizations at
some of the Club’s events, recognizing, also, that an immense group of ob-
jects, individuals, possessed the right (!!) to self-determination, and more-
over, that the organization and its members had to ‘achieve international
co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cul-
tural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion’.65 Later on, each treaty ensuring re-
spect to human rights, civil society participation in decision-making pro-
cesses or locus standi before tribunals, as well as each Court decision ac-
cepting amicus briefs, by the same token helped to define a way out of that
prison, removing another brick in the wall.66
Given that both International Law and Human Rights Law share the
same roots in Natural Law, one can expect that they are capable of produ-
cing similar offspring .i.e., the recognition that the human being is at the
core of the legal system and that every theoretical construction thereafter
considers the individual as its original source of legitimacy. It follows that
the definition of the role of States, Intergovernmental Organizations and
NGOs at the international level necessarily requires the appraisal of their
legitimacy, a task that we will perform in the forthcoming chapters.
However, before concluding this chapter, we deem it appropriate to ap-
praise the situation of individuals and international NGOs before the last
subsidiary source of international law, the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations. For that purpose, we have
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decided to focus on the work of major organized law doctrine bodies, hav-
ing selected three of them - the International Law Commission, the Institut
de Droit International and the International Law Association - whose ser-
iousness, membership, and reputation unequivocally fulfill the scope of
Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ.67
6.2 Organized Law doctrine bodies
6.2.1 The International Law Commission
The International Law Commission (ILC) was established by the UN in
1948, therefore being a public international body, which differentiates it
from the two other organized law doctrine bodies, incorporated under pri-
vate law. Its members have originated from various segments of the inter-
national legal community, such as academia, the diplomatic corps, govern-
ment ministries and international organizations, in order to reflect a broad
spectrum of expertise and practical experience within the field of interna-
tional law.
According to Article 1(1) of its Statute, the ILC ‘shall have for its object
the promotion of the progressive development of international law and its
codification’. Article 15 makes a distinction between progressive develop-
ment, defined as meaning ‘the preparation of draft conventions on subjects
which have not yet been regulated by international law or in regard to
which the law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of
States’ and codification, defined as meaning ‘the more precise formulation
and systematization of rules of international law in fields where there al-
ready has been extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine’.68
The ILC has concerned itself primarily with public international law, but
it is not precluded from entering the fields of private international law and
international criminal law. In the latter case, the ILC appraised the formula-
tion of the Nuremberg principles and the consideration of the question of
international criminal jurisdiction back in 1949, a work that culminated in
the completion of the draft Statute for an International Criminal Court in
1994, and the draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind in 1996. For that reason, we can regard that the ILC has worked
towards the international legal personality of individuals, by defining that
they would have locus standi, as defendants, in international criminal
tribunals.
Apart from the appraisal of individuals as subjects of international crim-
inal law, we have not identified further studies of the ILC on the interna-
tional legal personality of civil society organizations or any other non-state
actors.
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6.2.2 The International Law Association
The International Law Association (ILA) is a private institution founded in
1873 in Belgium, and currently headquartered in London. The objectives
of the ILA are the study, clarification and development of international
law, both public and private, and the furtherance of international under-
standing and respect for international law.69 Currently the organization
congregates nearly 3,700 practitioners of international law in 45 countries
covering the major legal systems of the world.70 The ILA operates
through International Committees, established to undertake research and to
prepare reports on areas of international law (public, private or commer-
cial), which are discussed and considered by the membership and other in-
terested parties at the biennial conferences. The reports take various forms:
a re-statement of the law; a draft treaty or convention; an elaboration of a
code or rules or principles of international law; or a review of recent devel-
opments of law or practice.
In September 2007, the ILA established a Committee for the study of
the rights and obligations of non-state actors under international law with
the purpose to ‘contribute to the larger academic debate on non-state actors
under international law as well as the identification of the legal problems
in the relationship between states and non-state actors as well as interna-
tional governmental organizations and non-state actors at the international
level’.71 At the ILA Conference, held in The Hague in 2010, the
Committee presented a 24 page report of its activities, in which it set the
methodology, scope, aims and working definitions of the study, as well as
three themes considered more relevant for mapping rights and obligations
related to non-state actors activities: (1) norm creation (treaty, customary,
general principles and ‘soft’), (2) monitoring compliance (administration),
and (3) enforcement (dispute settlement, accountability/responsibility and
immunity).
The report is not conclusive, but has shown some evidences that non-
state actors, including NGOs, have limited formal roles in international
norm-creation, being also involved in international law-monitoring in spe-
cific international regimes (human rights and environmental in particular).
It found that, although having some participatory rights in international dis-
pute settlement mechanisms, non-state actors generally do not incur direct
responsibility for transgressions of international law, and are not entitled to
immunity. More important, the research found that ‘there is a need for
clarity to improve understanding of the appropriate roles of all actors, State
and non-State, active in the international legal plane and to improve their
responsibility/accountability to the international community as a whole.
Arguably, clarifying the legal status of diverse NSAs and giving a voice to
new participants should enrich and increase the legitimacy of international
220 NGOS: LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
legal processes and improve the chances of wider compliance with interna-
tional norms.’72
6.2.3 The Institut de Droit International
The Institute de Droit International (IDI) is a private institution with scien-
tific aims founded on 8 September 1873 in Belgium, whose purpose is to
‘promote the progress of international law’,73 which congregates prominent
jurisconsults in international laws from the major legal systems of the
world.74 According to its practices, the associates and members of the IDI
meet every two years, when they can adopt Resolutions of a ‘normative
character’, which are brought to the attention of governmental authorities,
international organizations as well as the scientific community, aiming to
highlight the characteristics of the lex lata in order to promote its respect.
Sometimes the IDI makes determinations de lege ferenda in order to con-
tribute to the development of international law.75
In 1923, the IDI prepared a draft convention regarding the legal status
of international associations. It did not declare the legal personality of
those entities under public international laws, even though it referred to
them as ‘international’. Rather, it defined such entities as those associations
established under private law that, while accepting membership from sev-
eral countries, had the purpose to pursue non-profit aims with an interna-
tional interest.76 According to the draft convention, the statutes of the orga-
nizations had to be submitted to a Commission created by the convention
and headquartered in Brussels, composed of diplomatic representatives of
the States parties to the convention, which would have the support of a
Secretariat. Once the statute was duly fulfilled, the entity would be granted
the condition of having the same rights as those ensured to national asso-
ciations by the State parties where it had operations, which included, at
least, the right to have assets, to engage into contracts, standing before tri-
bunals and similar fiscal benefits. The entities would also have the obliga-
tion to annually submit their financial statements to the Secretariat.
Since the first attempt did not produce any echo under the auspices of
the League of Nations, in 1950, the IDI returned to the subject, having pre-
pared a draft convention with a content very similar to the previous one,
this time attributing the status not only to associations but also to private
foundations. Again, the convention did not provide international legal per-
sonality to the concerned bodies and, in a certain way, proposed a step
backwards in the truly international scope of its proposal, by abandoning
the idea of the Commission composed of representatives of the States’ par-
ties, which was replaced by a registration procedure defined by each State
party.
One can observe some similarities between the proposals of these two
drafts and the Strasbourg Convention, adopted by the Council of Europe in
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1996, formerly addressed in this work. However, all these documents have
missed the exact same point: they refrain from clearly recognizing the in-
ternational legal personality of NGOs, despite naming them international.
Despite the aspects analyzed in the first part of this chapter, there is strong
evidence that NGOs possess international legal personality, an issue that
we will address in the conclusion of this work. But first, we shall focus
our analysis on the legitimacy of other legal structures that have been con-
ceived to represent the individuals in the realm of public international law.
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CHAPTER 7
Legitimacy of States
7.1 The concept of Modern State; a contractual arrangement in
evolution?
For international law, States are subjects of law. And, for that reason, they
are entitled with several rights and possess some legal capacities. The
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States defined a sover-
eign State as ‘something’ that has: (i) a permanent population, (ii) a de-
fined territory, (iii) a government, and (iv) the authoritative power to enter
into relations with other States.1 The treaty, however, was not capable of
defining why States exist, how they had been formed, who had formed
them and what their purposes were.
In Chapter 1, we succinctly presented the ideas of some classic scholars
about the nature of the State and the origins of international law that have
tried to answer those questions. Their theories, in short, supported that men
had inherent non-derogable rights arisen out of Natural Law and that, hav-
ing an innate inclination to live peacefully and acknowledging their incapa-
city to protect their lives, liberties and estates in a state of nature, they es-
tablished a covenant – the so-called Social Contract – for the creation of
the State, which, possessing the arbitrary control over men and the mono-
poly of use of force, ensured those threatened rights. A State’s legitimacy,
thus, relied on a contract entered into by free individuals. As pointed out
by Thomas Franck,
‘The social contract and its canon embody the secular community’s
response to commonly perceived dangers of chaos, disorder, or
other overweening threats to its security and material progress.’2
The Social Contract theory, which dominated legal thought during the 17th
and 18th centuries, was further criticized by several authors, including
Hegel. According to him, legitimacy relied on the reciprocal recognition of
one human being with a stranger. At a macro level, this reciprocal recogni-
tion was manifested in shared state-centric institutions and law, i.e., on
‘ethicality’ or ‘ethical life’. For Hegel, men were thinking individuals that
could not be regarded as free if a State, external to human consciousness,
had the power to control all men within a territory and possessed the
monopoly of use of force. For him, any legal order based upon the idea of
a social contract lacked legitimacy because it would neither be the sum of
the wills of the people nor would it give birth to an organic legal order of
a public character, rather to the institutionalization of the arbitrary wills of
some individuals, as the Reign of Terror that followed the French
Revolution had demonstrated. To avoid this, he argued, the objectiveness
of the institutions and their laws had to be incorporated into the conscious-
ness of the individual, thereby making the private realm public. 3
Notwithstanding the sophistication of the legal reasoning of Hegel, his
thought failed – in contemporary terms - to associate States with civiliza-
tion by assuming that ‘peoples of low level of culture’ (vulgas) lived in a
‘pre-legal age’ and could not achieve statehood. For him, international law
‘entitled civilized nations to treat as barbarians other nations which are less
advanced’, to conclude that ‘the rights of these other nations are not equal
to theirs and that their independence is merely formal.’4 Such reasoning
provided philosophical legitimacy for colonialist initiatives and for the con-
formation of Eurocentric international law, which, even today, can be ob-
served in article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ, addressed in Chapter 5.
Fortunately, such a differentiation between people is now outlawed in the
international sphere.
Another aspect of his thought that deserves attention is the State. He
considered the State ‘an end in itself’, which would have overwhelming
power, as observed, for instance, in the arguments that individuals had to
sacrifice their lives for the State and that nations do not deserve recognition
and that history only begins when a nation is recognized as a State. His
conception is hardly acceptable today, with, for instance, the emergence of
fundamental human rights and the recognized erga omnes character of
self-determination. In another dimension, the characteristics of a Hegelian
State, as noticed throughout The Philosophy of Right, fit perfectly the cri-
teria of the Montevideo Convention and, for that reason, we will not ex-
pend more time on them. However, two other aspects of Hegel’ State de-
serve attention: firstly, his understanding that States were bound only by
the agreements they entered into with other States, hence affiliating himself
to the Positivist School; and, secondly, his particular appreciation for bu-
reaucracy – the universal class, a structure that we will appraise in ensuing
section of this essay.
It follows that, even though his appreciated bureaucracy flourished, rele-
vant aspects of his theory have become outdated with the strengthening of
the principles of self-determination and jus cogens and the emergence of
human rights, which, in our understanding, represent a late rebirth of some
aspects of Natural Law. By saying so, we are not supporting that Natural
Law, as conceived centuries ago, is strictly applicable to the complex con-
temporary world. This is not the case. However, it cannot go unnoticed that
the development of international human rights law and international
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humanitarian law has, as precisely acknowledged by Rosalyn Higgins and
discussed in Chapter 3, put the human being in the centre of the decisions
made in the international legal system,5 even justifying – albeit seriously
disputed - foreign intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign States if
gross violations to those rights are occurring. This represents notorious evi-
dence of the superposition of the sovereignty of men over the sovereignty
of States, of naturalism over positivism.
If men and women possess non-derogable rights under international law,
they are necessarily subjects of international law, a condition that we ap-
praised in the previous chapter. Objects of law cannot possess rights, even
more non-derogable ones. It is illogical. But it would also be unreasonable
to imagine that men and women, while having those rights, could exercise
them directly at the international level. As we have said, and it is quite ob-
vious, it would not work. Even worse, it would lead to the very negation
of those same rights, because rights that cannot be protected under a legal
framework may even exist but, in practice, can be regarded as non-existent.
For that purpose, States, these abstract persons, were created, according to
the natural law tradition that underpins the creation of international law.
States, thus, are not an end in themselves, rather they are structures created
by people to protect their lives, liberties and estates.6
Some of the criticism of the Enlightenment theories relied on the appar-
ent naivety of the notion of ‘men in the state of nature’ whose existence
could not be precisely defined in time and space. Of course, it was just a
hypothetical situation to justify an actual proposal of legitimacy of state-
hood. In spite of this, it provided a good starting point, which, regrettably,
can be noted today, in the so-called failed States. Let’s take Somalia as an
example. The overthrowing of the central government in 1991 and the sub-
sequent humanitarian crisis motivated the envoy of twenty-five thousand
US soldiers to the country at the end of 1992 with the purpose of supply-
ing the hungry population with food and medicine. At that time, Somali
territory was being disputed by at least fourteen different groups and food
had become a valuable item for payment of loyalty and guns. The unex-
pected difficulties faced by the Americans led to the deployment of an
UN-led force composed of troops from twenty-one countries to supply
food and rebuild the Somali State. However, things did not work well even
then and after an outstanding failure of US elite troops to capture a war-
lord, which culminated in the loss of two helicopters, the death of eighteen
US soldiers and injuries in eighty more, the US and the UN abandoned the
country in 1993. Today, almost two decades later, Somalia makes world
news, due to the threat it poses to international navigation, caused by pi-
rates acting in its territorial waters. Those individuals are subjects of inter-
national law under the Convention on the Law of the Seas.7 However,
could Somalia be regarded as a State for the sake of the Montevideo
Convention and the mainstream understanding of statehood if it does not
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have a central government capable of controlling its territory and popula-
tion? We hardly would say yes. In our understanding, the term ‘failed
State’ is a euphemism for a ‘non-existing State’ and was coined because
the community of States cannot accept the ‘death’ of one of its members
and the consequent statehood lacunae in a given territory. But if no State
exists in that territory and its people are struggling to live in a lawless en-
vironment amidst everyday disputes for food, water, lodging and security,
they are experiencing a situation that substantially resembles the
Enlightenment’ state of nature.
States, hence, are necessary; but they are necessary to ensure that men
and women can live their lives and enjoy their liberties and estates accord-
ing to their innate inclination for peaceful co-existence in a society gov-
erned by rational rules. The so-called founders of international law –
Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolf and Vattel – just to mention a few, con-
ceived their theories with deep roots in natural law. If their theories were
somewhat overshadowed by the teachings of Hegel and other positivists
during the late 19th and in the first half of the 20th century, the latter have
also been undermined by the emergence of human rights and the consoli-
dation of liberal democracy as the generally pursued form of government.
As noticed by Brierly, the positivist political philosophers failed to see that
with the coming of democracy, a new theory of the nature of governing
power was called for.8
States exist to ensure the well-being of people and, by performing this
task, allow them to live their lives and pursue their happiness with their
rights protected within a rational legal structure. To ensure that all rights
are protected, as well as peaceful co-existence, the individuals have dele-
gated to the State the monopoly of the use of physical violence, which is
only legitimated if exercised in accordance to those rights. Once the State
uses violence against those who it was supposed to protect without a pre-
established rational reason, such use becomes illegitimate. The sovereignty
of the human being – expressed by Human Rights – limits the sovereignty
of States.
Given that men, in the words of Aristotle, are ‘political animals’, they
necessarily live in society and, for that reason, have settled in determined
territories where they could interact with one another. The development of
different languages and patterns of behavior during immemorial genera-
tions of shared experiences has led to the formation of what would be
known as nations. If the individuals created the States to protect them
against themselves, the same abstract structure was legitimized to protect
them against threats from other nations, following that the States became
the representatives of their nations toward other nations in the realm that
would be later called inter-national.
At the domestic level, States are, among other attributions, responsible
for ensuring respect to private property, which, even in communist
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regimes, encompassed the right to possess determined properties for living
or working. This micro-level occupation of territories, when exercised col-
lectively by the individuals of a given nation, gave birth to one of the fun-
damental aspects of State sovereignty: the exclusive control of a deter-
mined territory and everything therein. If one individual leaves a territory
to settle in another one and that move implies in a change of State, then,
he will be submitted to another set of rules. Men are thinking beings and
the pursuit of self-consciousness and the innate desire for freedom drives
men toward self-governing. But, once self-governing may be restrained by
others’ self-governing initiatives, the State appeared as a solution to regu-
late it. Again, roughly speaking, the extrapolation of the individual micro-
level towards the macro level, leads the State to the position of being the
(self) government of the nation within that territory.
There is, hence, a marked parallelism between the way men behave at
the micro-level and the attributions of the State at the international level.
Men occupy space, interact with others, exercise self-defense and are self-
conscious, with an innate desire for freedom; Statehood relies on people
occupying a territory under a government capable of entering into relations
with others, within a broad concept of sovereignty.9 After all, as clearly
stated by Lauterpacht, States are not like individuals, they are actually com-
posed of individual human beings. Consequently, it was human beings
who created international society.10
If men possess this innate individual behavior and it is exercised collec-
tively through an abstract person, it occurs because this person, the State,
has obtained such powers by delegation of those whom it represents -
through a contractual arrangement, the decanted Social Contract - follow-
ing that it is not actually the ultimate bearer of any rights, rather the one
that exercises them on behalf of others. Fundamental rights of States are,
actually, fundamental rights of people which are, for practical reasons, ex-
ercised by the latter under generally acceptable circumstances. As ap-
pointed by Freeman
‘Rather than being a particular kind of ethical view, the general no-
tion of agreement functions as a framework for justification in
ethics. This framework is based on the liberal idea that the legiti-
macy of social rules and institutions depends on their being freely
and publicly acceptable to all individuals bound by them. If rational
individuals in appropriately defined circumstances could or would
agree to certain rules and institutions, then insofar as we identify
with these individuals and their interests, what they accept should
also be acceptable to us now as a basis for our cooperation. Seeing
in this way, the justificatory force of social contract views depends
only in part on the idea of agreement; even more essential is the
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conception of the person and the conception of practical reason that
are built into particular views.’11
The Social Contract theory had a later rebirth in 1971, when Rawls pub-
lished A Theory of Justice, in which he aimed to develop a theory of jus-
tice from the idea of social contract found in Locke, Rousseau and Kant12
that could be compatible with freedom and equality, the core values of jus-
tice in a democratic society. He departs from an Original position, a hy-
pothetical situation that resembles the state of nature, to determine the prin-
ciples that will govern the people’s lives thereafter.13 According to him,
these principles are the ‘liberty principle’ and the ‘difference principle’.
Concerning the first, he states that ‘each person is to have an equal right to
the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a simi-
lar scheme of liberties for others’.14 The second principle claims that social
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to be of the
greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society and that offices
and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality
of opportunity.
The basic liberties mentioned in the first principle comprehend several
freedoms already enshrined in the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights (CCPR) such as the freedom from arbitrary arrest (art 9),
freedom of thought and conscience (art 18), freedom of expression (art
19), freedom of association and assembly (art 21 and 22) and political lib-
erty to participate in public affairs (art 25). Hence, these basic liberties are
already protected by a covenant, which is not a philosophical construction,
but rather a tangible written agreement enforceable under international law.
Regarding equality and fairness, the underlying elements of the second
principle, legal protection is neither very clear nor widely assured. Despite
some arguments that the CCPR and several other conventions and binding
international documents (such as the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights) have addressed equality and fairness to some extent, none of the
documents has made it clear as to whether those rights could be opposable
to third parties or States in an international legal system with solid liberal
roots. If, for instance, equality of States is a basic norm in international
law, fairness in their relations does not have the same legal standing or pro-
tection, even if we consider WTO dispute settlement procedures.
Notwithstanding, Rawls’ theory on the ‘original position’ has contribu-
ted towards putting the idea of the Social Contract once again into the de-
bate of international legal theory, which, in our opinion, has proven to be
helpful, especially if one bears in mind that the concept has been resumed
in a far friendlier context than the one that existed during the
Enlightenment: Now, men do not have rights arisen out of the abstract
Natural Law, rather they are guaranteed by hard law international agree-
ments and States’ constitutions supported in the concepts of the former;
232 NGOS: LEGITIMATE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
human rights have also moved from the periphery to the centre of interna-
tional law decisions, replacing States’ rights and, finally, States have estab-
lished organic bodies – rational-legal bureaucracies - to deal with specific
aspects of the whole pack of covenants comprised within the Social
Contract, both at the municipal and international levels. The social con-
tract, now, is in front of our eyes and we can read it and sue the State, if it
fails to fulfill its obligation thereunder.
In 1999, Rawls published a second work, called The Law of Peoples, in
which he returned to the concept of original position to support a ‘particu-
lar political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles
and norms of international law and practice’.15 In this work, by ‘peoples’
he meant ‘the actors in the Society of Peoples, just as citizens are the ac-
tors in domestic society’, making, therefore, a distinction between the law
of peoples and the law of nations, or international law. While the latter is
an existing legal order, however incomplete it may be in some ways, the
former, by contrast, is ‘a family of political concepts with principles of
right, justice, and the common good, that specify the content of a liberal
conception of justice worked up to extend to and to apply to international
law.’16 The principles and corresponding support in international hard law
are the following:
The Law of Peoples’ principles Corresponding international law
Peoples (as organized by their
government) are free and independent,
and their freedom and independence is to
be respected by other peoples.
UN Charter, Art 1(2) and art 2(1)
Peoples are equal and parties to their own
agreements.
UN Charter, Art 2(1)
Peoples have the right of self-defense but
no right to war.
UN Charter, Art 2(1), art 33, art 51
Peoples are to observe a duty of non-
intervention.
UN Charter, Art 2(4)
Peoples are to observe treaties and
undertakings.
Pacta sunt servanda
Peoples are to observe certain specified
restrictions on the conduct of war
(assumed to be in self-defense).
Geneva Conventions
Peoples are to honor human rights. Mainly, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights
Peoples have a duty to assist other
peoples living under unfavorable
conditions that prevent their having a just
or decent political and social regime.
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The above comparative chart shows that even though a major part of
Rawls’ principles is actually part of international law, one of them – soli-
darity among peoples – still does not have a counterpart. Not coincidently,
the latter is the subject of intense struggles in international relations, usual-
ly divided up into economic/social and political matters, which often place
the contending groups in reciprocally opposing sides: when the developed
States intend to intervene in other States on grounds of improving justice
or decency in their political regimes (i.e., introducing democracy) the target
States raise the argument of sovereignty and non-intervention in internal
affairs; when the latter seeks more justice in the North/South social and
economic relations, the richer States argue the same sovereignty and the
equality among States.
Given that international law is a liberal system, there appears to be an
insoluble dispute between freedom and justice, a fact recognized by Rawls,
who regarded his Law of Peoples as a realistic utopia: realistic because it
is possible and may be achieved; utopia, because States will most probably
never reach it.
7.2 The concept of Democracy: the contractual arrangement
framework
Under the Social Contract theory that established the States, people agreed
to delegate – not to transfer – to the State some of their powers in order to
have a ‘comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a
secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any that
are not of it’.17 According to Locke, it implied in making collective deci-
sions and in the submission of each individual to the decision of the major-
ity. Since direct participation was not feasible, such decision would be
reached through the parliament, which would occupy the center of his ac-
count of political legitimacy.18
Parliaments adopt either a unicameral or bi-cameral format and are clas-
sically composed of representatives of people chosen with the purpose to
enact the laws that will govern the State and the lives of people therein.
The parliament represents empirical evidence that the people has the origi-
nal power to control their lives, which was partially delegated to people’s
representatives that form the State. The further development of liberalism
with its emphasis on fundamental freedoms and the enforcement of human
rights both at the municipal and international levels, adds renewed argu-
ments to contractualism.
The nature of parliament traditionally expresses the idea of self-determi-
nation - people approving the rules that will govern their lives – and de-
mocracy – achieving that goal through debates among representatives of
diverse segments of the society by majority vote. Self-determination can be
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enjoyed either individually or collectively. While the first is customarily
expressed by fundamental freedoms, the latter is often associated with de-
mocracy. But, democracy can be analyzed under two different approaches.
The first one looks at systems of government and the relations between in-
stitutions. The second looks at the attributes of a democratic process and
the qualities it should incarnate. Therefore, as affirmed by Schumpeter, de-
mocracy is a political method, i.e., an institutional arrangement executed
under the two mentioned approaches to reach a decision, following that it
cannot be an end in itself.19 Democracy, as a system of government, is ex-
pressed by parliament and periodical free elections of its members; as a de-
mocratic process, it is observed in the debates involving several constituen-
cies potentially affected by the decision to be made, its lawful approval by
a qualified majority according to established rules of procedure, and the
publicity and enforceability of the outcome.
In his seminal article on Democratic Governance, Thomas Franck
pointed out that the quality of a rule, or a system of rules, or a process of
making or interpreting rules had legitimacy only to the extent that they
could pull both the rule-makers and those addressed by the rules toward
voluntary compliance. For that purpose, one had to appraise four indica-
tors: pedigree, referring to the depth of the rule’s roots in a historical pro-
cess; determinacy, in regard to the rule’s ability to communicate content;
coherence, regarding the rule’s internal consistency and lateral connected-
ness to the principles underlying other rules and; adherence, referring to
the rule’s vertical connectedness to a normative hierarchy.20 According to
him, self-determination provided the pedigree of a democratic entitlement.
As we appraised in Chapter 4, self-determination has solid roots in Natural
Law and it has been experiencing continuous development in the realm of
international law, widely acknowledged by decisions of the international
tribunals and State practices. Self-determination is also in the origin of the
theory of Social Contract, which has been empirically and repeatedly ob-
served in the formation of dozens of new States during the last forty years,
and in the growth of fundamental freedoms and human rights, recognized
by several declarations and multilateral treaties. It is not our purpose to ap-
praise in this essay the evolution of the principle of self-determination at
length, but one aspect that deserves attention is the fact that its expansion
has not taken place without repeated complaints from those same countries
that composed the classic droit public et concert européens, which invoked
the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs to retain their colonial
empires throughout Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The emergence of
the right of self-determination of people under colonial domination ulti-
mately worked against the interests of ‘heavy foot-printer’ countries,
hence, proving its strength in international law.21
Democratic entitlement has also had its determinacy expressed in several
rules, which, according to Franck, can be regarded as composing three
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different generations or ‘building blocks’: self-determination, as the first;
freedom of expression as the second; and finally, the right to free and open
elections, as the third. If self-determination was enshrined in the UN
Charter (art 73), the other building blocks were clearly determined in a
binding treaty only in 1966, with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, addressed in Chapter 4, which comprehended the right to
self-determination, freedom of expression and electoral rights, the latter in-
ferred from the rights of association and participation in public affairs. The
remaining two indicators, coherence and adherence, are also clearly obser-
vable, with the three blocks making up the ‘closely interwoven strands of a
single fabric’22 aiming to create the opportunity for all persons to assume
responsibility for shaping the world where they live and work, which, in
turn, adhere to a ‘higher’ principle that defines the social contract theory
and even international law: the right to peace.
Franck affirms that democratic governance is an emerging right and that
that right has reached its latest, third generation, with rules concerning free
elections. We are inclined to agree with him to the extent in that the several
arguments presented in his essay and just briefly summarized above, have
focused on parliament. His analysis was written in 1992 and was certainly
influenced by the dismantling of the Soviet Union in the previous years,
but lacked the necessary widening to cover democracy beyond the
parliament.
The traditional division of the State in three branches established its out-
er governance framework: the Legislative establishes the rules; the
Executive delivers the services and the Judiciary decides the disputes with-
in civil society and between civil society and the State. In this simple tri-
nity, civil society was represented in the parliament, thus hypothetically
controlling the bureaucracy, nested in the Executive, with the enactment of
the rules that had to be followed and would be enforced by the Judiciary.
However, the complexity of State affairs has distorted the model and such
a fact has gone unnoticed in Franck’s essay. In 1992, a major part of the
rules had already been enacted by the Executive, i.e., by the bureaucracy,
and it has experienced a steady growth since then. The economic strength
of the Executive, that often gathers no less than ninety percent of the
State’s budget, impairs the equilibrium between the powers, also threatened
by the nomination of members of the Supreme Courts by the Executive.
With political parties having little (if any) real programmatic differentia-
tion, parliament’s power to shape the State was impaired, even in parlia-
mentary democracies.
What appears to be unquestionable in current days is that the right to
participate, directly or not, in public affairs has gone beyond the participa-
tion in free elections. The expansion of the conceptual understanding of
the legal principle of self-determination, together with the political rights
ensured by the CCPR, have given men and women a prominent role, from
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either a collective or an individual perspective, which cannot be confused
with the role of the State (the parliament) as their representatives. For ex-
ample, when van Kersbergen interpreted the chain of over two million peo-
ple that united the capitals of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania in the 50th
anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact as an ‘impressive demonstra-
tion of national sovereignty’,23 he did it in a context that seemed to refer
to States. It was a ‘people’ who were exercising their rights to create a
State, not a State that was emerging proprio motu. Definitively, it tended
more towards Kant than Hegel.
The right to intervene in public affairs, however, has experienced an in-
ternal change. In the late 19th and in the beginning of the 20th century, po-
litical parties and labour unions catalyzed the opportunity to change.
Anarchism, communism, socialism, social democracy, fascism and all their
variances represented a rich menu for avid consumers of political participa-
tion. Strikes, parades of public protest and political gatherings in public ve-
nues attracted hundreds of thousands of people. Unions and political par-
ties really presented different options for civil society and in that period,
nonprofit institutions were only focused on providing direct services to
people in need. Parliament, however, is susceptible to degenerating into
factions representing special interests gathered in a forum for inter-party
compromises, creating conditions for the strengthening of the executive as
the ‘democratic representative’ of people, a fact acknowledged by Carl
Schmitt in regard to the Weimar Republic.24 Since World War II, a slow
but steady pasteurization-like process took over in politics: the unions and
political parties continuously lost their capacity to offer real alternatives to
status quo. In the late 1960s, change no longer was promoted by them: stu-
dents in Paris, Vietnam war protesters in Washington, civil rights and fem-
inist movements, none of the Western countries’ major political demonstra-
tions of the decade had been convened by unions or political parties, but
rather by citizens at large. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, with the defini-
tive death of the remote hypothesis of communism in the West, the alterna-
tives narrowed even more.
While parties and unions were fading out, other players, the NGOs, be-
gan to take their place as fora for engagement of people in public affairs.
But this was not just a matter of replacing one political actor by another,
because there was one substantive difference: if political parties seek to op-
erate within the State, NGOs operate beyond it; if unions work within cor-
porative boundaries, NGOs operate beyond them, at the universal level.
With NGOs, politics has crossed the borders of parliament.25 Presently, no
political parties are capable of attracting multitudes; they all look alike.
Unions, in turn, have become working dogs. Actually, both have an unde-
niably bureaucratic flavor.
The apparent tranquility brought by neo-liberalism and the widespread
adoption of market economies in the 1990s conceals a threat to the core of
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democracy: pluralism. This concept corresponds in the political sphere to
competition on the economic market. If all political parties look alike and
if the State is governed by a self-oriented bureaucracy, even with free elec-
tions, we may be living under a monopoly or an oligopoly. This condition
impairs democracy in a way similar to how it impairs the market. When
we discuss democracy, we necessarily have to discuss tolerance, diversity
and openness. When we talk about State governance, we have to appraise
the manner in which power is exercised in the management of the State,
thus necessarily passing through the legitimacy of authority and account-
ability. Democratic governance tries to deal with all of these aspects, hav-
ing in mind the purposes of the State, i.e., the fulfillment of the Social
Contract.
The Social Contract must be enforced in some other manner. Civil so-
ciety must control the State. Liberalism has adopted rationalism to ensure
fundamental freedoms, hence, the latter commands the former, and not the
contrary. The primacy of individual rights over State rights was acknowl-
edged by international law when it accepted restrictions to the States’ so-
vereignty if this proved necessary to ensure human rights. The prohibition
of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of States, for instance, is no
longer a dogma in international law, yet fiercely defended against neo-colo-
nization initiatives hidden under the veil of the establishment of (perma-
nently tutored and/or militarily enforced) democratic regimens.
At the domestic level, NGOs are energizing the public sphere and im-
proving the pluralist debate within the States in order to ensure a better ac-
complishment of the Social Contract. In several States, public policies are
now discussed between State officials and civil society representatives in
official fora, such as thematic councils and cyclical conferences.26 NGOs
can encourage local political processes that support democracy with the
purpose to strengthen civil society in general, without becoming partisan in
a political party’s sense.27 Fostering such civil participation in the public
arena is essential for the health of democracy: it ensures the rights of free-
dom of thought and participation in public affairs in harmony with the ra-
tional-legal structure of the State. It preserves the structure while it im-
proves it. Moreover, it allows an effective counterbalance against self-or-
iented bureaucracies that may undermine democracy. Such measures have
proven their efficiency by destroying the most powerful bureaucracy of
the 20th century: the Soviet Union.
As is well-known, the connection between socialism and democracy
seemed quite obvious in the years before the Russian Revolution. Marxist
thought regarded private control over the means of production as the rea-
son underpinning not only the capitalistic economic exploitation of the pro-
letariat but also its (capitalistic) ability to impose its interests upon politics.
Once the means of production changed to the hands of people, the same
would happen with political power, which would be the ‘rule of people’.28
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That would have been ‘fantastic’ for the proletariat if the Communist
Party, after assuming power, had not regarded governing a ‘science’ that
should be put in the hands of a skilled group of professionals capable of
implementing the required policies. After all, government being a complex
task, the sum of individual ignorance would not produce collective wisdom
through free elections, and the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ began.
However, one must note that the dictators were not proletarians, but skilled
people that composed a bureaucracy
Of course, appraising the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union
can demand a book in itself, but it is arguable that the Soviet empire was
undermined by the incapacity of its bureaucracy to comply with the cove-
nant established in 1917, especially in a context of liberalization and demo-
cratization. When Gorbachev became General Secretary, in 1988, he con-
vinced the Communist Party to hold elections for a new legislature to be
called the Congress of People's Deputies. The elections eventually replaced
important party officials with some critics of the Communist Party leader-
ship, hence allowing some fresh air in the political thought of the country.
In the following year, glasnost (openness) was introduced, together with
freedom of speech and publication. The path to democracy was paved.
With the breakdown of the centralized command economy, liberal winds
began to blow and at the end of the year the Berlin Wall fell together with
the Iron Curtain. How could such a bureaucratic stronghold fall without a
single shot having been fired? The answer is not simple, but democracy
surely has played a key role.
Since then, democracy has become the political orthodoxy, and some are
tempted to say, the political religion of the West.29 But, as we have seen,
democracy is a method and if it is the only existing remedy to protect the
abstract States and respective covenants with their nations against the ill-
nesses caused by self-oriented bureaucracies, then it is important to ap-
praise what instruments are at our disposal. The parliament is the classical
antibiotic, but it is loosing effectiveness. For that reason, it is important to
enhance the performance of the immunological system with a new, fourth
generation of ‘participatory rights’. McDougal and Reisman argued that
‘The core demand for the availability of genuine individual partici-
pation [in public affairs] may be made comprehensively explicit in
an overriding policy of inclusivity.’30
NGOs have evidenced that are structures capable to increase political den-
sity in societies, fostering the plurality of ideas and debate, exercising over-
sight and monitoring the bureaucracy. As affirmed by Lindahl, ‘who is af-
fected and what is the problem to be solved are matters of substance that
require deliberation, yet deliberation cannot kick off without a prior deter-
mination of the members and the problem of the deliberative body.’31 If
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democratic governance requires continuous improvement, then it is neces-
sary to appraise who is taking the decisions, a task that necessarily drives
us to the bureaucracy.
7.3 The concept of Bureaucracy: the contractual arrangement
operator
States, as abstract bodies, cannot operate by themselves. They need to be
structured, and for that purpose, together with the creation of the modern
State, bureaucracy flourished. Hegel’s aforementioned admiration of the
Napoleonic restructuring of France was not senseless. His homeland
Prussia was living under a feudal regimen of several principalities, and for
that reason, in his Philosophy of Right, he dedicated considerable efforts to
justifying the desirability of a ‘universal’ class of civil servants to provide
the organic character of a legal order, the State, in Germany, sowing the
seed that would later grow in Weber’s work and definitively blossom in
the intergovernmental organizations, a quintessential (however stateless)
bureaucracy. Weber once wrote that
‘Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic
type of administrative organization is, from a purely technical point
of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is
in this sense formally the most rational known means of carrying
out imperative control over human beings.’32
When Weber wrote his seminal book on the economic and social order, he
was impacted by the transformations that were occurring in Russia and,
particularly, in Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. He was un-
able to foresee that the rational-legal machinery that he had so precisely
conceptualized would develop in his homeland to such an extent that it
would be able to bureaucratically control the murder of millions of people,
including German citizens, as described by Hannah Arendt.33
However, his perception of the power of bureaucracies is noteworthy:
when asked how those subjected to bureaucratic control could seek to es-
cape from its apparatus, he answered that this would happen ‘normally’ by
their establishing an organization of their own, which would be equally
subjected to the process of bureaucratization! Although apparently outra-
geous, hir assertion has found an echo in reality: when a large group of
people decide to challenge the apparatus of one State, they create another
State; when a small group decides to do so, they create an NGO. In spite
of this, there is an aspect of Weber’s theory that cannot go unnoticed: the
undeniable purpose of bureaucracy is control, which is exercised on the ba-
sis of knowledge. He makes no reference to any other relevant purpose.
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Contemporarily, the rational-legal organicity of bureaucracy is defined in
the Constitutions of the States, which confer the necessary legitimacy to
put it in authority to operate the State. Considering, also, that the
Constitutions express the contractarian nature of the States, it follows that
bureaucracy is necessary to implement the Social Contract within the
States. However, giving life to an ‘organic body’ is always risky.
Straightforwardly, you know how you created it, but you often do not
know how to – or worse, cannot – control it. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right
postulated that the State (government) would have a pyramidal structure
whose components – the several offices - would be linked both vertically
and horizontally to form a unity or ‘singleness’ (§ 321) that would have
‘absolutely universal ends’ (§ 256). This would not be particularly a pro-
blem if he had not postulated that ‘the sphere of civil society passed over
into the State’ (§ 256) and had not discredited the self-determination of
people.34 By doing so, Hegel’s philosophy allowed, though it did not en-
courage, bureaucracy, a self-determining organism-like institution, to pur-
sue its own self-interests under the loose justification of the universal will
within the States. This could be observed, for instance, in the aforemen-
tioned reference to the Soviet Union.
In the next chapter we will see that bureaucracy managed to spread
widely throughout the international system, summing up more bodies (in-
tergovernmental organizations) than States, and living beyond them. One
cannot overlook some notable similarities with a famous fictional novel
written by one of Hegel’s contemporaries, the daughter of William
Godwin, the leading English theorist of the French Revolution, whose
main character trades domestic happiness for the chimaeras of scientific
power: Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus.35 Bureaucracy, thus,
must be controlled and this can be done only to the extent that people pos-
sess the power to enforce the fulfillment of the Social Contract entered into
with the States. It is only possible in democracy and, moreover, in those
democratic regimens that have adopted mechanisms of civil participation.
If civil society cannot hold States’ bureaucracies accountable for their deci-
sions, relying on loose controls established by the State itself,36 that control
will be just a formal, fictional and ineffective one.
Schumpeter said that
‘Revolution need not mean an attempt by a minority to impose its
will upon a recalcitrant people; it may mean no more than the re-
moval of obstructions opposed to the will of the people by outworn
institutions controlled by groups interested in their preservation’.37
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7.4 Adding a fourth building block to the emerging right to
democratic governance
If one talks about change, one may be thinking either of something becom-
ing something else (A => B) or of something changing internally (A ver-
sion 1.0 => A version 2.0). Lock noted that in the present-day debate on
political change, a widespread tendency has been occurring due to the un-
folding of the liberal-democratic ideology and some of its elements, indivi-
dualism, rationalism and anti-dogmatism.38
Individualism is a key element in liberal thought. The more individual
freedoms a given regimen has, the more liberal it is; the more sovereign
the people, the more liberal the State. It follows that liberal individualism
is expressed in the realm of law in the form of fundamental freedoms and
rights and democratic participation in the decision-making processes of
public affairs. In the international law, it is also possible, because, as we
have observed, individuals possess primary international legal personality.
The other element, rationalism, finds an echo in the pursuit of constant
progress and efficient use of resources. The more organized the State, the
keener it will be to progress. Therefore, a rational-legal structure that re-
spects individual rights and contributes to the achievement of their final
ends is liberal par excellence. But, as we have noted, being rational is not
enough, it is necessary to be democratic. Economic progress requires inde-
pendent-minded technical workforces and it is incompatible with the politi-
cal censorship encountered in oppressive regimens. The more a certain
economy is developed, the more it requires a skilled middle class to run its
businesses and (the more) this middle class demands its political rights.
The third element invokes the negation of dogmas, a concept with ori-
gins in religious thought and that can be defined as an irrevocable doctrine
revealed by God that, once and for all, settles a question or a problem that
concerns faith or morals.39 The transposition of this concept to political
thought implies necessarily in adjustments. When one argues that liberal-
ism is anti-dogmatic, it is not with the intention of considering it ‘heretic’,
but rather it means to say that it does not accept unquestionable truths. Is
this true? We can hardly say so, because liberal ideology regards the idea
of fundamental freedoms as something that it is not negotiable, because it
is innate to human beings. When Franck affirmed that ‘self-determination
postulates the right of a people organized in an established territory to de-
termine its collective political destiny in a democratic fashion’,40 he did so
supported in a right arisen out of Natural Law, which, according to
Aquinas, ‘is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation in the
eternal law’.41 Liberal thought, hence, is anti-dogmatic only to the extent
that it is capable of criticizing, transforming and replacing any structure or
theory that does not challenge the fundamental freedoms of individuals,
the core dogma of liberal thought.
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NGOs, for instance, are individualistic initiatives that often swing to-
and-fro between rationalism and dogmatism while dealing with States.
They are rational bodies, because they are organizations established by in-
dividuals under contractual arrangements to pursue a public interest objec-
tive and are always questioning models, theories and structures. But they
are also dogmatic when they justify the innate right of civil society to inter-
vene in public affairs.42
To add a fourth building block to the right to democratic governance, it
is necessary to remove ‘obstructions opposed to the will of the people by
outworn institutions’, which necessarily passes through the acceptance that
individuals possess legal personality in international law.
As pointed out by Grahame Lock,
‘Contractualism is of course a very old idea. But much newer – dat-
ing from the end of the Cold War – is the situation in which the
contractualist metaphor, posited as a generally valid picture of hu-
man society, hardly meets with any resistance.43
International law is a legal system arguably born from Natural Law and
liberalism that has recognized States as the representatives of people. Why
should it continue rejecting the idea that its ‘parents’ could give birth to
sibling liberal structures capable of fostering the fundamental freedoms of
men and of ensuring their lives, liberties and estates? Competition for
power and ‘parental’ preference?
Given that legal entities are commanded by people with feelings and as-
pirations, and that State’s official can, indeed, feel threatened by the close
NGOs’ scrutiny on their work, answering these questions would lead our
analysis away from the field of Law, which is not the purpose of this essay.
Nevertheless, it appears that change is needed. Evidence presented in the
previous chapters has shown that individuals do possess rights and obliga-
tions under international law, as are NGOs, private bodies created by those
same individuals to pursue their interests, supposedly protected and de-
fended by the contractualist metaphor.
We do not see NGOs, nor IGOs, competing with States. States are and
will remain the major actors in international law. If States possess the glo-
bal means and IGOs possess the knowledge to, jointly, ensure the Social
Contract, NGOs possess the capacity to make them accountable for their
acts and decisions and ensure plurality during their decision-making pro-
cesses. We are inclined to affirm that States represent their people only in
those situations in which the representation is carried out by freely elected
representatives. Considering that diplomatic corpses are members of bu-
reaucracy, hence not elected, the argument that they democratically repre-
sent their countrymen lacks empirical evidence. When Franck presented
his building-block theory on the right to democratic governance, he
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focused on democratic elections, which imply in choosing hundreds of
thousands of peoples’ representatives to the parliaments around the world
and, comparably, a handful of Heads of State in presidential republics. But,
as is well-known, national parliaments do not act at the international level
- a domain reserved to the Head of Government - neither does there exist a
world parliament. Even Heads of Government have a limited role in inter-
national affairs, mostly concentrated in the hands of diplomats and other
bureaucrats, following that the major condotieri of international affairs
does not have, themselves, a democratic pedigree.
If one compares NGOs to international bureaucracy, remarkable differ-
ences will be observed. International NGOs, for instance, have strong sup-
porters around the world. The few examples mentioned in the Preliminary
Chapter evidence that they can reach millions of supporters in dozens of
countries. These civil society roots imply in transparency and accountabil-
ity, mostly because NGOs traditionally depend on private funding. If indi-
viduals are not satisfied with the performance of a given NGO, they will
not contribute to it nor volunteer to participate in its activities, and the en-
tity will suffer. Of course, one can argue that NGOs’ transparency and ac-
countability is not that good and that it demands improvement. Yes, it is
right, and, fortunately, such criticism evidences the strength of NGOs: the
more an organization represents and is relevant for civil society, the more
it is scrutinized. No one would care about accountability if representative-
ness were not at stake. These are the two sides of the same coin. This dua-
lity is the very reason for NGO criticism to State’s and IGO’s lack of trans-
parency and accountability, or, in more common words, ‘democratic defi-
cit’. If they are in charge of delivering ‘services’ to people, they have to be
held accountable. We shall resume this issue in the conclusion of our
study.
One could say that the conception of a ‘good government’ is somewhat
‘consumer-led’: customers and voters are sovereign. If companies should
live and die by market competition, governments should likewise rise and
fall by popular judgment of their performance.44 This often happens when
people go to the polls, but, as we have mentioned formerly, the programs
of political parties are almost the same and the change of the Head of State
does not represent a huge variation in the State’s route in an apparently
universal liberal environment. Moreover, the State is in the hands of bu-
reaucracy, a permanent staff that is barely affected by the polls.
Bureaucracy often claims that NGOs were not elected by the people. In
a narrow interpretation of an ‘election’ as a cyclical democratic process
where people go to the polls to choose representatives within a set of can-
didates, this is unequivocally true. But, if one interprets elected as sup-
ported by a large group of people, the result will be different.
The CCPR (article 25), for instance, ensured to every citizen, without
distinctions of any kind and without unreasonable restrictions, the right
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and opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or
through freely chosen representatives. If the CCPR ensured the right to di-
rect participation in public affairs, which can be performed by freely cho-
sen representatives, without unreasonable restrictions, then, international
law does not impose any limitations whatsoever that such participation be
carried out through NGOs. Hence, it appears to be beyond a doubt that
there is legal space to add a fourth block in the emerging right to public
governance: the participation of NGOs, as subjects of law, in international
organizations.45
Some aspects of the international legal personality of NGOs have been
addressed in the previous chapters: they have consultative rights ensured
by treaties; they can participate in international conferences under custom-
ary law and have legal standing, as claimants, before certain international
courts and can participate, through amicus briefs, in some other situations.
Some of them, such as the IUCN, have achieved more rights than others
and one of them, the ICRC, has a widely recognized international legal
condition. Similarly, we have demonstrated that individuals possess inter-
national legal personality according to the understanding of representative
contemporary legal doctrine, which acknowledged the remarkable changes
in international law since World War II. Moreover, we saw that the CCPR
ensured to individuals the right to participate in public affairs as well as
the widespread democracy provided the adequate environment for the exer-
cise of that right. Therefore, individuals in general, and NGOs in particular,
cannot continue to be regarded as objects dispossessed of international le-
gal personality. States, IGOs and NGOs perform different, but complemen-
tary roles, in international law and for that purpose they all must have an
international personality, although with different legal capacities, a theme
that, in regard to NGOs, we will return to in the ensuing chapters. All of
them have been created to help people to live their lives and enjoy their
liberties and estates in a peaceful and democratic environment. It is, as
usual, always important to remember the thoughts of Lauterpacht, who re-
garded the individuals as the real subjects of international duties and
rights.
Democracy necessarily requires the engagement of several constituencies
presenting their opinions and debating the issue at stake, and for that pur-
pose, parliaments were created, but they are not the only form of doing
this. Plurality is essential. Furthermore, States are not just a matter of de-
bate; they have to act and deliver services to the nation. That is the role of
the Executive, and, in particular, of bureaucracy. So, there are times when
debate has to be replaced by action. But action depends on decisions,
which, in turn, depend upon legitimate authority and comprehensive debate
over the options, means and consequences at stake. This reminds us of an
anecdote about a president who had called a cabinet meeting to discuss a
relevant issue. During the long meeting he listened quietly to the opinions
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of all his ministers to finally say: ‘Thank you ladies and gentlemen. The
meeting is over. Now I will decide.’
We think that democratic governance is all about that: the State has to
listen, but it has to decide alone. It can share the debate, but not the deci-
sion, because the State will always be ultimately accountable for the out-
come. Hence, the participation of NGOs in the international realm, together
with States and IGOs, does not imply in giving them decision-making
power, but rather, in safeguarding their participatory power and plurality.
The traditional doctrine regarded the States as the only subject of law, but
there has always been a wide discrepancy between this verbal doctrine and
practice in the international arenas: while the organized ones tended to set
up rigid requirements for participation, the unorganized – and sometimes
most effective - ones have not. However, since 1945, the trend has clearly
moved toward broader participation.46
The NGOs’ role is to enhance the debate with different points of view,
concerns and alternative models, qualifying the decision that will be made
by the States and IGOs bureaucracy. However, participatory rights are not
enough, because NGOs are closer to the people than any of the States and
IGOs. The improvement of the right to democratic governance requires ac-
cess to information with the purpose of holding those who have made the
decision or executed them, accountable for their performance.
Accountability may be defined as the scrutiny of actions and perfor-
mance of those who hold power. It can be carried out by the public in gen-
eral or by specialist institutions, such as NGOs with direct or indirect man-
date granted by the public. We consider direct mandate those situations
where a close contractual-like relationship between principals and an agent
exists, such as the IUCN toward its own members and the contracting-
states in regard to the compliance of the substantive Secretariat of the
Ramsar Convention. The indirect mandate, in the same case, is toward the
people at large.
States, IGOs and NGOs are somehow representatives of the primary
subjects of international law, the individuals, in the international sphere
and, for that reason, to understand the possible development of the role of
NGOs under international law, it seems appropriate to appraise the role of
their more recent next-of-kin, IGOs.
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CHAPTER 8
Legitimacy of Intergovernmental Organizations
8.1 IGOs’ rising number and importance
In the opening phrase of his book, Bowett affirmed that the development
of intergovernmental organizations is, primarily, a response to practical
needs, rather than to the philosophical or ideological appeal of the notion
of global development.1 Schermers and Blokker support the same rationale,
stating that the interdependence of States has led to international solutions,2
being followed by Amerasinghe, who affirmed that the birth of such orga-
nizations was a response to the imperative need to regulate the relations be-
tween the peoples of different countries.3 The baseline of their assertions
appears to be a State’s perceived need to find solutions to growing com-
mon problems of their populations that could not be solved on an indivi-
dual basis. To achieve the desired outcome, States understood that they
had to delegate certain attributions comprised within their national self-reg-
ulatory powers to a new kind of body that had until then not existed: inter-
governmental organizations (IGOs).
It cannot go unnoticed that this situation resembles the decanted ‘state
of nature’ hypothesis, which supports some theories on the creation of the
State. Of course, despite some striking similarities – a prior state of confu-
sion in which everyone acts individually to access common concerns and
further delegation of power to an established ‘collective’ legal entity –
there is one marked and undisputed difference: States have not created a
Super-State, even if we do have the UN in mind. Rather, they have created
IGOs to organize their lives and, consequently, the lives of the nations they
represent. Could this inference be considered reasonable? Would it be pos-
sible for us to unravel our appraisal from any philosophical or ideological
aspects to concentrate on the operational effectiveness of these
organizations?
Before answering these questions, it seems appropriate to identify how
many organizations have been created to face up to the challenges imposed
to the nations of our so-called ‘global village’. But, at this point, a problem
arises. The scholars aforementioned adopt different figures. Bowett and
Amerasinghe rely on the same source of information, the Yearbook of
International Organizations, but reach different final figures, with the for-
mer affirming that there are 1,839 IGOs4 while the latter supports that it is
unlikely that 5,131 IGOs exist, but that there could be more than 232, to
conclude, through conjecturing, that the final quantity is probably between
500 and 700,5 a number that is taken up by Blokker and Schermers as the
best estimate available.6 Barnett and Finnemore, also relying on the same
source, have found ‘at least’ 238 IGOs.7
The difficulty to reach an accurate record of the number of organizations
created by the fewer than 200 States unveils the challenges imposed to in-
ternational law when it abandons the rather parochial physical boundaries
of single-headed States to enter into the realm of the global intangible is-
sues of a multi-faceted society and anticipates the enormous challenge in
dealing with NGOs and other non-state actors.
When the first IGOs were created in the 19th century, they aimed to pro-
vide the States with a permanent body capable of dealing with recurrent
pluri-national practical needs which were being dealt with by ad hoc inter-
national conferences, such as rivers (the Rhine, Elbe, Douro, Po and
Pruth), railway transportation, and telegraphy and postal communications.
The advent of such a type of organization demonstrates its rather pragmatic
purpose of facilitating commercial interaction between the various States.
A Grotian conception of a community of nations was, hence, not at sight;
practical needs demanded the creation of IGOs, which were capable of im-
posing uniform rules and standards on several matters such as metrics and
railway gauges. Due to their ‘private’ orientation, they were not regarded
as capable of threatening the core of the States’ sovereignty, even if we
consider that the International Office of Public Health, established in 1907
with the purpose of implementing sanitary protection in shipping, could
impose quarantines and fines for breach of its rules.
However, the proliferation of these disarticulated solution-oriented orga-
nizations has created a ‘gear’ problem. The first attempt to solve it in-
volved concentrating their co-ordination in the League of Nations,8 which
proved unsuccessful due to the overall failure of the organization and its
incapability to effectively coordinate the organizations amidst its political
concerns. Nevertheless, this unfruitful experience illustrates the difficulties
that can arise when technical issues are submitted to political and diplo-
matic bodies. Furthermore, these difficulties can be considerably greater if
the coordinating body is entrusted to overview multiple organizations with
several adjacent or, even more troublesome, overlapping agendas. The
aforementioned proliferation of IGOs evidences that. In Chapter 2, we ap-
praised the multiplicity of the so-called focal points of the UN in dealing
with NGOs: seven, in the ‘mother-IGO’ alone!
When the UN was created, some of the former ‘technical’ organizations
already in existence were transferred to the coordination of the newly-born
universal entity, being later joined by some other specialized agencies, pro-
grammes and funds, summing up nearly forty different bodies today.9
Considering that the States are not obliged to deposit the texts of the
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treaties that they have entered into before the UN or any other centralizing
body to make them legally binding and effective, and that States are free
to create bilateral or multilateral entities for whatever purpose they deem
convenient or necessary, giving them international legal personality, sur-
prisingly no one really knows how many IGOs exist today.10 In spite of
this, one can identify one of them due to the common features that they
share: they are subjects of international law created by treaty and with a
governing body capable of expressing an autonomous will distinct from
that of its members, States and other IGOs, and of adopting norms ad-
dressed to them.11 Another relevant and virtually unanimous characteristic
of IGOs is the existence of a Secretariat, a bureaucratic staff created to ful-
fill the tasks assigned to the organization.
If the creation of IGOs resembles some characteristics of the hypothesis
of the creation of States, the features mentioned have marked similarities
with NGOs too, to which we can add others: they are not unique in their
field and they are voluntarily created by several constituencies to address a
specific matter without territorial limitations. IGOs, similarly to NGOs,
also have a substantive liberal character, not only because they have been
created mostly by Western States under a voluntary and contractual man-
ner, but especially because they promote liberal values, either in the field
of political ideas - such as human rights and democracy – or in economics,
supporting the virtues of the market and capitalism. Hence, despite the ap-
parent operational aim of the IGOs, they actually express a liberal ideol-
ogy. Their marked voluntarism and contractarianism also evidence their
embedment in the classical theory of the formation of the State.
Given these aspects, our research suggests that IGOs necessarily play a
twofold role: they provide an efficient bureaucracy to cope with contem-
porary challenges (either by executing programs or developing new regula-
tions in matters of their concern and also offer a locus for dialogue be-
tween the leading actors of international relations - the States - and new ac-
tors of increasing economic and social importance, such as multinational
enterprises and NGOs. By doing so, the IGOs congregate some characteris-
tics of both the Executive and Legislative branches of domestic governing
structures. As a bureaucracy, they plan and implement; as a locus open to
dialogue under diverse schemes, such as conferences, consultative status,
seminars and assemblies, they may allow a pluralistic debate, thus exercis-
ing part of the tasks of the parliament missing at the international level.
If the authority of the States is underpinned by the successful monopoly
of the legitimate use of physical force within their territories and, for that
purpose, they seek that legitimacy by virtue of legality, i.e., ‘by virtue of
the belief in the validity of legal statute and functional competence based
on rationally created rules’,12 the authority of an IGO, which lacks the use
of force as well as a territory to control, relies, firstly, on the specialized
knowledge and administrative competence of its bureaucracy. This aspect
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is relevant: if, at the national level, bureaucracy depended on the theoreti-
cal construction of the State to flourish within its limits, at the international
level, bureaucracy can prescind from the classical attributes of statehood –
territory, people and sovereignty - and gain life beyond them to make
authoritative decisions affecting all territories, all people and all sovereign
states, without the monopoly of force. Additionally, if we bear in mind that
the direct (member states) and the indirect (civil society at large) constitu-
encies have little influence on the daily activities of the organizations,
which were left in the hands of the bureaucracy, their strength is even more
acknowledgeable. However, despite the effective support in international
law, the authority of IGOs also depends upon an effective transparency of
activities and plurality in their decision-making process. As pointed out by
Klabber, contemporary legal research on IGOs does not assume that they
are ‘inherently good’, often assuming a critical approach.13 These aspects
impose to IGOs some rising challenges, which will be addressed hereafter.
8.2 IGOs’ rising challenges
8.2.1 The first challenge: Social Contract compliance
The widespread adoption of a Weberian civil service by a prolific number
of international organizations has led to a subtle shift in the perception of
State sovereignty in the wording of multilateral treaties. If at the end of the
19th century, States were referred to as ‘Powers’ represented by ‘plenipo-
tentiaries’, now they are ‘Parties’ or ‘Members’ with ‘representatives’.
Although it did not represented a State’s capitis diminutio being, hence, ap-
parently irrelevant per se, this shift evidences a rising tension between the
formal independence of States and their actual interdependence in a world
where multilateral organizations are occupying a growing political and nor-
mative space and where States have had to co-operate to cope with issues
that were commonly administered satisfactorily at the national level.
History has shown that States always engage in major adjustments of in-
ternational law when they realize their gross failure to comply with the
‘Social Contract’ they have entered into with the Nations they represent: in
1648, after the carnage of the Thirty Years’ War, which involved practi-
cally all of Western Europe, the Peace of Westphalia brought to light the
concept of State sovereignty; in 1919, after the massacre of World War I,
the Treaty of Versailles established the League of Nations and, finally, in
1945, the UN was created, after a death toll of nearly forty million people
in the six years of a global war. The adoption of a worldwide network of
bureaucracies appears to be the last attempt to comply with the established
Social Contract. When the UN was established, the member-states agreed
on the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, compe-
tence, and integrity in the employment of the staff and in the determination
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of the conditions of service of the organization.14 By doing so, the States,
which had always had their internal bureaucracies, created a supra-national
bureaucracy to ‘maintain international peace and security’ and to ‘develop
friendly relations among nations’. Not coincidentally, these purposes have
always been at the core of the Natural Law tradition that regarded men as
having an innate inclination to live peacefully according to certain rational
rules15 and, moreover, in the justification of the classical Social Contract
theory.16
Legally speaking, the UN and all other IGOs have the duty to comply
with that Social Contract, enshrined in different manners in their statutes.
For example, while the UN has the purpose to ‘maintain peace and secur-
ity’, the WHO follows principles ‘basic to the happiness, harmonious rela-
tions and security of all peoples’, the ILO promotes ‘decent work through-
out the world’ and the IMF works to ‘foster global monetary cooperation’
and ‘to reduce the poverty in the world’, just to quote a few of them. To
achieve these goals globally, IGOs were put ‘in authority’, i.e., were em-
powered by international law to cope with the issues needed to comply
with the Social Contract. By providing them with a qualified staff, the
States aimed to turn each of them into ‘an authority’ in their respective
fields of competence. This dual role provided IGOs with powerful tools
and allowed them to make authoritative decisions in virtually any matter
affecting the lives of people.
Bureaucracy is usually seen as something aseptic. It is expected to act
rationally, impartially and technically. These characteristics fit perfectly in
international law, a normative system expected to bring order to the society
to maximize its common good.17 However, as affirmed by Rosalyn
Higgins, this system is not a static set of rules, rather ‘a continuing process
of authoritative decisions’18 – hence, paralleling the continuous process of
self-determination - that considers accumulated past decisions and their ori-
ginal context, as well as their application in the current context where a de-
cision has to be made. Once the context has changed, those who make de-
cisions must make choices between claims that have varying degrees of
merit.19 This is substantively observed in international bureaucracy. Given
their liberal roots, IGOs often choose the most liberal option in sight, such
as the IMF and World Bank recommendations of liberal economic mea-
sures to Latin American countries after the 1980s foreign debts crisis – the
so-called Washington Consensus - and the UNHCHR working to increase
knowledge and raise awareness about fundamental freedoms. Hence, the
establishment of a rational-legal structure with liberal ideals in a wide array
of intergovernmental bodies ensured the consolidation of capitalism and
democracy as the central components of world culture,20 moreover after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, which leads us to the conclusion that one
must expect an IGO’s rational, impartial and technical decision-making to
be within the boundaries of liberal thought. As pointed out by Barnett and
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Finnemore, ‘rationalization has given IGOs their basic form (as bureaucra-
cies), and liberalism has provided the social content that all IGOs now pur-
sue’.21 Human rights and democracy are Western’s core goals and values
and are ‘generously’ being made available to the people of the world by
IGOs that act as missionaries for democracy. However, they cannot be sol-
diers of democracy to impose, by force, democracy to other nations, be-
cause a greater international good than democracy, is pluralism and
freedom.22
While IGOs share a common root with States, they also do so with
NGOs. In the former case, the identity relies on the exercise of delegated
attributes of State sovereignty; in the latter, they share contractual and vo-
luntary origins to address themes beyond territorial boundaries. And all
three types of organizations share the same purpose to fulfill the Social
Contract with the original constituencies, the individuals. It follows that
the symbiotic relationship between IGOs and NGOs, addressed in Chapter
2, has come to stay, for IGOs and NGOs are peers that share the same
ideals, social roots and operating structures. Not without reason, the settled
practice of interaction between the two types of bodies through consulta-
tive arrangements has evolved into customary international law, as pointed
out in Chapter 4.
Notwithstanding, complying with the Social Contract is no easy task.
IGOs have to deal with multiple pressures from NGOs, multinational enter-
prises and other forces of civil society at large. They are also pressured by
States, which are bound by the Social Contract, too. If IGOs are amidst the
so-called ‘North-South’ dispute, they also have to offer ‘social value’ for
the resources received from the States, seek that same value when they
sponsor NGO activities, and be accountable for what they have done, not
only procedurally but specially substantively. This situation leads to an-
other kind of challenge: transparency.
8.2.2 The second challenge: effective transparency
IGOs and NGOs share several common features and both suffer growing
pressure to reach greater accountability toward their stakeholders, which,
given their global agenda, comprise not only their inner circle of members,
financial supporters and staff, but also a wide outer circle, which includes
the communities where they are actually operating and, in the background,
civil society at large. But if a glass were to be so transparent to the point
that, while existing, no one could see it, the same occurs with information.
More important than the act of disclosure, information must be easily ac-
cessible and capable of providing useful data, not only about actual results,
but also about plans, strategies and goals, and decision-making procedures,
organized in such a way as to permit comparability.
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Transparency is intimately related to democracy, which, in turn, is embo-
died in the principle of self-determination of the peoples. If the nations, ac-
cording to the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
(CCPR), are free to pursue their economic, social and cultural development
and can dispose of their resources based upon the principle of mutual bene-
fit, having also the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, di-
rectly or through freely chosen representatives, they are also legally en-
titled to pursue a higher level of transparency from those who represent
them and manage resources on their behalf.
The necessary responsiveness to the needs, interests and expectative of
the citizens, as well, as the liberal accent of the CCPR suggest a right to
transparency. This would necessarily comprise access to the procedures
adopted during the decision-making process, i.e., the capacity to appraise
their compliance with the substantive rules on the matter; access to the
content of the decision; and the appraisal of its effectiveness in pursuing
goals consistent with the Social Contract. However, despite the pursued
co-existence of the aforementioned dimensions, evidence has shown that
the decision-making procedures are often opaque, the content of the deci-
sions are rather vague and succinct, and effectiveness is sometimes hin-
dered by procedural rules wisely established to protect those who decide.23
Bijsterveld has argued that the principle of transparency is an emerging
counterpart of the classical principle of legality.24 Legality, on one hand, is
at the core of liberal thought and represents a barrier of the individuals
against abusive acts of State. It classically encompassed the right to partici-
pate, often through parliaments, in the adoption of new rules, which were
expected to have generality and to be formulated in advance to any action
taken by the State. From an institutional dimension, the principle of legal-
ity is expressed in the definition of the formal structure of a legal entity, its
purposes and competences, its governing bodies, and its relationship with
its constituencies. One could say that it is embodied in the Statute of the
organization concerned. Straightforwardly, if, in a democratic regimen, leg-
ality is having the decision made correctly by the correct body aiming at
the correct purpose and the correct beneficiaries, transparency is allowing
anyone to see all this correctness at any time.
The UN Charter provided basic mechanisms of transparency, determin-
ing that the Secretary General, the Security Council and other organs shall
present annual reports to the General Assembly, which will also consider
and approve the budget of the organization and any financial and budget-
ary arrangements with specialized agencies, as well as examine the admin-
istrative budgets of such specialized agencies.25 Nevertheless, these me-
chanisms are markedly bureaucratic and limited. For example, the Charter
does not impose clear guidance on the content of the reports nor does it de-
termine that it must inform the rationale of the decision-making process or
even an appraisal of the context. Moreover, it does not impose any
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guideline for measuring the capacity of the staff to fulfill the aims of the
organization. Hence, the UN’s current transparency mechanisms could be
compared to the image observed in the rearview mirror of a car which is
being driven by a hopefully qualified chauffeur who purportedly knows
where the passengers want to go: They show the past, cannot help in fore-
seeing the future and do not provide any information about the rationale of
the decisions made by the driver.
Even if we consider that the General Assembly bears the capacity to de-
mand enhancement of the quality of the reports and the budgetary consid-
erations, it appears to be beyond any doubt that enhanced transparency is
not only desirable, but necessary, not only in the UN, but also in all of its
specialized agencies, funds and programmes, as well as in other intergo-
vernmental bodies with an international or regional scope.
From a financial perspective, in recent years the UN General Assembly
has adopted some resolutions to ensure better quality of information.
Worth quoting are the independence of internal oversight bodies,26 the
availability of internal audits to the General Assembly,27 and the adoption
of international accounting standards.28 Unfortunately, all these initiatives
have focused on a ‘business-like’ approach of financial expenditures and
have placed little importance on the quality of the information, with re-
gards to the goals of the organization. After all, if in a company the ‘end’
is money and the services are ‘means’, in an IGO, money is a ‘mean’ to
render services to achieve the statutory ‘ends’. Therefore, considering that
reports must access the achievement of the ends, the current ones possess a
gross misconception. A similar approach can be observed in other initia-
tives addressing whistleblower protection, the establishment of an Ethics
Office to appraise the conduct of the staff, and employees’ financial disclo-
sure policies.29 They are important, but are just instruments of control of
‘means’. Of course one cannot accept transparency as the simple publica-
tion of decisions in official gazettes and websites, auditing financial state-
ments and employment policies.30 It is far more than this.31
At the European level, a first noteworthy movement toward qualified
transparency can be observed in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which, in
amending the Treaty of the European Union, stated that the decisions
would be made ‘as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citi-
zen’.32 By doing so, the treaty recognized that transparency possessed a
two-fold dimension: access to information (openness) and civil participa-
tion (closeness). In a subsequent important movement toward enhanced
transparency in international organizations, the EC Commission released in
2001 a white paper on Governance proposing the adoption of five princi-
ples combined to form the basis of good governance: openness: the
European institutions should attach more importance to transparency and
communication in their decision-making; participation: citizens must be
more systematically involved in the drafting and implementation of
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policies; accountability: the role of each party in the decision-making pro-
cess needs to be clarified - each actor involved should then assume respon-
sibility for the role given to them; effectiveness: decisions need to be made
at the appropriate level and time, and deliver what is needed; and coher-
ence: the EU conducts extremely diverse policies which need to be pur-
sued coherently. 33 At the international level, major evidence of the intro-
duction of this perception of transparency into the realm of international
law is observed in the Aarhus Convention,34 addressed in Chapter 5.
When the aforementioned treaties established the right of access to infor-
mation, they understood that it was a necessary requirement for an effec-
tive democracy. It was linked to another expression of effective democracy:
access to the decision-making policy. One cannot be regarded as a true par-
ticipant if one has not had access to the same information as the other par-
ticipants. This participation does not represent, of course, the negation of
the State and the IGOs, or the replacement of representative democracy,
and much less their diminution. Rather, it represents enhanced accountabil-
ity of the States’ and IGOs’ acts toward their final constituencies, the
nations.
We can regard the increase in transparency as a natural outcome of the
democratic wave that has swept the world after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
It can also be acknowledged as skepticism toward the prolific (how many?)
international bureaucracies that often influence outcomes by manipulating
information, i.e., by releasing selected ‘processed’ information in order to
foster a given behavior, hindering other ones and, by doing so, shaping an-
other social model for the world. This is rather obvious if we consider their
liberal background and their capacity to adopt authoritative decisions and
recommendations because they are legally ‘in authority’ of the concerned
matter and possess a bureaucratic staff that could be regarded as ‘an
authority’ on the issue. The less they share, the more they shape.
Thus, the openness of information and the closeness of civil society in
the decision-making process may be regarded as a counterbalancing initia-
tive to those powers and an effective contribution to the reduction of the
democratic deficit of IGOs, which, albeit liberal, are, in regard to citizens,
undemocratic par excellence. The importance of transparency in the deci-
sion-making process for the strength of public confidence in the interna-
tional institutions and their democratic nature was acknowledged by sev-
eral decisions made by the Court of First Instance.35 Transparency may
also add another feature to democracy: peace, the ultimate aim of the UN.
According to the former UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali,
‘la transparence des gouvernements démocratiques et l’obligation
qui leur est faire de render compte aux citoyens, généralement d’au-
tant moin désireux de fair la guerre qu’ils ont à en supporter les
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risques et le fardeau, peuvent aider à prévenir les conflits armés
avec dáutres Etats’.36
If transparency is important, one cannot lose sight of the fact that it is not
an end in itself, but just a means to appraise if the considered body or or-
ganization is on the correct path. Therefore, it has an instrumental role in
allowing individuals to monitor the performance of the States and IGOs.
Notwithstanding its importance, transparency cannot preclude a far more
relevant challenge imposed to IGOs: accountability.
8.2.3 The third challenge: Ends-oriented Accountability
In the previous chapter, we have appraised the power of bureaucracies and
their undeniable purpose to control civil society on the basis of knowledge.
So, how can people control the controllers? By making them widely ac-
countable for the decisions made and the results obtained. Holding bureau-
cracies accountable enables two relevant outcomes: it curbs bureaucracy’s
inherent centripetal tendency, i.e., its inclination to work for its own main-
tenance; and it permits the appraisal of its legally established purposes and
obligations. The strategy for democratic promotion necessarily must ad-
dress two complementary goals: strengthening change actors, and weaken-
ing veto players.37 The more individuals participate, the less the bureau-
cracy governs alone.
Theoretically, intergovernmental organizations possess derived interna-
tional legal personality, which they have been granted for the purpose of
achieving some ends clearly defined in their statutes. So, differently from
the classical Weberian civil service, which, comprised within the apparatus
of the State, had the purpose of controlling a people in a territory, the bu-
reaucracies of IGOs have been established as rational bodies with econom-
ic considerations: they must deliver a service to the States and to the
Nations that they represent. For that reason, it can be argued that they were
established as a special kind of principal-agent relationship under interna-
tional law where the States (the principals) hire the IGOs (the agents) to
pursue the interests (in terms of health, financial stability, human rights
protection, etc.) of the former.
It follows that the relationship is based necessarily on a contractual ar-
rangement, in this case represented by the constitution or statutes of the
IGOs and underpinning treaties or conventions, which, in turn, demand ne-
cessary evaluation of their performance. If one can say that the existence
of a Social Contract between peoples and their States is doubtful, it appears
undoubtedly certain that a covenant aiming to pursue the same ends as
those of the Social Contract exists between the States and the IGOs. Given
that a principal-agent agreement exists, it shall be potentially submitted to
the problem traditionally encountered in this kind of relationship, i.e., that
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the principal often does not know enough about whether or to what extent
the covenant has been satisfied. For that purpose, the establishment of legal
procedures capable of making IGOs accountable for their acts is essential.
In this particular aspect, the interests of States and civil society converge:
both desire to make IGOs accountable for their past and future actions and
decisions, for their planning, and for the verified outcome. The measure-
ment of their performance has two defined parameters: the statutory objec-
tive of the concerned organization or the purposes of the convention, and
the budgetary considerations. The more information that is shared, the less
the world is shaped by bureaucrats.
In the first section of this chapter we addressed the twofold role of
IGOs: they are organizations endowed with specific tasks to be performed
by bureaucrats; and they are a locus for dialogue between actors of interna-
tional relations with regard to common concerns to mankind, i.e., particular
aspects of the Social Contract. In both cases, transparency is deemed ne-
cessary and this tool was appraised in the previous section. However, one
can be transparent evidencing a tremendous success, displaying nothing re-
levant, or, even worse, presenting a gross failure. Thus, transparency at
large is not enough: it is necessary to qualify the information and the pro-
cedure of access in order to hold IGOs accountable for their performance
in fulfilling both roles.
The appraisal of the performance of IGOs according to the aforemen-
tioned parameters comports roughly two lines of work: (i) the fulfillment
of the objectives, plans and budgetary considerations of the organization
(the substantive dimension) and (ii) the fulfillment of the legal require-
ments (the legal dimension). Straightforwardly, it is important to evaluate
if they have done the right thing, in the right way. Holding IGOs accounta-
ble in their first role – as a task-oriented bureaucracy – appears to be an ea-
sier task. After all, they have been established to pursue a specific goal and
have been equipped with staff, money and legal capacity to do so, or, in
the words of the ICJ, ‘its members, by entrusting certain functions to it,
with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it with the com-
petence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged’.38
However, this may prove to not be so easy.
From the substantive dimension, the appraisal of their performance oc-
curs mainly at formal events, when the reports of the Secretariat are sub-
mitted to the member-states gathered in formal assemblies of short duration
and a long list of matters to cover, the topic usually being one of the last
items on the Agenda, falling under the depreciated generic heading of ‘or-
ganizational, administrative and other matters.’39 The reports, though large
documents, do not clearly define the actual achievements (ends), rather fo-
cusing on the activities (means).40 From the legal dimension, the Articles
on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts41 prepared by
the International Law Commission (ILC) focused only on States’
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responsibility, although making a general reference to IGOs in article 57,
when it stated that the ‘articles are without prejudice to any question of the
responsibility under international law of an international organization, or of
any state for the conduct of an international organization’. While the
UNGA Sixth Committee is currently working on the issue of ensuring the
accountability of UN staff and experts on mission with respect to criminal
acts committed in mission,42 there is no clear resolution, treaty or conven-
tion regulating, in general terms, the responsibility of IGOs and their
staff.43 Nevertheless, it is beyond any doubt that this lacunae does not enti-
tle IGOs to ‘violate the principles they were established to serve’.44
It follows that there is great room for improvement. Not coincidentally,
such enhancements are occurring through the interference of non-state ac-
tors, such as NGOs. In Chapter 2, for example, we briefly mentioned the
World Bank Inspection Panel. This (then) cutting-edge structure was estab-
lished in 1993 with the purpose to allow third parties to file complaints re-
garding the bank’s failure to follow its own policies and procedural re-
quirements of its projects.45 A similar structure, albeit focused on States’
failure to comply with environmental legislation, has been introduced by
the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC).46 In Chapter 3, we studied that NGOs can lodge complaints be-
fore the European Court of Justice to seek judicial protection against illegal
acts inflicted on them by Community institutions. However, apart from this
narrow opportunity, none of the existing international courts enjoys juris-
diction to hear complaints brought directly against international
organizations.
As we have mentioned, holding an entity accountable encompasses its
past and future actions and decisions. If inspection panels and claims be-
fore tribunals are valid instruments to appraise the past, they are not keen,
except from a ‘lessons-learned’ point of view, to (accurately) envision the
future. For this latter perspective, the reliance on the principal-agent rela-
tionship appears to provide the best channel for better IGO accountability,
albeit this channel is, in principle, open only to member-states.
Notwithstanding, if we take into consideration the second role of IGOs - a
locus for dialogue - new opportunities are visible.
From a general viewpoint, considering that IGOs operate worldwide and
are capable of affecting the lives of the entire society, consultative arrange-
ments with NGOs may play a relevant role. As we have seen, INGOs with
consultative status before the ECOSOC can submit written statements, as
well as participate in UN convened conferences. Similar opportunities are
ensured by the statutes, written rules and customary practices of several
other organizations. In Europe, IGOs have achieved improved rights, with
the recognition, in 2003, of their participatory status; in South America,
they participate in the MERCOSUR Social Economic Consultative Forum;
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in Africa, they have a seat in the ECOSOCC and in Asia, they are associ-
ates to the ASEAN.47
Considering that NGOs have access to the aforementioned IGO struc-
tures with a possibility to address the member-states that participate in the
collegiate and also interact with the bureaucracy of the mentioned organi-
zations, the existing channels can be used for compliance review and for
submission of proposals, interfering in the decision-making process and, in
addition, appraising the principal-agent relationship. In this aspect, it is im-
portant to take into consideration that, similarly to States, IGOs, as subjects
of international law, are bound by jus cogens and customary international
law,48 which recognize the inalienable right of people to several economic
and human rights and fundamental freedoms, including political liberty to
participate in public affairs, the utmost purpose of the Social Contract. For
that reason, better governance is desirable.
8.3 A pressing requirement: Democratic Governance
The word ‘democracy’ is not mentioned in the UN Charter nor is it for-
mally required as one of the criteria for admission of new member-states.
In 1948, in its very first advisory opinion, the ICJ concluded that the ad-
mission of new member-states could not depend on conditions not ex-
pressly provided by the Charter.49 Hence, despite the liberal roots of inter-
national law, democracy was not regarded as a necessary condition to join
the UN. Interestingly, several NGOs which were active at the San
Francisco conference supported the idea, basing their argument on realpoli-
tik, by stating that ‘a union of democratic states might find itself con-
fronted by a union of non-democratic states; and recent history has shown
that a union of like-minded states of a certain mind may lead to union of
like-minded states of another mind’.50
The UN is a universalistic organization whose history has evidenced that
it has made room for liberal and non-liberal states, treating them equally,
regardless of their political or social ideology, size or population. By doing
so, it was capable of congregating opposite sides during the Cold War and
several real wars. But as time goes by, seeds flourish and walls fall. Things
have to change once the context has changed. Currently, the UN is effec-
tively engaged in building democratic governance throughout the world,
supporting several initiatives in parliamentary development, the electoral
system and processes, e-governance and access to information to promote
citizens’ participation in public affairs, public administration reform and
anti-corruption, mostly through the UNDP, supported by budgetary re-
sources and also additional ones, gathered through the Democratic
Governance Thematic Trust Fund, established in 2001.
LEGITIMACY OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 263
If there is a ‘global acceptance of democracy as a universal value’51 and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has enunciated the essentials
of democracy, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
(CCPR) has ensured to any citizen the right to take part in the conduct of
public affairs directly or through freely chosen representatives. IGOs are
engaged in public affairs, but their bureaucrats were not freely chosen. The
CCPR must be applied in the realm of IGOs.
At the international level, the consultative rights ensured to NGOs, their
participation in conferences, locus standi before certain Tribunals and qua-
si-judicial bodies and authorization to submit amicus briefs in third parties
cases and the participation in decision-making processes under certain trea-
ties represent unequivocal evidence that democratic participation is largely
recognized by international law. Similarly, several ICJ decisions, studied in
Chapter 3, evidence a wide array of recognition that individuals possess
rights under international law, which, it is worth stating, were not granted
by the States or the IGOs, but deeply embedded in Natural Law.
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, peoples have the right of self-determina-
tion, hence it follows that they possess the inherent right to interact with
other peoples, doing so through the States. Considering that the States have
created the IGOs with the purpose to comply with several attributions that
were comprised in their own responsibilities toward their citizens, it neces-
sarily appears that citizens have an inherent right to have some kind of par-
ticipation in the governance of IGOs. We may say so because the ultimate
purpose of the IGOs is to satisfy the peoples’ needs and, therefore, they
are held accountable not only to the direct constituencies – member-states
– but also to their (States) own constituencies, the people. Furthermore, as
we pointed out in the previous section, States and people have converging
interests in the matter: both want to appraise the effectiveness of the activ-
ities performed by the IGOs: the States, because they are the financial sup-
porters and will be held ultimately responsible for any failure, not only
covering any financial costs related to that failure, but moreover, the inher-
ent political costs; the people at large, because they are the ultimate benefi-
ciaries of those actions. If both States and people have motives and means
to enhance the governance of IGOs, this suffices to promote changes.
Strengthening the governance of IGOs will not imply in any weakening
of State sovereignty. Recent studies have shown that States are still strong
and adapted to new world circumstances.52 Statehood remains a top prior-
ity for those peoples struggling for their self-determination. IGOs will not
replace States nor resuscitate, as rulers, the empires buried in history. Not
even the ‘multi-level governance’ which establishes direct contact between
the European and the infra-national levels of government, thus bypassing
the monopoly of central governments in the international arena, has been
capable of removing their prominence in defining EU spending.53
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However, that is not to say that States and IGOs cannot be more open to
civil society. The almost unanimous conversion of States’ economies into
capitalist practices and the growing adoption of liberal democracy through-
out the world claim a higher level of citizen participation in the policy de-
cision-making of IGOs and this can be done with the help of NGOs.
Pluralism is critical. As pointed out by Schermers and Blokker, interest
groups, such as NGOs, have some right of initiative in decision-making in
those organizations in which they possess a consultative status. The proce-
dure ensures that matters of particular concern to NGOs will receive at
least some attention from the considered organization.54
It is beyond any doubt that the end of the Cold War and the movement
of States towards liberal democracies have changed the context in which
international law and IGOs, in particular, have been conceived. As stated
by Rosalyn Higgins, if law, as rules, requires the application of outdated
and inappropriate norms, then law as a process, encourages interpretation
and choice, which is more compatible with the values one seeks to pro-
mote and the objectives one seeks to achieve.55 If contemporary society
values pluralist democracy, then greater involvement of civil society in
IGOs is not only desirable, but necessary to achieve the ultimate ends of
the Social Contract established with the States.
We do not see such an integration as outrageous, because the IGO pro-
file parallels, to some extent, the same legal regimen observed by NGOs:
Intergovernmental Organization Non-Governmental Organization
Created by written agreement (Treaty) Created by written agreement (type varies
according to the country)
Entity governed by a statute and with
public interest aims, focusing on a group
of constituencies broader than its creators
Entity governed by a statute with public
interest aims, focusing on a group of
constituencies broader than its creators
Creators become members. New members
can be admitted, if accepted by the current
ones
Creators become members. New members
can be admitted, if accepted by the current
ones.
The IGO has a legal personality distinct
from its members and both are generally
governed by the same legal system
(international law)
The NGO has a legal personality distinct
from its members and both are generally
governed by the same legal system
(municipal law)
Members make decisions in assemblies, by
vote (often by majority)
Members make decisions in assemblies, by
vote (often by majority)
The IGO has a governing body capable of
making distinct decisions from that of its
members, thus not being capable of
binding them.
The NGO has a governing body capable of
making distinct decisions from that of its
members, thus not being capable of
binding them.
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These features make it clear that IGOs and NGOs have similar structures
and are governed by the same rationale: they are legal bodies voluntarily
created by their members to pursue public interest goals for the benefit of
a wider array of constituencies. However, in some other aspects, they are
materially different:
Intergovernmental Organization Non-Governmental Organization
Generally, ‘self governed’ by its own
constitutive acts. Customary international
law and general principles of law also apply
Extensively regulated by written municipal
law
Entity with privileges and immunities at the
national level
No similar privileges and immunities at the
national level (except some tax benefits)
We believe that the widely acceptance of pluralist democracy as the best
form of government throughout the world authorizes adding a fourth build-
ing block to the right to democratic governance. The similarities between
IGOs and NGOs provide a good opportunity for that. However, in order to
make such arrangements effective, it is necessary to re-arrange the form by
which the IGOs recognize relevant international NGOs. If NGOs can bear
rights and obligations under international law, it is necessary to acknowl-
edge their international legal personality. If they represent an expression of
the right of people to participate directly or indirectly in public affairs, then
new forms of interaction must be established. If the social contract is to be
fulfilled, then democratic governance and transparency, as means to hold
States and IGOs accountable, are essential. These challenges will be ad-
dressed in the next, conclusive, chapter.
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CONCLUSION
NGOs, Legitimate Subjects of International Law
McDougal, Laswell and Reisman wrote, back in 1969, that
‘It is correctly common to characterize the 19th century as the era of
the nation-state and the 20th century as the era of the intergovern-
mental organization. Posterity may characterize our period as the re-
nascent of the individual.’1
At the beginning of this 21st century, the individual appears to occupy the
central stage of international law. Never before, in the history of
Humankind, have people possessed so many rights and freedoms opposa-
ble to sovereign States. If democracy is currently the major political regi-
men of the world, it is a fact that parliament is no longer the only legiti-
mate channel available for the expression of the views, claims and opinions
of individuals. Bernard Manin, for instance, has argued that the media has
replaced parliament as the locus for public debate, an affirmation appar-
ently confirmed by the special attention that politicians currently devote to
media training and opinion surveys. Of course, the widespread use of in-
struments of communication with the masses necessarily drives our atten-
tion to the ideas of Ortega y Gasset and the risks to democracy and indivi-
dual liberty portrayed in his Rebelión de las Massas (1930) if the society
were to end up dominated by masses of mediocre and indistinguishable in-
dividuals. But, if national parliaments are no longer capable of dealing
with the complexities of contemporary globalized life and, in turn, the in-
ternational sphere does not possess a parliament-like institution, how will
society be able to cope with the challenges of ensuring pluralist democracy
in the 21st century, with 193 interdependent nation-states and 6 billion
people?
Some authors have argued that in a world with fragile national borders
and rising interdependence, the sovereign nation-states, as we know of
them nowadays, would come to an end. Ali Khan, for example, supports
their replacement by a ‘Free State’, a kind of transposition, at the global le-
vel, of the administrative model that is observed within unitary countries
(such as France), where internal divisions would be established for admin-
istrative purposes.2 Others, such as Hedley Bull, support that States will
disappear and will be replaced by a neo-medieval world governmental
system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty, similar to the one that
existed in Western Christendom during the Middle Ages.3 The fragility of
the State may be appraised from another perspective: pluralism. Michael
Reisman, for example, supports that undemocratic governments lack the le-
gitimacy to participate fully in the international community, hence, author-
izing foreign intervention to restore democracy.4 Following along the same
line of thought, Anne Marie Slaughter rejects the long-established equality
among States to declare that ‘the most distinctive aspect of liberal interna-
tional relations theory is that it permits, indeed mandates, a distinction
among different types of states based on their domestic political structure
and ideology’.5 Both authors, in their vehement defense of liberalism,
ended up rejecting its own essence, i.e., the respect to fundamental free-
doms of expression and self-government.
Is the world moving toward a situation in which the very pillars of inter-
national law will be destroyed? If we assume it, what will emerge from the
rubble? A world controlled by the masses? What will prevail: Khan’s glo-
bal government, Bull’s neo-medievalism or Reisman’s and Slaughter’s il-
liberal liberalism? Could international law, which so bravely resisted sev-
eral ‘hot’ wars and a cold war, be destroyed by the so sought-after and
dreamt-of widespread democracy and cooperation between States?
During our research, we have demonstrated that international law has in-
deed been changing to accommodate new legitimated actors that were not
conceivable under positivism. The first, classical one is the individual; the
second, contemporary ones are the NGOs. The individual is the origin and
also the final addressee of law. He is at the origin, because laws are made
by individuals acting on behalf of other individuals in abstract structures;
he is at the end, since all laws aim at regulating the individual or collective
behavior of every human being, endeavoring to ensure a peaceful exis-
tence. This rather obvious circularity had not been acknowledged by inter-
national law, which, left in the hands of positivists, had conceived of a
model in which individuals and private persons were matters falling within
the control of the States, which possessed absolute competence to regulate
their lives without the interference of other States. Considering that the
world was divided into several States, international law acted as the
‘grease’ used to reduce the friction between the world’s ‘tectonic plates’.
In this model, only diplomats and soldiers were visible.
However, as we have already mentioned, the positivists failed to ac-
knowledge the emergence of democracy in the West and, arguably, the im-
pact that industrialization and the massive movement of people to urban
settings had on their access to information and, also, the expansion of their
cognitive capacities, proportional to their increasingly universal access to
education. Once men acquire self-consciousness, they tend to reject oppres-
sion. One cannot forget that the more educated an individual is, the more
claims he makes and the more things he demands. This situation was
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acknowledged, in a certain way, by Ortega y Gasset when he affirmed that
‘minorities are individual or groups of individuals especially qualified
[and] the masses are the collection of people not specially qualified.’6
During the 20th century, the States’ concerns steadily shifted from deter-
rence to cooperation, moreover after the end of the Cold War. Paralleling
this cooperative tendency, the individual emerged as a subject of law pos-
sessing rights and duties under international law. In a certain way, the posi-
tivist theory, which had always denied such a possibility, led to its emer-
gence when, having pushed to one extreme by totalitarian States, it col-
lapsed under the heavy toll of the massacres of human beings. Certainly, if
the 20th century had experienced a less severe form of positivism, the cur-
rent situation would be different. Hence we must be careful, when defend-
ing the ideas of liberalism and democracy, to act more like missionaries
than like soldiers.
Nonetheless, the individual was at the center of the political theories that
conceived the State before Hegel and positivism. Under the contractarian-
ism of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, the individuals were the origi-
nal bearers of the power to govern themselves, which was passed on to the
sovereign, either under a purely interest-base –as ascertained by Hobbes –
or under moral and right concerns, as supported by Locke, Rousseau and
Kant. As also affirmed by Grotius, people wanted to live peacefully and
possessed the right to enjoy the common things. After the interlude of the
19th century, the individual re-emerged, but now in a different condition:
the social contract was no longer a complete metaphor: it could be read
hidden in laws ensuring fundamental rights and freedoms as well as obliga-
tions of the States toward their citizens; it could be understood as embo-
died in the States’ democratic constitutions. Idealism had somehow found
its way into the legal system.
Lauterpacht, for instance, was the forerunner in acknowledging the
emergence of international human rights and freedoms, and, particularly, of
the international legal personality of individuals when, joining the prepara-
tory works for the Nuremberg Tribunal, he contributed to the recognition
that individuals possessed duties (and rights) under international law. As a
neo-Grotian, his conception of international law was deeply embedded in
natural law and in the conviction that men desired to live peacefully in so-
ciety. But, as a Jew who had fled from the Nazis and had seen the atroci-
ties of the War, his idealism had to cope with the hard realism of the peri-
od. Therefore, while recognizing that the individual was the original sub-
ject of law, he rationally supported the conception that States had to act,
hence joining mainstream international law, though representing their citi-
zens because the international norm had to be regarded ‘in the final in-
stance [as] structured towards the realization of respect for the rights and
interests of human beings.’7 States, then, were not Authors, bodies with
their own souls, but Actors.
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The atrocities of totalitarianism also affected the understanding of the
place of the individual in political science. Hannah Arendt, for example,
dedicated considerable efforts towards demystifying the mighty-State. In
her first major work, On Totalitarianism (1951), she insisted that Nazism
and Stalinism, which were built on an ideological appeal to the masses, in-
deed denied the ‘humanity’ of individuals and destroyed the public realm
as a space of liberty and freedom. With individuality lost indistinguishably
in a mass of mediocrity, terror could be implanted with the massive killings
of degenerated races or opponents of bourgeoisie. She supported that totali-
tarianism was the outcome of a series of social pathologies that had de-le-
gitimated political institutions and atrophied the principles of citizenship
and pluralist participation in deliberative consensus, which constituted the
core of democracy. It is a timeless truth that once bureaucracies, even law-
fully, deny the participation of individuals in the public realm, they weaken
their legitimacy and put democracy in jeopardy.
In her following major work, The Human Condition (1958), Hannah
Arendt continued her journey in reasserting politics as a valuable and ef-
fective realm of human action, hence capable of distinguishing it from any
other forms of animal life. While Labor, performed by ‘unfree’ animal la-
borans, was related to the relentless activities required to supply the needs
of the natural and biological dimensions of life, Work, performed by the
Homo Faber, possessed an inherent distinctly humane character, because it
was connected to the construction of both physical (buildings, for instance)
and cultural (law) walls separating the human realm from that of nature
and providing a ‘common world’ of public institutions and spaces for the
unfolding of human life in a political community. It follows that even in a
society said (considered) liberal and capitalist, where individuals seek af-
fluence (as apparently occurs in the one we live in today), the animal la-
borans may threaten the homo faber, because the focus shifts from the lat-
ter’s view of a permanent common world to the former’s need of consump-
tion of perishable ‘must-have’ goods, which cannot ensure an enduring
public and shared environment for our existence. So liberalism may con-
ceal a trap to men in drawing their attention and efforts only towards the
fulfillment of their basic, though rising consumer needs. By doing so, men
tend to alienate themselves from political life and end up losing their free-
dom. To avoid this, men must depart from the Work done by the homo fa-
ber and Act in a political community, being such Action necessary to
achieve plurality, which is ‘specifically the condition - not only the condi-
tio sine qua non, but moreover the conditio per quam - of all political life'.
Straightforwardly, for Hannah Arendt, participation in public affairs is an
intrinsically humane condition and a secure barrier against totalitarianism,
whatever the form or the mermaid’s chant that it performs. But, how will
men be able to exercise their pluralist humane condition in the international
realm?
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As seen in Chapter 5, the general principles of law constitute a concrete
manifestation of the idea of Natural Law in contemporary international
law, which, in turn, embeds an innate humane condition of self-governing.
The right of individuals’ participation in the political sphere was recog-
nized by the UN Charter (1945), which established the principle of self-de-
termination of people and put an end to colonialism, and in the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (1966). These two
hard law commandments did not actually create the right, since ‘States are
not capable of creating human rights by law or by convention; they can
only confirm their existence and give them protection’, because those
rights had always existed together with the human being, ‘independently
of, and before, the State’.8 If, for Hannah Arendt, as well as Grotius, men
are political animals in an Aristotelian sense, international law has also ac-
knowledged this condition in the aforementioned major conventions. The
philosophical construction, hence, acquired a material body in the interna-
tional system.
But, in any legal system, possessing rights necessarily implies in assum-
ing that the bearer of those rights is a subject of law, i.e., that he or she
possesses a legal personality. If the legal system rejects the subjectivity of
the bearer of the rights, it actually denies the existence of any right at all,
and, hence, such a system could be regarded as totalitarian in relation to
that individual, who no longer stands as a human being, but rather passes
into the realm of things. Since immemorial times, law has used the subject/
object dichotomy to legitimate the master/servant relation or that of owner/
possessed and deny fundamental rights.9 If individuals possess innate
rights to participate in the public sphere and such rights are recognized by
highly supported treaty law, then those rights must be raised to State prac-
tices at the international level. Such a claim is necessarily a truism if we
consider the inherent and always proclaimed characteristic of international
law, which, historically, does not look vertically, downward at the States,
but horizontally, between the States. Hence, denying the horizontal inter-
state character of any rights ensured by international law is denying the
own coherence of the system.
Considering that, as discussed in Chapter 6, individuals possess an origi-
nal international legal personality and that, according to the above men-
tioned treaties they are entitled to fundamental rights under international
law, it is important to appraise to what extent those rights can be exercised
in a legitimate, rational and effective manner in a system originally con-
ceived to have few interacting parties.
The emergence of intergovernmental organizations, notably in the sec-
ond half of the last century, has demonstrated that international law is cap-
able of accommodating new actors and procedures in a productive manner.
As we have studied and is widely acknowledged, States shifted their em-
phasis from bilateral contractual arrangements towards bureaucracy-like
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structures, exporting to the international level the same model that they
had successfully implemented within their domestic spheres, which, in de-
mocratic regimes, comprehends a wide array of channels of dialogue with
individuals and civil society at large that goes far beyond the narrow limits
of parliament, neither jeopardizing (in fact, enhancing) the effectiveness
and legitimacy of the States nor transferring the decision-making power.
These broad dialogue arrangements have the purpose of increasing the
State’s responsiveness to the needs, interests and expectations of the citi-
zens, ensuring the necessary pluralism in democracy. Given that some stu-
dies suggest that democratic States tend not to make war against other de-
mocratic States, it appears that some connection can be established be-
tween pluralism and peace.
Pluralism is present in the international system supported in various
long-established legal doctrines. From a State-centric perspective, the first
one is equality between States - whether giants or dwarfs, as Kant said. If
all States are equal under international law, then they possess legal condi-
tions to stand at the same level to formulate the destinies of the interna-
tional community, even though realists, such as De Visscher, relying on the
foot-print theory, support that some are more equal than others, and passio-
nate idealists, such as Reisman and Anne-Maria Slaughter, support that
they are equal only if they have a democratic pedigree. The second one is
the decision by vote in the intergovernmental organization’s bodies and the
customary quest for consensus in multilateral treaty making. Thirdly, one
could argue that pluralism is ensured by the criteria adopted by the UN
Charter for admission of its members, which do not impose any restrictions
whatsoever on grounds of political or social ideology or form of govern-
ment. Finally, given that resorting to war was outlawed by the Charter, ex-
cept in situations of legitimate self-defense, arguably pluralism would not
be threatened by the overwhelming military power of one or more States.
However, pluralism is admitted by the Charter from yet another perspec-
tive, for it ensured not only pluralism between States, but also beyond
States, when it acknowledged that individuals could interact with the
United Nations through non-governmental organizations. By doing so, the
Charter, aligned with the respect of human rights of individuals and the
right to self-determination of collectivities of individuals (the nations) that
constituted the core of its soul, recognized that that right could be exer-
cised, but making concessions to rationality and effectiveness, established
that this would be done through a new kind of organization established by
the individuals, coining, for the first time in a legal document, the expres-
sion ‘non-governmental organization’. When individuals were to act in a
broader collective perspective, i.e., as a nation, they would do so through
governmental organizations (the States); when they were to act in another
form, they would do so through non-governmental organizations. Pluralism
may also be acknowledged from a universal perspective: since nations (and
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States) are deeply enrooted in their own cultural background, therefore
lacking (inter)nationality, the United Nations, having universal aims, had
to welcome a different perspective of interaction with individuals from sev-
eral countries, for which the international NGOs appeared to be a reason-
able solution.
But, as we suggested above, some connection may be established be-
tween pluralism and peace. Hence, it is important to bear in mind that
peace, as affirmed by Grotius, is respect for rights and, as enshrined in the
UN Charter, is the purpose of the organization that congregates peace-lov-
ing countries. So, enhancing pluralism is a key element towards fostering
the achievement of the main goal of the United Nations and all its specia-
lized agencies, funds and programmes, which, as we have affirmed else-
where, are in charge of specific elements of the overall idea of peace as re-
spect for rights.
But how could the UN enhance pluralism if virtually all States are al-
ready its members and the UN is not inclined to sponsor their dismember-
ment? The answer appears to be given by the Charter: through interaction
with international NGOs. However, such interaction demands an answer to
a subjacent question: Should NGOs be regarded as subjects of international
law?
NGOs are subjects of law to the same extent that Intergovernmental
Organizations are, because they were created by legitimate subjects of in-
ternational law under a typical principal-agent relationship as rational-legal
bodies entrusted with certain functions, which, with the attendant duties
and responsibilities, were clothed by its constituencies ‘with the compe-
tence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged’.10 It
follows that, like intergovernmental organizations, international NGOs do
not compete with the States. They are bureaucracies established by formal
arrangements to perform a same type of issue-oriented task.
The recognition of the NGOs’ legal personality can be observed in sev-
eral formal sources of law, notably treaties and customary international
law, addressed at length in the first chapters of this essay. A noteworthy as-
pect of the outcome of our research is the overwhelming evidence that this
legal personality has been fully acknowledged by acts of States. In Chapter
2, we saw that there are several hard law and soft law agreements dealing
with the relationship between States and international NGOs, which recog-
nized NGOs to have locus standi before international courts and quasi-ju-
dicial bodies, as appraised in the subsequent chapter. In Chapter 4, we saw
that there is strong evidence that NGOs have acquired certain rights under
international customary law, supported in constant, extensive and virtually
uniform settled practice accepted as law by those parties whose interests
are specially affected, without persistent objection. The effectiveness of the
enhancement of plurality and the respect of rights with the participation of
international NGOs in the UN system is remarkably perceived, for
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instance, in the recurring struggles in the admission of new NGOs with
consultative status before the ECOSOC, as addressed in Chapter 2 (item
2.1.2) and in the submission of amicus briefs before judicial and quasi-ju-
dicial bodies, studied in Chapter 3. From a less contentious perspective, it
is widely acknowledged that the participation of NGOs in UN convened
Conferences ‘reached unprecedented levels and led to an important break-
through in the perception by UN officials and member-states alike of the
role of NGOs’, which are ‘no longer seen only as disseminators of infor-
mation, but as shapers of policy and indispensable bridges between the
general public and the intergovernmental processes’.11 In sum, NGOs con-
stitute a remarkable contribution to pluralism at the international level and,
even more importantly, a fundamental gust of fresh air in the bureaucracy
of the UN system.
As we have stated and is also widely known, bureaucrats are not elected.
They do not occupy their chair based on a democratic rotation model;
rather, they usually maintain their position until their retirement under gen-
erous pension schemes. Hence, they lack what Thomas Franck called a
‘democratic pedigree’. Governments come and go and bureaucrats are
hardly ever removed, because they have the right to stay there. Sometimes
they bend to the wind like stalks of bamboo, but more often they remain
as steady as centenary oaks. If bureaucracies are fundamental for the stabi-
lity of the rational-legal structure of the States and the Intergovernmental
Organizations, they also represent a risk of the negation of the public
sphere, conceived as such as a locus in which individuals interact.
So, it appears to be important, indeed critical, for the sake of democracy
in general, and pluralism in particular, that intergovernmental organizations
become more accountable for their achievements and more permeable to
the participation of individuals, acting through NGOs. International law
has, in Arendtian terms, already Worked. Action is, now, necessary to en-
sure that the humane condition – the core of the Charter – will be pre-
served and that in the future, men will not find themselves in the nightmare
of global proportions suggested by D’Amato and appraised in the
Introduction.
How?
This is no easy task, but it is feasible.
Firstly, the transformation of humankind into a mass of mediocre and
indistinguishable individuals in the eyes of international bureaucrats must
be avoided. For that purpose, and to enhance their legitimacy, the intergo-
vernmental organizations must establish effective broad fora of discussion
in which their bureaucrats engage in continuous discussion procedures with
international NGOs and State representatives to establish, monitor, ap-
praise, adjust and make public the policies and programs of the organiza-
tion, under the principles of effective notice, adequate information, proper
procedures, and appropriate taking into account of the outcome of public
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participation, already established by the Aarhus Convention. Similarly, the
judicial and quasi judicial bodies, in their search for the truth and relevant
facts to deliver a judicious decision, must be prepared to accept informa-
tion provided by international NGOs relevant to the case in analysis.
Secondly, to ensure the necessary legitimacy, plurality as well as the in-
ternationality of the debates, renewed qualified criteria for granting consul-
tative status to international NGOs must be adopted. For such a purpose,
we suggest that international non-governmental organizations should be af-
firmatively defined as those non-profit legal entities, voluntarily estab-
lished by citizens or associations of citizens with residence in at least five
countries, that are independent from government and political groups that
seek political power, whose transnational aims and peaceful operations
have international utility and are in conformity with the spirit, purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
Acknowledging that NGOs represent the form of participation of indivi-
duals in the intergovernmental organizations and that individuals, as well
as the international NGOs constituted for such a purpose, are subjects of
international law, criteria similar to those adopted by the admission of
member-states to the UN must be implemented in regard to NGOs.
However, considering that the multiplicity of international NGOs surpasses
by far the number of States, the decision regarding admission must shift
from approval to rejection, which, in any case has to be justified by the
voting State and made widely public.
Assuming that conflicts of interest may arise and that anyone dealing
with public concerns must be held accountable for their acts and decisions,
necessary checks and balances and appropriate incentives to good govern-
ance must be established. We can foresee, for instance, from a ‘means’ per-
spective: the prohibition of any NGO receiving funds from the UN or any
intergovernmental organization in which it has been accredited; adoption
of the same criteria for transparency of reports and financial statements es-
tablished, from time to time, to the UN; establishment of whistleblower
and conflict of interest policies; and adoption of the same accounting stan-
dards. From an ‘ends’ perspective, reports must focus on the achievement
of the ends defined in the statutes of the concerned organization according
to determined objective criteria, comparing, whenever possible, the goals
with the achievements.
Thirdly, given that transparency is not forbidden by international law or
the constitutive acts of any of the intergovernmental organizations, some
procedures can be established within the decision-making capacities of the
governing bodies of the considered organization. Considering the technol-
ogy available, real-time transmission and interaction should be pursued, as
well as on-line user-friendly information sharing.
Fourthly, appraising the effectiveness and coherence of performance is
essential. For that purpose, reports must be completely reoriented in order
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to make the intergovernmental organizations accountable for their past and
future actions and decisions, for their planning, and for the verified out-
come. The measurement of their performance has two defined parameters:
the statutory objective of the concerned organization or the purposes of the
convention, and the budgetary considerations.
International NGOs, together with States, can make intergovernmental or-
ganizations more pluralist and ends-oriented. NGOs do not represent na-
tions, as do States; they represent individuals exercising their political and
participatory rights in the international sphere. When States realized that
the world’s challenges could not be dealt with on an independent basis and
that cooperation was necessary, a new opportunity for development and
peace became feasible. Given that States are lasting structures established
in a uniform way across the planet, it does not seem probable that neo-
medievalism or free states will flourish, because this would necessarily im-
ply in the existence of supra-state structures with a power of their own,
which does not appear foreseeable in the future. Sovereignty has proven to
be a malleable concept that has managed to keep its strength since the
Peace of Westphalia. However, it can be threatened by its very own liberal
origins in a world with apparently uniform political regimens. Liberal
Democracy cannot be a religion that transforms missionaries into soldiers,
or, even worse, into crusaders. Such an approach backfired in the past and
it cannot succeed in the future. The West cannot march eastward dissemi-
nating its ‘religion’ because Democracy presupposes plurality; and
Freedom and Order are its germane fundamental values in an international
system conceived to avoid ‘earthquakes’ caused by ‘tectonic states’. As we
have already said, the centrality that ‘Common Rights’ has in Grotius’
work can’t go unnoticed. Handling those rights in the ‘Common World’ of
Hannah Arendt requires plurality and this plurality can be achieved in
many forms, moreover making international bureaucracy more accountable
for its ends-oriented achievements, in which our well-known NGOs can
play an important and legitimate role. After all, the ‘the ability of citizens
to control their own lives, by virtue of their rights as human beings, is the
most critical and fundamental human concern at the dawn of the 21st
century’.12
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SUMMARY IN DUTCH
NGO’S: WETTIGE SUBJECTEN VAN INTERNATIONAAL RECHT
In ons oeuvre verdedigen wij het standpunt dat het pluralisme is toegestaan
door het Handvest der Verenigde Naties, niet slechts tussen de Staten, maar
verder dan deze, omdat het Handvest heeft erkend dat individuen in
contact zouden kunnen treden met de Verenigde Naties, niet alleen door
middel van de gouvernementele organisaties, maar ook door middel van
particuliere organisaties.
NGO’s zijn kinderen van onze tijd. Als de electorale democratie de over-
heersende regeringsvorm is in de wereld en de mensen steeds meer deel
uitmaken van de publieke sfeer, lijkt het ons ook onbetwistbaar dat het
recht van de volkeren op zelfbeschikking zich veel verder heeft uitgebreid
dan het recht op onafhankelijkheid van het koloniale systeem, om het recht
op democratie te omvatten.
Erkennend dat individuen subjecten zijn van internationaal recht, hierbij
uitgaande van de gevestigde hedendaagse doctrine, betogen wij dat,
evenals de multilaterale organen juridische internationale persoonlijkheid
hebben afgeleid van hun leden, de Staten, de NGO’s een soortgelijke wet-
telijke status hebben verworven, uitgaande van de individuen.
Wij zijn ons bewust dat onze stelling vernieuwend is, en daarom trachten
wij onze argumentering te ondersteunen met als uitgangspunt de studie van
de NGO’s ten opzichte van ieder der bronnen van internationaal recht,
zoals opgesomd in artikel 38 van het statuut van het Internationale Hof van
Justitie. Bij onze analyse stelden wij vast dat de positivistische theorie dat
het internationale recht een wettelijk reguleringssysteem is van de verhoud-
ing tussen Staten en dat het aldus nimmer andere rechtssubjecten zou toe-
staan, niet langer houdbaar is.
Zoals we zullen zien hebben NGO’s bepaalde rechten in de sfeer van het
Internationale Recht, erkend door verdragen en ook door talloze andere
multilaterale handelingen. De constante, extensieve en feitelijk uniforme
geconsolideerde praktijk van de Staten en hun relatie met NGO’s, als regel
aanvaard door allen die daardoor speciaal geraakt worden, zonder enig be-
stendig bezwaar, bewijst dat het internationaal gewoonterecht ook hun
rechten erkent. Op dezelfde wijze hebben NGO’s bepaalde rechten bij de
internationale hoven, ook al is het niet uniform; zij kunnen bij enkele daar-
van amicus curie zaken voorleggen, alsook bij andere locus standi staande
houden. De situatie van de NGO’s vanuit het oogpunt van de algemene be-
ginselen van het internationale recht leidde ons naar het onderzoek van de
ontwikkeling van die beginselen in de beslissingen van het Internationale
Hof van Justitie, waar wij een progressieve uitbreiding aantroffen van de
erkenning van humanitaire beginselen en individuele rechten en ook in een
andere dimensie, de markante verruiming van het beginsel van de zelf-
beschikking van de volkeren, die heden ten dage geïnterpreteerd wordt als
recht op deelneming aan publieke aangelegenheden en, waarom het niet te
zeggen, als recht op democratie. De situatie van de NGO’s in de oeuvres
van de grote juristen van internationaal recht vereiste nadruk op het onder-
zoek van de situatie van het individu als subject van internationaal recht.
Het onderzoek van de theorieën over contractualisme betreffende de vor-
ming van de Staat in een hedendaagse zeer democratische ambiance gaf
ons de mogelijkheid te stellen dat het noodzakelijk is een nieuw bestand
toe te voegen aan het model ontworpen door Thomas Franck over
Democratisch Bestuur, door middel van mechanismen van maatschappe-
lijke deelneming in bureaucratische structuren die de multilaterale organen
bewerkstelligen, welke, het dient aangetekend te worden, exponentieel
groeien in aantal en macht, sinds de oprichting van de Verenigde Naties.
Voor deze uitdaging lijken ons de NGO’s een redelijke en legitieme
oplossing.
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SUMMARY IN FRENCH
ONGs: SUJET LE´GITIME EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL
Dans notre traité, nous soutenons que le pluralisme est admis par la Charte
des Nations Unies non seulement entre les États, mais hors d’eux, puisque
la Charte reconnaît que les personnes puissent interagir avec les Nations
Unies non seulement au moyen d’organismes gouvernamentaux, mais aussi
au moyen d’organisations non-gouvernementales.
Les ONGs sont les enfants de notre époque. Si la démocratie électorale est
bien la forme prédominante de gouvernement dans le monde et si les ci-
toyens participent toujours plus aux affaires publiques, il nous paraît tout
aussi indubitable que le droit des peuples à l’auto-détermination s’est
étendu bien au-delà du droit à l’indépendance du régime colonial, afin
d’englober le droit à la démocratie.
Reconnaîssant, à partir de la doctrine contemporaine, que les individus sont
assujettis au droit international, nous soutenons que de même que les orga-
nismes multilatéraux possèdent une personnalité juridique internationale
dérivée de leurs associés les États, les ONGs ont, à partir des individus,
aquis un statut légal similaire.
Nous avons conscience que notre thèse est novatrice, et pour cette raison
recherchons étayer notre argumentaire à partir de l’étude de la situation des
ONGs au regard de chacune des sources du droit international, telles
qu’énumérées dans l’article 38 des statuts de la Cour Internationale de
Justice. Au cours de notre analyse, nous mettons en exergue que la théorie
positiviste qui affirme que le droit international est un système légal de
régulation des rapports entre États n’est plus valable car elle n’admet ja-
mais d’autres sujets de droit.
Comme nous le verrons, les ONGs détiennent certains droits dans le cadre
du Droit International, reconnus par des traités, également par d’innom-
brables autres actes multilatéraux. La pratique constante, uniforme et
répandue des États dans leur rapports aux ONGs accepte comme règle pour
quelconque partie qui est spécialement concernée, sans l’ombre d’une ob-
jection, l’évidence que le droit coutumier international leur a également re-
connu des droits. De la même manière, les ONGs détiennent certains droits
par devant les tribunaux internationaux, même de façon non uniforme,
pouvant se présenter comme amicus curie en certains d’entre eux et
jusqu’à jouir de locus standi devant d’autres. La situation des ONGs sous
l’angle des principes généraux du droit international nous a conduit à
l’analyse de l’évolution de ces principes dans les décisions de la Cour
Internationale de Justice, où nous avons rencontré une expansion progres-
sive de la reconnaissance de principes humanitaires et de droits individuels
ainsi que, dans une autre échelle, l’élargissement marquant du principe de
l’auto-détermination des peuples qui est interprété aujourd’hui comme un
droit de participation aux sujets publics et, pourquoi ne pas l’affirmer,
comme un droit à la démocratie. La situation des ONGs dans les travaux
des grands juristes du droit international a demandé à s’attacher à l’analyse
de la situation de l’individu en tant que sujet du droit international.
L’analyse des théories de contrats comme formation de l’État dans une am-
biance contemporaine amplement démocratique nous a permis d’affirmer
qu’il était nécessaire d’ajouter un nouveau bloc au modèle conçu par
Thomas Franck sur la Gouvernance Démocratique, par des mécanismes de
participation civile au sein des structures bureaucratiques qui régissent les
organismes multilatéraux, lesquels, on le voit, croissent de manière expo-
nentielle, en nombre et pouvoir, depuis la création des Nations Unies. Pour
répondre à ce défi, les ONGs nous semblent être une solution raisonnable
et légitime.
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SUMMARY IN GERMAN
NROn: BERECHTIGTES VO¨LKERRECHTSSUBJEKTE
In unserer Arbeit stellen wir fest, daß der Pluralismus im Rahmen der VN
Karte nicht nur zwischen den Staaten erlaubt ist, sondern darüber hinaus,
weil die Karte anerkannte, daß Personen mit den Vereinten Nationen nicht
nur durch staatliche Organisationen interagieren konnte, aber auch von
Nicht-Regierungs-Organisationen.
NGOs sind Töchter unserer Zeit. Wenn die Wahlkreise Demokratie die vor-
herrschende Form der Regierung in der Welt ist und die Menschen sich die
Öffentlichkeit zunehmen, scheint es uns auch klar, daß das Recht der
Völker auf Selbstbestimmung weit über das Recht auf Unabhängigkeit von
der Kolonialherrschaftm erweitert hat, um das Recht auf Demokratie zu
verstehen.
In dem Erkenntnis, von etablierten zeitgenössischen Lehre, daß die
Menschen Subjekte des Völkerrechts sind, argumentieren wir daß, sowie
multilateralen Organisationen internationale Rechtspersönlichkeit von ihren
Mitgliedern haben, ergibt es sich daß die NROn einen ähnlichen rechtli-
chen Status von Einzelpersonen erwerben.
Wir sind bewusst, daß unsere Arbeit innovativ ist, und daher versuchen
wir unsere Argumente aus den Studien der NROs gegen jede der Quellen
des Völkerrechts zu unterstützen, wie im Artikel 38 des Statuts des
Internationalen Gerichtshofs. Während unserer Analyse haben wir festge-
stellt daß die positivistische Theorie, in der das internationelle Völkerrecht
ein Rechtssystem des Verhältnis zwischen den Staaten ist, nicht mehr
unterstüzbar ist und deswegen würden andere Rechtssubjekte niemals
zugegeben.
Wie man sehen wird, NROn haben bestimmte Rechte in dem Völkerrecht,
durch Verträge anerkannt und auch von zahlreichen anderen multilateralen
Rechtsakten. Die ständige, umfassende und praktisch einheitliche konsoli-
dierte Praxis der Staaten in ihre Beziehungen zu den NROn, in der Regel
anerkannt durch alle diejenigen die besonders betroffen sind, ohne anhal-
tende Einwand, Beweise dafür daß das Völkergewohnheitsrecht auch ihre
Rechte anerkannt. Ebenso halten NRO bestimmte Rechte vor internationa-
len Gerichten, wenn auch in einer uneinheitlicher Weise und kann amicus
curie in einige von ihnen zu nehmen und locus standi vor anderen halten.
Die Situation der NROn aus der Perspektive der allgemeinen Grundsätze
des Völkerrechts, führte uns auf die Analyse diese Grundsätze in den
Entscheidungen des Internationalen Gerichtshofs, Teil einen schrittweiser
Ausbau der Anerkennung der humanitären Grundsätze und die Rechte des
Einzelnen, aber auch in einer anderer Größe, eine beeindruckende
Ausweitung des Prinzips der Selbstbestimmung der Völker, die heute als
Recht auf Teilnahme an öffentlichen Angelegenheiten interpretiert ist und
für diese Angelegenheit, wie ein Recht auf Demokratie. Die Situation der
NROn in den Werken des großen Juristen des Völkerrechts erforderte
Schwerpunkt auf der Analyse der einzelnen als Subjekt des Völkerrechts.
Die Analyse der vertragstheoretischen Theorien der Staatsbildung in einer
weit demokratische moderne Stimmung lässt uns sagen, daß ein neuer
Block um das Modell von Thomas Franck entwickelt über die demokra-
tische Governance hinzufügen muss, durch Beteiligung Mechanismen der
Bürger an bürokratischen Strukturen die die multilateralen Organisationen
treiben, die exponentiell an Zahl und Kraft wachsen seit der Gründung der
Vereinten Nationen. Für diese Aufgabe, scheinen uns NROn eine
vernünftige und legitime Lösung zu sein.
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SUMMARY IN PORTUGUESE
ONGS: LEGI´TIMOS SUJEITOS DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL
Em nossa obra, sustentamos que a pluralismo é admitido pela Carta das
Nações Unidas não apenas entre os Estados, mas além deles, porque a
Carta reconheceu que indivíduos poderiam interagir com as Nações Unidas
não apenas por meio de organizações governamentais, mas também por
organizações não-governamentais.
ONGs são filhas de nosso tempo. Se a democracia eleitoral é a forma pre-
dominante de governo no mundo e as pessoas cada vez mais participam da
esfera pública, parece-nos também inquestionável que o direito dos povos
à autodeterminação expandiu-se muito além do direito à independência do
regime colonial, para compreender o direito à democracia.
Reconhecendo, a partir de estabelecida doutrina contemporânea, que
indivíduos são sujeitos de direito internacional, argumentamos que, assim
como os organismos multilaterais têm personalidade jurídica internacional
derivada de seus associados, os Estados, as ONGs adquiriram semelhante
status legal, a partir dos indivíduos.
Estamos conscientes que nossa tese é inovadora, e, por isso, buscamos su-
portar nosso argumento a partir do estudo da situação das ONGs ante cada
uma das fontes do direito internacional, tal como listadas no artigo 38 do
estatuto da Corte Internacional de Justiça. Ao longo de nossa análise, iden-
tificamos que não mais se sustenta a teoria positivista de que o direito in-
ternacional é um sistema legal de regulação do relacionamento entre
Estados e que, assim, jamais admitiria outros sujeitos de direito.
Como veremos, ONGs detém certos direitos no âmbito do Direito
Internacional, reconhecidos por tratados e, também, por inúmeros outros
atos multilaterais. A constante, extensiva e virtualmente uniforme prática
consolidada dos Estados em sua relação com ONGs, aceita como regra por
todos aqueles que sejam especialmente afetados, sem qualquer persistente
objeção, evidencia que o direito costumeiro internacional também lhes re-
conheceu direitos. Da mesma forma, ONGs detêm certos direitos antes tri-
bunais internacionais, embora de uma maneira não uniforme, podendo
apresentar amicus curie em alguns deles e até deter locus standi perante
outros. A situação das ONGs sob a ótica dos princípios gerais do direito
internacional, nos levou à análise da evolução desses princípios nas
decisões da Corte Internacional de Justiça, onde encontramos uma
progressiva expansão do reconhecimento de princípios humanitários e dir-
eitos individuais e, também, sob outra dimensão, o marcante alargamento
do principio da autodeterminação dos povos que hoje vem sendo interpre-
tado como direito à participação em assuntos públicos e, por que não dizer,
como direito à democracia. A situação das ONGs nas obras dos grandes
juristas de direito internacional requereu ênfase na análise da situação do
indivíduo como sujeito de direito internacional.
A análise das teorias contratualistas da formação do Estado em um am-
biente contemporâneo amplamente democrático permitiu-nos afirmar que é
necessário adicionar um novo bloco ao modelo concebido por Thomas
Franck sobre Governança Democrática, através de mecanismos de
participação civil nas estruturas burocráticas que operam os organismos
multilaterais, os quais, registre-se, crescem exponencialmente, em número
e poder, desde a criação das Nações Unidas. Para esse desafio, as ONGs
nos parecem uma razoável e legítima solução.
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